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ABSTRACT 
For two decades, Milton Friedman has contended that the monetary 
theory of John Maynard Keynes is highly special, applicable only to 
conditions of deep depression. He continues to cite Keynes' dependence 
on a condition of absolute liquidity preference, commonly called the 
liquidity trap, as the theoretical basis for Keynes' unemployment 
"equilibrium." Friedman believes that Keynes' The General Theory was 
based on this underlying premise, so that its results are correct only 
in this special circumstance. Therefore, Friedman contends that Keynes 
regarded monetary policy as ineffective. Additionally, Friedman 
criticizes all economists in the Keynesian tradition because they adopt 
a narrow "credit" view of monetary policy while his theory is based on a 
broad "monetary" view. 
This study investigates Friedman's charges in reference to Keynes' 
The General Theory, and in the process a study is made of Keynes' and 
Friedman's monetary theories. The result is a presentation of the 
fundamental differences of the two monetary theories. Additionally, 
Keynes' monetary policy prescriptions from The General Theory are 
discussed to investigate further any possible basis for Friedman's 
criticisms. 
The conclusions of the study are: that Friedman is incorrect in 
his charges that the liquidity trap is the basis for unemployment in 
The General Theory, that Keynes' monetary theory is very similar to 
the one which Friedman espouses, and that Keynes' monetary policy view 
regards changes in the supply of money as a potent tool for maintaining 
a high level of employment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTMODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
This dissertation examines the divergent monetary theories of 
Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes. The major disagreement in 
macroeconomics concerns the effectiveness, durability and desirability 
of monetary and fiscal policy. The basis for this divergence lies 
beneath the empirical tests and the policy prescriptions, and consists 
of differences in theoretical structure, including assumptions about the 
behavior of agents and varying degrees of inclusion of institutional 
factors. 
Friedman has criticized Keynes' monetary theory and Keynes' theory 
of the determination of real variables (output and employment). In 
particular, Friedman has made the following three charges (1970, p. 214; 
1972, p. 943; 1982, pp. 41-42): (1) the key feature of Keynes' monetary 
theory is the "special twist" of absolute liquidity preference ( the 
liquidity trap); (2) Keynes' "key proposition" that long-run full 
employment equilibrium may not exist even if all prices are fiexible 
relies on the existence of absolute liquidity preference; and (3) 
Keynes' approach of regarding prices as an institutional datum for the 
purpose of analyzing short-run employment fluctuations also relies on 
absolute liquidity preference. Friedman has concluded that, due to 
these three features, Keynes"• shunted the car of economic science 
onto a wrong line (1982 I P• 621) • 
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A. Objectives and Method of Analysis 
The chief objective of this study is to address and evaluate 
Friedman's criticisms of Keynes as summarized in the above three 
propositions. To address these issues, however, it is necessary to 
state the objectives in a somewhat different form: (1) To determine 
whether the liquidity trap is logically implied by Keynes' monetary 
theory. (2) To compare Keynes' and Friedman.' s monetary theories with 
respect to (a) the range of assets in wealth-holders' portfolios 
affected by changes in the quantity of money and (b) the monetary 
transmission process--that is, the process by which a change in the 
quantity of money affects other variables including real variables such 
as output and employment. (3) To determine whether Keynes believed 
monetary policy to be ineffective, as Friedman has charged. Monetary 
policy is defined as changes in the quantity of money brought about by 
actions of the central bank. 
The method of study is empirical, in the sense that the relevant 
data are the writings of the two economists. In particular, the method 
involves tracing the implications of the formal theories of Keynes and 
Friedman to their logical conclusions, without regard to "asides" and 
peripheral observations, no matter how insightful they may be. For as 
Friedman (1972, pp. 918, 935) has noted, what an economist says and what 
his formal theory logically implies may be quite different. 
B. The Liquidity Trap 
One aspect of the controversy concerns the role of the liquidity 
trap as a necessary condition for the non-market clearing outcome of 
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Keynes' The General Theory. Friedman charges that logically the 
unemployment outcome that Keynes claims to exist cannot do so without 
the aid of rigidities (1982, p. 42), and in both the short run and the 
long run, the liquidity trap is the basis for Keynes' theory. 
The liquidity trap is a perfectly elastic demand for money at 
some rate of interest. If the demand for money is perfectly elastic, 
wealth holders are willing to hold additional money balances that pay no 
interest rather than trade for any asset with a positive yield. 
Normally, wealth holders would be induced to hold additional money only 
if the alternative yields on substitute stores of wealth fell. But in 
the case of absolute liquidity preference, these individuals will keep 
additional money even if other yields remain the same. Therefore, any 
attempt by the central bank to lower interest rates by bidding up prices 
of bonds or other assets will fail if there is a liquidity trap. These 
wealth holders will merely store as "wealth" any additional money that 
the central bank creates. They will not use it to purchase other stores 
of wealth such as bonds or physical assets thus raising their prices and 
lowering their yields. 
Friedman has asserted that Keynes did not recognize the wealth 
effect as an equilibrating force (1968, p. 2; 1982, p. 42) when prices 
are flexible. Thus, even if falling prices do not reduce interest 
rates, real wealth will increase and spending accordingly will rise 
until long-run equilibrium at full employment is restored (see Haberler, 
1941, and Pigou, 1947). 
One might dismiss this criticism of Keynes by Friedman by 
contending that Keynes was, after all, mainly interested in a short-run 
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situation in which prices and wages do not move to clear labor and goods 
markets rather than in a long run in which prices and wages are 
flexible. But Friedman goes further to state that even short run 
disequilibrium in Keynes' theory is a result of the liquidity trap, 
since its existence is "critical" for those propositions that he 
attributes to The General Theory of prices being given for the short 
run. The precise way that the liquidity trap ensures rigid prices must 
be inferred from Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' monetary 
transmission mechaniS1D. To dismiss these charges does not serve the 
goal of illuminating the critical differences in monetary theory. 
Friedman has elicited some response to his charges, especially 
from those who defend Keynes' theoretical structure. Patinkin argues 
that the liquidity trap is "in contrast with Keynes' own statement that 
" it did not exist (1974, p. 130), and was only a "theoretical 
possibility that had not yet been realized" (1976, p. 112). He points 
out that his own interpretation of Keynes in a disequilibrium setting 
frees the theory "from any logical dependence on the existence of a 
'liquidity trap'" (1974, p. 130). Recently Patinkin stated that 11 
the fact that this work does not assume the existence of a liquidity 
trap already appears in macroeconomics textbooks" (1983, p. 48). 
Other economists have expressed similar sentiments about 
Friedman's insistence that the liquidity trap is even an issue. Robert 
E. Hall complains that Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary Trends devotes 
an inordinate share of the volume to "a view that has no serious 
adherents among professional economists. Friedman and Schwartz are 
generals fighting an earlier war (1982, p. 1552). Thomas Mayer 
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agrees that Friedman and Schwartz are "unconvincing" as they attempt to 
persuade the reader that"• Keynes took absolute liquidity 
preference • as the standard case" (1982, p. 1529). 
Leijonhufvud (1968, footnote p. 202) finds that "Keynes explicitly 
rejected the idea that the money-demand function would be perfectly 
interest-inelastic within any range that we would possibly be interested 
in." Hahn states that, "Keynes did not build his revolution on the 
liquidity trap" (1971, p. 59). But, Friedman's question resurfaces: 
what ultimately explains the existence of unemployment that Keynes 
talked about in The General Theory (1936, p. 218)? If Keynes based 
his theory of short-run employment fluctuations on the existence of a 
liquidity trap, as Friedman has charged, how could it be that Keynes 
denied that the liquidity trap had ever existed? If not the liquidity 
trap, the theoretical justification for Keynes' position must be made 
clear. Friedman would have us accept that Keynes did not see his own 
error in this matter. 
Friedman has held this view for a long time, and he presents it at 
every opportunity. In 1956, in his "Restatement" paper, Friedman notes: 
the Keynesian underemployment is based primarily on an assertion 
with the form of [the demand for money]. The demand for money • 
• is infinitely elastic at a "small" positive interest rate. At 
this interest rate, which can be expected to prevail under 
unemployment conditions, changes in the real supply of money, 
whether produced by changes in prices or in the nominal stock of 
money, have no effect on anything (1956, p. 17). 
In a paper published in 1964, Friedman says that under conditions 
of unemployment, people would be indifferent to holding money or bonds 
in Keynes' theory (1969c, p. 70), and in 1966, he says that Keynes 
considered liquidity preference absolute or "approximately so" (1969d, 
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p. 141). Friedman considers the liquidity trap the "key novelty" of 
The General Theory in his 1967 tribute to Henry Simons (1967, p. 7) 
and similarly in 1968 in his presidential address. In his presentation 
of his "Theoretical Framework" in 1970 and the "Comments on the Critics" 
in 1972, he devotes considerable space to and effort in explaining the 
essence of the General Theory as he interprets it. 
In my interpretation of Keynes, I put great emphasis on a highly 
elastic liquidity preference cal ling this his "special twist" and 
a "key element" in his proposition about long-run equilibrium 
(1972, p. 928). 
His great work in 1982, Monetary Trends with Anna Schwartz, 
repeats his contentions that it is indeed a liquidity trap which 
prevents full employment in the long run with flexible wages and prices. 
He goes further to state that a liquidity trap in the short run is what 
"allowed" Keynes to assume the existence of "rigid" wages and prices, 
preventing monetary policy from operating in the short run and 
justifying the neglect of the effects of wage and price changes (1982, 
pp. 41-42). 
Since Friedman has expended so much time and effort in presenting 
his case, it certainly bears investigation, especially since other 
economists do not seem to have considered it worth pursuing. The 
contention requires more than a flat denial or affirmation. It is a 
question which requires delving deeply into the monetary theory of 
Keynes. 
The complexity of Keynes' theory is evident. Some of the 
observations that he makes may be "asides" that clarify or hedge and are 
not really a part of his formal theory, while others may serve as 
elucidators or amplifiers. Friedman warns that we must " ••• distinguish 
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between the logical implications of a theory and the statements about 
observable phenomena • " (1974, p. 143). But, he says that Keynes' 
theory was not describing a "normal" situation but a highly 
idiosyncratic one based on conditions in the Great Depression (1982, p. 
464). An examination of Friedman's interpretation of Keynes will 
disclose how Friedman sees Keynes as having a special theory tempered by 
general asides. 
There are only two possibilities for resolution of this argument 
with respect to the long run: (l) Friedman has not interpreted Keynes'· 
theory correctly and it does not depend on the existence of a liquidity 
trap for long run unemployment equilibrium, or does not claim to have a 
long run unemployment equilibrium with flexible wages and prices; or (2) 
Friedman is correct and Keynes' theory must be ex~mined in light of its 
dependence on the liquidity trap as a basis for long run unemployment 
equilibrium even with flexible wages and prices. Our interest is mainly 
the short run since it is the explanantion of short run fluctuations in 
output and employment with which Keynes was most concerned. 
Similarly, there are only two possibilities for resolution of the 
argument with respect to the short run: (l) Friedman has not 
interpreted Keynes' theory correctly and it does not-depend on the 
existence of a liquidity trap to explain short-run employment 
fluctuations; or (2) Friedman is correct and Keynes' approach of taking 
goods' prices as given to analyze the short-run effects of changes in 
aggregate demand (1936, chapters l - 7) relies on the existence of a 
liquidity trap. If this study finds that Keynes' theory logically 
implies (2), it must be the case that Keynes' theory is applicable only 
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to a very special case, for virtually no economist contends that, as an 
empirical matter, absolute liquidity preference characterizes an actual 
economy. 
C. The Range of Assets and the Transmission Process 
The sucess of monetary policy depends upon the absence of absolute 
liquidity preference or a highly elastic demand for money. If Friedman 
is correct that Keynes relied on absolute liquidity preference, then 
Keynes' monetary transmission mechanism must be shown to demonstrate 
that monetary policy would be unable to lower the rate of interest. 
This would be the case even if flexible wages and prices had ~•used the 
real money supply to increase. Friedman would be ~orrect in asserting 
that Keynes considered monetary policy ineffective. The existence of a 
liquidity trap would prevent an increase in the supply of money from 
lowering the interest rate and affecting aggregate demand. 
The method by which monetary policy may affect real variables 
differs between Friedman and Keynes. Friedman and Schwartz interpret 
the major difference between his theory and the 11Keynesians 11 as the 
range of assets that properly belong in the portfolio (1982, p. 58). 
Assets are important because they are the forms in which persons store 
their wealth, and the transmission process impacts the switching or 
substitution of one asset for another. If, as Friedman and Schwartz 
believe is proper, all goods and financial instruments qualify equally 
as assets, then the transmission process affects virtually all prices of 
goods, services and bonds through substitution (1982, pp. 57-58). New 
money recipients must choose among these forms according to which offers 
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the highest "yield." Prices of currently produced goods are thus 
affected directly by the transmission process, as wealth holders bid up 
prices in their effort to substitute goods for financial assets with 
lowered yields. 
If the transmission process incorporates a narrow range of assets, 
then only financial instruments (money and interest-bearing securities) 
figure into the portfolio substitution process, and a change in the 
quantity of money impacts only their prices. As wealth holders try to 
dispose of their excess money by purchasing securities, prices of all 
remaining financial securities rise and their respective yields fall. 
This fall in yields, then, encourages borrowing for investment and 
consumption spending and thus a rise in effective demand. 
It is clear that the definition of assets is crucial for a theory 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. A broad definition puts 
emphasis on relative price changes, while the narrow definition requires 
only the prices of financial assets to change instead of the prices of 
goods or services. The narrow definition acordingly emphasizes the cost 
of credit as the mechanism whereby money affects aggregate demand. 
Friedman interprets the Keynesians as espousing the narrow 
definition of assets. Our concern in this paper however is with Keynes 
and not with the Keynesians, so the proposition that Keynes himself 
took this view will be examined since this view would be an alternative 
to the broad range of assets or to the liquidity trap. Differences in 
the range of assets is an important issue for the transmission process 
in explaining how a change in the quantity of money is realized in 
different outcomes among the theories. If a narrow range is a hallmark 
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for Keynes' monetary transmission process, then he limited his portfolio 
to bonds and money. If not he may have allowed durable goods as well. 
We do not address here whether or not "Keynesians" have preserved 
Keynes' monetary theory but endeavor to present the actual ■onetary 
theory contained in The General Theory, so that the reader may judge 
the validity of Friedman's complaints against it. 
Friedman and Schwartz take "different assumptions about price" as 
the central distinction in the different transmission mechanisms (1982, 
p. 58). They say that Keynes' followers, in rejecting the liquidity 
trap, admitted flexible interest rates to their theories but retained 
the fixed price assumption of Keynes. The assumption of fixed prices 
forces the narrow transmission channel so that changes in the quantity 
of money affect only bond prices (1982, p. 58). 
The legitimacy of this approach is challenged by Friedman and 
Schwartz who reject the narrow channel and the segregation of the bond 
and goods markets. They see the rate of interest not as a price but as 
a "pure number," a ratio with a temporal dimension (1982, p. 527). It 
relates the "price of services to the value of the source yie.lding those 
services" (1963 1 p. 218). An interest rate is implied in the prices of 
all goods, though not necessarily explicitly stated as it is for bonds 
(1982 1 P• 58). 
There is an inverse relationship of bond interest rates to bond 
prices and the same relationship of the rate of return on goods to the 
prices of goods. Friedman criticizes the removal of this "rate" from 
goods' prices and the special treatment of the bond market as the only 
legitimate vehicle of monetary policy. The isolation of the bond market 
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from the goods market, implied by the narrow channel, is illegitimate 
according to Friedman, and he brings this up as a crucial issue, yet 
Davidson and Tobin, who defend the narrow channel, see no violation of 
economic logic. 
How far may an economist go in segregating markets in 
macroeconomics? ls it legitimate for one to theorize clearing in the 
bond market while excess supply exists in the market for goods? Are 
bond prices and goods prices of the same nature so that we have one 
"asset" price due to substitution? or may they be treated separately? 
Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' theory that the liquidity 
trap causes short run price rigidity differs from his interpretation of 
the Keynesians' theories that rigid prices force the narrow transmission 
channel. Does this mean that he believes that Keynes did not espouse 
the narrow channel? Or does he believe that Keynes' liquidity trap 
completely shut off any monetary effects, so that the range of assets 
became unimportant, the only relevant asset being money? 
There are some economists who do not recognize these different 
transmission processes as significant for explaining different outcomes 
from a change in the supply of money. Harris, in his Monetary 
Economics text, finds that" • monetarists and Keynesian& adopt 
broadly similar portfolio models for analyzing the effects of monetary 
policy" ( 1981, p. 436). Ste in agrees that "Whatever differences there 
are between monetarists and the neo-Keynesians are not due to the nature 
of the transmission mechanism" (1976, p. 8). How is it that Stein and 
Harris, among other economists, do not see this as an issue? Tobin 
sees Friedman's version of the transmission process as supporting 
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Keynesian conclusions: "The puzzle is how Friedman could think 
that his account of the transmission mechanism supports monetarist 
conclusions" (1974, pp. 88-89). But a typical monetarist response from 
Brunner and Meltzer concludes on the contrary that "[t]he difference in 
implications reflects differences in the transmission or adjustment 
process" (1976, p. 98). 
How producers are signalled to increase output is another point of 
contention. Particularly, do agents respond only to relative price 
signals or are there other quantity signals which either replace or 
complement the price signals? This critical issue is cloudy as the 
terms "aggregate demand" used by Friedman and "effective demand" used by 
Keynes may be miles apart. Price signals, which hold center stage in 
eliciting output changes in Friedman's model, seem redundant in 
producing changes in effective demand for Keynes' model. The actual 
role of price changes in Keynes' model is unclear. If prices play an 
insignificant role in Keynes' model, how are changes in demand conveyed 
to producers? 
The implications of the liquidity trap, the relevant range of 
assets, the monetary transmission process, and the characteristics of 
the demand for money are important in the theoretical war between 
Friedman and Keynes, yet their main differences have been underplayed, 
dismissed or ignored in the literature. Friedman's call for 
clarification on these issues has not elicited the response it deserves. 
Since Friedman is undaunted by denials of his charges, this issue 
deserves an examination of the possible relation of the liquidity trap 
to Keynes' monetary theory and his theory of output fluctuations. 
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Friedman's crusade to put Keynes' theory in its proper perspective as a 
"highly special" theory applicable to "idiosyncratic" conditions has had 
an effect on current economic thought. If Friedman is correct, his 
contention should be conclusively proved; if he is incorrect, he should 
be shown his error. Therefore, it is to the uncovering of the 
fundamental propositions in the monetary theories of Friedman and Keynes 
that this dissertation is addressed. Friedman has characterized Keynes 
as regarding monetary policy as ineffective (1982, p. 48). Yet, The 
General Theory is replete with descriptions of exactly how changes in 
the quantity of money may result in output changes. Though Keynes 
qualifies many of his statements and policy prescriptions, the question 
of whether Keynes really disclaimed monetary policy, and if so to what 
degree, is still alive. The issues surrounding Keynes' monetary policy 
center upon the qualifications he presents and whether he meant for 
these to be generally applicable or extraordinary. 
D. Plan of the Study 
To accomplish the task, this study is divided into five remaining 
chapters. Each chapter uses a similar framework for analyzing the 
monetary theory of Friedman and Keynes for purposes of comparison. 
The second chapter examines the monetary theory of Milton Friedman as 
presented in his series of articles and as summarized in his Monetary 
Trends work with A. J. Schwartz. Though he has advanced his theory on 
several levels as it deals with employment, inflation, the monetary 
transmission mechanism, the consumption function or the demand for 
money, in no place has he brought together his entire theory so that 
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the parts form a whole. Although this study focuses primarily on 
monetary theory, it appeals to Friedman's other theories for 
clarification of terms and more detailed descriptions of processes or 
behavior of agents. Friedman's model of a monetary economy is presented 
as to how money influences economic activity and variables. 
The next chapter addresses the criticism leveled by Friedman 
against the "unemployment" outcome of The General Theory. The charges 
are listed and analyzed with reference to both short run fluctuations 
and long run equilibrium. The logic behind these accusations and the 
critical nature of the charges for market clearing are revealed. The 
discussion on the narrow range of assets that Friedman attributes to the 
"Keynesians" is also analyzed. 
The fourth chapter interprets and analyzes ~eynes' monetary theory 
as presented in The General Theory. The analysis parallels the one 
for Friedman above so that the reader may draw comparisons. Keynes' 
model of monetary transmission is specified also. 
Since Friedman says that Keynes considered monetary policy 
"ineffective," the fifth chapter attempts to refute this allegation by 
citations from The General Theory which this writer considers evidence 
to the contrary. Since this section deals with "policy" rather than 
theory, there is an attempt to reconcile the evidence with Keynes' 
theory. 
Finally, the last chapter will put forth major conclusions reached 
by this study. The similarities and differences in the theories will be 
stated, and whatever assumptions required by the theory will be 
specified. Then, an evaluation of Friedman's contentions will be 
14 
offered along with an alternative interpretation of the major 
conclusions of The General Theory. 
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CHAPTER II 
FRIEDMAN'S MONETARY THEORY 
A. The Role of Money 
Friedman's theory of how money affects real variables in the short 
run and the long run depends on his view of individual behavior, price 
flexibility, and the transmission process of money. Spending decisions 
by agents are undertaken in view of a utility function which they seek 
to maximize over time by providing for present and fut·ure consumption. 
This utility functi~n determines the tendency for individua~s .. to 
"consume" or "save" and the forms in which this consumption and saving 
take place. If money is one form in which agents hold accumulated 
savings, then the demand for money would be a subset of this model. 
The conditions under which agents alter their money holdings form 
the basis for monetary theory. Motives for "spending" on assets or 
trading monetary assets for real assets must be consistent with the 
demand for money function. Changes in the quantity of money affect real 
variables through changes in spending. 
The transmission process is a spelling out of exactly how output 
may be affected by changes in monetary aggregates. The outcome of the 
transmission process depends upon the assumptions made with respect to 
the demand for money, price flexibility, and the behavior of producers. 
Milton Friedman has been widely recognized as an innovator and 
student of monetary theory. His transmission process incorporates 
certain assumptions and definitions which are crucial to the outcome of 
his theory. This chapter will attempt to describe his model of a 
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monetary economy and to pinpoint those crucial definitions and 
assumptions that he makes which allow his theory to reach its stated 
conclusions. 
First, Friedman's demand for money function is specified along 
with his definition of interest rates and how they are determined in the 
long and short run. Friedman's view of long run equilibrium for the 
economy is described, and the model that he has envisioned for the long 
run is specified. In this connection, it is shown how a departure from 
long run equilibrium results in the economy eventually moving back to 
its former long run, position. This long-run equilibrium path, however, 
is resumed only after a cyclical change in output. Thus the next step 
is to examine Friedman's theory of short run fluctuations, especially 
his view of how money affects spending decisions of agents, prices, and 
real output via the transmission process. The range of assets that 
Friedman sees as relevant for his transmission process is specified. 
Anticipations, perceptions of agents, and price flexibility play major 
roles in Friedman's model. These roles are described and examined. 
Friedman's explanations of recession, expansion, short term interest 
rate movements, and price inflation are included in his monetary 
transmission mechanism. Finally, the implications of his theory for 
policy prescriptions are traced. 
B. The Demand for Money 
If money is primarily a form of wealth, money possesses a yield, 
has a price, and the demand for money would depend on factors which 
affect its qualities as an asset. Money's function as the medium of 
exchange provides the qualities which make it useful as an asset. These 
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are the "services" that money provides. If money were not the medium of 
exchange, it would have no use in a portfolio for it would provide no 
services. Friedman considers this departure from Keynes' division of 
the function of money into separable motives to be significant. He also 
sees it as a departure from the earlier quantity theory in which money 
had but one purpose, facilitating transactions. 
According to the earlier view of money as primarily a medium of 
exchange ••• it was fairly natural to think of a short link 
between changes in the stock of money and changes in expenditure 
and to think of the effects of changes in the stock of money as 
occuring very promptly. • • according to more recent emphasis, 
money is something more basic than a medium of transactions; it is 
something which enables people to separate the act of purchase 
from the act of sale. From this point of view, the role of money 
is to seive as a temporary ·sbode of purchasing power. It is this 
view that is fostered by considering money as an asset or as part 
of wealth (1969c, p. 74). 
The cash-balances approach ••• leads to emphasis on variables 
affecting the usefulness of money as an asset: the costs and 
returns from holding money instead of other assets, the 
uncertainty of the future, ••• essentially, that is to emphasis 
on the role of cash in a portfolio. (1982, p. 25) 
The temporary abode of purchasing power is the fundamental quality 
of money and that which permits its use as an asset, even though its 
nominal yield may be zero. Rather than separated from its role as an 
asset, as Keynes suggested, it is an integral part of it. 
There are two reasons that a person may "hold" money: (1) To 
maintain a temporary abode of purchasing power. "The separation of the 
act of sale from the act of purchase is the fundamental productive 
function of money. It gives rise to the 'transactions' motive stressed 
in the literature" (1969e, p. 3). (2) To provide a reserve for future 
emergencies. "This reason corresponds to the 'asset' motive for holding 
money" ( 1969e, p. 3). Both reasons depend critically on the character 
of the economy in which individuals are subject to uncertainty and 
change. 
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Each of these categories of money-holders can be said to demand 
money partly from "transactions" motives and partly from 
"speculative" motives, but dollars of money are not distinguished 
according as they are held for one or the other purpose. Rather, 
each dollar is ••• regarded as rendering a variety of services, 
and the holder of money as altering his money holdings until the 
value to him of the addition to the total flow of services 
produced by adding a dollar to his money stock is equal to the 
reduction in the flow of services produced by subtracting a dollar 
from each of the other forms in which he holds assets (1956, p. 
14). 
The demand for money depends on those variables which affect the 
utility of money as an "asset." Since the transactions services of 
money are an integral part of its yield, then variables affecting its 
usefulness in transactions would be important for the demand _,unction. 
The Yield on Money 
Since the nominal yield on money ''may be zero," the demand for 
money is a function of uncertainty. Otherwise, 
••• no one would hold money instead of an interest-bearing 
asset if he were certain he would not have to draw on it for a 
very long time. Yet he may hold money even though there is a 
sizable possibility that he may not have to draw on it for a very 
long time. Whether he will do so depends on the return available 
from assets held for long periods (1982, p. 260). 
Since money is an asset in the portfolio (1982, p. 37), the wealth 
holder calculates the return on holding money in the same way as for 
other assets. Therefore, just as any other commodity, there is a demand 
for money whose determinants may be specified (1982, p. 26). The demand 
and supply of money determine the price of money and, concurrently, the 
general price level (1982, p. 36). 
The yield on money comes from the services it renders, since 
money's return is not measured by a stated yield but depends on its 
purchasing power (1982, p. 26). Just as any other asset, money has a 
rate of return implicit in holding it. This rate is the "value of the 
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service flow from a unit of money [compared] with the price of money" 
(1982, pp. 26-27). Therefore, the "rate of return" implicit in holding 
a unit of money is equal to the value of the service of a unit of money 
divided by the price of a unit of money. It is this return which wealth 
holders consider in their decisions to hold money. 
The return from holding money is a function of the real quantity 
of money (M/P) rather than just the actual "pieces of paper" in 
existence. This real quantity of money corresponds to a certain command 
over real goods and services. When the price level rises, the real 
return to a unit of money falls, but the total yield on the stock of 
money is dependent upon the volume of goods and services, and so 
unless this volume changes the yield on the stock of money remains 
constant (1982, p. 17). 
It will simplify matters and entail no essential loss in 
generality to suppose that money yields its return solely in kind, 
in the usual form of convenience, security, etc. The magnitude of 
the return in "real" terms per nominal unit of money clearly 
depends on the volume of goods that unit corresponds to, or on the 
general price level ••• (1956, pp. 5-6) • 
• • • this demand equation [for money] must be considered 
independent in any essential way of the nominal units used to 
measure the money variables (1956, p. 58). 
The quantity theory of money takes it for granted first, that what 
matters to holders of money is the real quantity rather than the 
nominal quantity they hold and, second, that there is a fairly 
definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold in any 
given circumstances (1982, p. 18). 
As the stock of money increases, given the existing level of output and 
the price level, the return from holding an additional unit would be 
zero since the existing stock is providing all the required services. 
Friedman says that monetarists consider the price of money to be 
1/P, the inverse of the general price level (1982, p. 26; 1976b, P• 
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316), which is a direct consequence of the stress placed on money's 
asset qualities in which changes in the demand for money are a result of 
a change in money's usefulness as an asset (1976b, p. 316). There is a 
tendency to confuse the price of money with the rate of interest which 
is the "price of credit" (1982, p. 26). 
Real balances are determined by the nominal money stock and the 
price level. By spending to affect the price level, holders of money 
can make the nominal stock equal to any real stock that they desire 
(1982, PP• 32, 36). 
The stock of money differs from the other two categories [of 
assets--human ~apital and goods) because _the productive services 
rendered by money do not depend closely on the number of physical 
units there are, but primarily on the existence of a stock (1976a, 
P• 284). 
The major return from holding money is the yield from its 
liquidity-"the non-pecuniary services rendered by money" (1982, p. 
260). The major~ of holding money is the income foregone by not 
holding an interest bearing asset or one which would appreciate in value 
or yield services (1982, p. 261). Factors affecting the demand for 
money would be those which affected either the expected return from 
money (via liquidity) or the expected costs of holding money. The costs 
of holding money are affected by the returns on alternative stores of 
wealth, and to some degree, these can provide the same services as 
money. So, as the "costs" of holding money rise, "there will be a 
greater incentive to 
cash" (1969e, p. 14). 
substitute other productive resources for 
Friedman's formal model of the demand for money is as follows: 
M/P • f(y, w; RM*, R8*, RE*• gp*; u), where y • the total wealth 
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or permanent income of the individual, and where w • the fraction of 
wealth held in non-human form. These two variables determine the 
level of desired wealth or the size of the portfolio; thus they would 
affect the demand for money since money is one of the assets considered. 
If permanent income increases, the demand for money would increase due 
to the increased demand for real balances for transactions purposes, 
but, in principle, there could be a situation in which the demand for 
money fell with an increase in permanent income if the money is a 
"necessity like bread" rather than a "luxury like recreation" (1982, p. 
38). 
But it must be remembered that the demand for money "is adapted 
not to measured income but to permanent income" (1959, p. 119). 
Therefore, procyclical changes in velocity related to "measured" income 
may not reflect changes in velocity when one uses "permanent" income. 
In Friedman's description of his transmission mechanism, he hypothesizes 
that demand for money is positively related to the level of output. The 
demand for money depends on how "large" a portfolio is required to 
satisfy the "wealth" requirement--thus a positive function of permanent 
income--but also reflects "how close" one is to achieving it--thus a 
negative function of the fraction of wealth held in non-human form 
{1976a, p. 64; 1957, p. 16). When a person has a larger stock of 
wealth, his savings declines, and so would his demand for money balances 
since this is "one form" for storing wealth 0982, p. 37). 
R * • M the expected nominal rate of return on money 
{+) 
RB* • the expected nominal rate of return on bonds {-) 
RE* • the expected nominal rate of return on equities {-) 
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gp* • the expected nominal rue of return on..phywcal aaaets which 
includes the rate of price changes plus the acutal nominal yield or cost 
(-). 
The demand for money would vary directly with~• and inversely 
with other nominal returns since they represent yields on substitutes 
for money as an asset. The symbol "u" represents whatever other 
variables affect the utility of money services. These could be 
conditions of uncertainty or instability which would induce wealth 
holders to assign an even higher yield to liquidity. Friedman and 
Schwartz say that ,this is one aspect of the demand for moi:iey that Keynes 
neglected in his demand function (1982, p. 53). 
Friedman's demand for money function seeks to define logically the 
motives that one may have to hold cash while preserving the feature of 
money that he considers the most important, the usefulness of money in 
facilitating transactions. 
On our approach, the average amount of money held per dollar of 
transactions is itself to be regarded as a resultant of an 
economic equilibrating process, not as a physical datum. If, for 
whatever reason, it becomes more expensive to hold money, then it 
is worth devoting more resources to effecting money transactions 
in less expensive ways or to reducing the volume of transactions 
per dollar of final output. In consequence, our ultimate demand 
function for money in its most general form does not contain as a 
variable the volume of transactions or of transactions per dollar 
of final output; it contains rather those basic technical and cost 
conditions that affect the costs of conserving money, by changing 
the average amount of money held per dollar of transactions per 
unit time or by changing the number of dollars of transactions per 
dollar of final output (1956, p. 12). 
The Rate of Interest 
Friedman considers a broad range of interest rates, not only those 
recorded rates on bonds and equities (1982, p. 486, 1963, p. 218). 
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There are interest rates implicit in owning any asset; these are 
measured as the ratio of the value of the services that the asset 
produces to the price of the asset itself (1963, pp. 218, 221). 
Alternatively, the interest rate of an asset is the "price of a source 
of services in terms of the service flow" Cl976a, p. 285). Therefore, 
the rate on a bond would be the coupon value in relation to the price of 
the bond itself. 
The interest rate is a "pure number" not measured in the dimension 
of dollars and independent of the level of prices. If the level of 
prices doubl~s, the final rate of interest will be unchanged after 
agents have accomodated the change (1982, pp. 527, 530). 
Whenever the price of the source (the asset itself) rises 
independently of the price of its services, the yield on the asset has 
fallen, so one may say that the interest rate on the asset has fallen. 
In the short run, monetary changes which affect some prices sooner than 
others will cause a short run change in the interest rate implicit in 
some assets and explicit in those assets which have recorded rates. 
Monetary changes ~ffect interest rates through changes in relative 
prices, but this is a short run phenomenon (1982, p. 482). Any change 
in the measured interest rate (to be distinguished from changes in the 
real rate) must be accomplished by relative price changes. Non-monetary 
induced changes, though, are caused by real changes in supply and demand 
(1982, p. 584). These changes in the rate of interest persist. 
A rise in the demand for "capital" will raise the equilibrium 
interest rate (1982, pp. 63, 583), and this demand will be met by 
"higher savings called forth by the higher interest rates" (1982, p. 
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498). The higher rate may not persist if velocity increases to 
accomodate the higher level of output, which suggests that Friedman and 
Schwartz see some monetary influence on the long run rate of interest. 
In Friedman's earlier description of the determination of interest 
rates, money plays no role in real changes, except that of setting a 
"floor" to the market rate since the costs of holding money as an asset 
are zero (1976a, p. 316). The nominal rate is determined by the 
equilibrium between the supply of the services of assets and the demand 
for them. Savers supply services; firms or borrowers demand them. 
Savers "sell" these services according to the price of th~. in relation 
to the price of the source. Borrowers buy them according to the 
productivity of them in relation to their price. If the real yield of 
capital increases, borrowers will demand more services of capital while 
sellers will supply more only at a higher price (1982, p. 583). Thus 
the capital market has a mechanism by which supply and demand determine 
the equilibrium nominal rate of interest. 
Monetary disturbances may disturb this mechanism as it distorts 
relative prices of services and their sources temporarily. In the long 
run, it is only price changes "arising from other sources" which affect 
the interest rate permanently (1982, p. 584). Therefore: 
The long-term effect of money on interest rates can therefore be 
analyzed best by considering the effect of money on prices 
and then of prices on interest rates (1982, p. 574). 
The effect of monetary change on prices is a major channel through 
which monetary change affects interest rates (1982, p. 631). 
The difference between the nominal rate and the real rate of 
interest concerns rates of price change. Since interest rates relate 
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the present to the future, they are necessarily temporal variables. 
Therefore, if the price level changes over the same period, the real 
yield is affected by this rate. The real rate is the nominal rate minus 
the rate of inflation or plus the rate of deflation (1982, P• 491; 
1976a, p. 315). Failure of agents to anticipate or allow for inflation 
or deflation causes the real rate of interest to be higher or lower than 
expected; the real rate can only be measured ex-post. Therefore, for 
decisions by agents it is the expected real yield that matters, or the 
known nominal yield plus the expected rate of price change (1982, p. 
491). 
C. The Range of Assets 
Total wealth, once the level is decided, "must be divided among 
various forms of assets" ( 1982, p. 37). Friedman and Schwartz put no 
restrictions on the form that wealth may take, and they "insist" that 
a wide range of assets be considered as relevant for storing wealth. 
Any good which is capable of being stored and yielding "services" would 
be eligible for the portfolio. Consumer durables and stocks -of consumer 
goods may serve as assets. Houses, automobiles, furniture, food and 
clothing are mentioned by Friedman and Schwartz as relevant assets. 
Every asset has an implicit rate of return which may be 
represented by the ratio of the price of the services to the price of 
the asset itself (1982, PP• 26-27). Even though this rate is not quoted 
on organized markets, it "connects" the price of the services to the 
price of the source so that it is this "yield" which is important in its 
value as an asset (1963, p. 221). The marketability of-an asset affects 
the terms on which it may be traded. 
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"It is necessary to regard households as themselves enterprises 
holding physical assets which they use to produce services that they 
consume themselves" (1963, p. 218). Consumption is the purchase of the 
"service" of an asset, while saving is the purchase of the asset itself, 
the "source" of the service. Goods could be considered "consumption" if 
they were the product of some other asset, such as electricity or food 
(1963, p. 218). 
D. Portfolio Balance 
Agents maximize the "return" on their wealth by equating the 
marginal return from each asset (including nominal balances) in their 
wealth portfolio. Therefore, the return to holding wealth in each form 
is equal to the return to each other form and to any alternative use, 
such as consumption, for each individual. 
Agents may alter their spending/saving behavior if there is an 
imbalance in their portfolios. That is, if the returns from holding one 
type of asset either increase or decrease, the agent will trade assets 
in the portfolio to restore the balance. If agents are in long run 
equilibrium, they will recognize any relative price changes as 
reflecting real changes in returns on various assets ~hey may hold. 
They trade to maximize returns on their portfolios or to increase wealth 
without sacrificing consumption. 
An individual in equilibrium receives an income or services from 
his assets which he may consume or with which he may purchase assets or 
money. Individuals calculate the interest rate implicit in the asset 
which would discount the sum of the future stream of income from 
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purchasing one more unit of the asset. This rate measures the marginal 
return per dollar's worth of the asset. Similarly, they calculate the 
marginal return from purchasing one more dollar's worth of the 
"service" that the asset yields. If the marginal return from owning the 
asset is higher, they will purchase the asset. Otherwise they will 
purchase the service (1963, p. 220). 
One special problem to which recent work in monetary theory has 
called attention is whether to hold wealth in money or in other 
forms. This is merely an extension of the marginal principle--the 
proportions of different resources held should be such as to 
equalize the marginal returns in all directions (1976a, p, 285). 
Changes in t~e price of some assets relative to the value of 
services will cause wealth holders to attempt to convert one form to 
another. If the price of an asset rises compared to the price of the 
services it yields, wealth holders will sell the asset and purchase only 
the services from it. An example is the purchase of a house versus 
rental of a house (1963, p. 219). 
Even though money may be desired as an asset itself in some 
quantity, persons will exchange other assets for it, not to hold the 
money permanently, but to profit from "attractive selling opportunities" 
while searching for "at tractive buying opportunities." Money may serve 
as "a temporary abode of purchasing power," and indeed this is "the 
major function of money and the basic source of its social utility" 
(1963, p. 219). Wealth holders consider this yield when holding money 
versus other assets. 
When a portfolio is in equilibrium all marginal yields are 
equated. A wealth-holder will trade asset A0 for asset Ai only if 
the marginal yield r 0 is greater than the marginal yield r 1• The 
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rate at which the wealth-holder is able to trade is of course the 
relative price of the assets. 
Wealth can be held in numerous forms, and the ultimate 
wealth-owning unit is to be regarded as dividing his wealth among 
them ••• so as to maximize "utility" ••• subject to whatever 
restrictions affect the possibility of converting one form of 
wealth to another •••• As usual, this implies that he will 
seek an apportionment of his wealth such that the rate at which he 
can substitute one form of wealtft for another is just equal to 
the rate at which he is just willing to do so (1956, p. 5). 
This analysis requires that the marginal yield on assets falls as 
more are acquired; otherwise no equilibrium could be established. In 
equilibrium, MRO/MR1 • pO/p1 for every asset including money. 
It is the marginal return on any asset that is important for the 
wealth holder in trading decisions. The decision to spend an extra 
dollar must mean that the marginal return from owning the asset or 
consuming the service is greater than the return from holding the extra 
dollar in cash. 
Assuming that he is able to purchase the service of the asset on 
the market, or to sell the asset on the market, then he has a choice 
which is governed by his ability to make the trade (relative prices.) 
Of course some services of assets are not for sale at any price, so that 
one would have to own the asset to get the services~ some assets are 
not disposable at any price. These considerations affect the ability to 
trade, but they do not alter the basis of utility maximization.I 
1 Since existing balances already provide desired services, 
then there would be no reason to "hold" the new money as an asset. 
There could be a time period in which they held the new money as a 
"temporary abode" of purchasing power, but only for the duration of 
their decision period. Otherwise, the real level of money balances 
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E. The Transmission Process 
As a "preliminary step in sketching a theory of the short run 
adjustment process" (1972, p. 924), Friedman starts his analysis of a 
change in money from long run equilibrium in which all expectations are 
realized and anticipated values are equal to their permanent values. 
The precise method of changing the money supply is unimportant in 
Friedman's model. He describes several ways it could be accomplished: 
a helicopter drop (or a furnace which consumes money) that occurs with 
or without distribution effects (1969e), open market operations (1982), 
government expenditures financed by issuing money (1982), and gold 
discoveries (1982). The method of introduction is not critical to the 
outcome since the first round effects are short-lived while the ultimate 
effects last indefinitely. The new money is soon indistinguishable from 
the old, and the first use to which it is put has no effect on the 
outcome of the process (1982, p. 30). 
demanded remains a fairly constant percentage of real income. 
Demand for money is affected by expectations of inflation or 
deflation causing agents to conserve or expand real balances. Either 
situation imposes "costs" to society since real balances are a 
productive resource, and there is an optimum level which is most 
efficient (1969e, p. 17; 1982, p. 492). 
Friedman considers the return on other assets as an argument in 
the demand for money function, but it seems that he admits no alteration 
in desired real balances for this reason in the transmission process. 
If wealth holders were induced to hold higher real balances by the short 
term fall in "interest rates," then they would reduce their spending on 
other assets. As interest rates begin to fall, they would revise their 
demand for real balances and consequently would not spend as much on 
consumption due to the relative price differential: the yield on money 
would be rising, and the level of real balances would be higher. The 
fact that interest rates are returned to their long run values requires 
that wealth holders spend until this is accomplished. If they had 
modified their demand for real balances, the interest rates would have 
been permanently lowered, and an equilibrium (MS• Md) would have 
been achieved with higher real balances. The constant d"emand for money 
in real terms causes the return to long run equilibrium. Similarly, 
the demand for money specifies that as permanent income rises the demand 
for real balances will rise; however, the transmission process predicts 
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An Increase in the Quantity of Money 
If the money supply is increased through open market operations, 
agents are induced by higher bond prices to sell their bonds for cash. 
Any process, however, by which nominal balances are increased will have 
the same effect. 
Recipients of the new money have several options: purchasing 
assets, purchasing services, or holding cash. Another possibility is 
that the recipient of the money will use it to discharge debt, but in 
this case it is only transferred to another who will attempt to replace 
his former asset ( the debt) with another a_sset or consumption service. 
The actual form that the spending takes matters only for the first 
round. If it is spent for services, then the price of services will be 
bid up first; if it is spent on goods or assets, then their prices will 
that as the level of output rises temporarily, the demand for money 
will increase (1982, pp. 18-19). 
If interest rates do not affect the demand for money, there can be 
an income elasticity of changes in money equal to one in the long run. 
Velocity could be nearly constant. This situation could exist even if 
money were considered primarily an asset rather than an exchange medium. 
A feature of Friedman's theory which distinguishes it from the 
earlier quantity theory is that money is considered an asset. As 
explained earlier, it qualifies under the assumption that assets provide 
some "income" or "services," and the services of money are its liquidity 
services. Friedman calls this approach a "way stat1on" between the 
simple quantity theory and the Cambridge cash balances approach (1982, 
P• 24). 
Given that an effect of Friedman's theory is a short run lowering 
of recorded interest rates, it is required that cash be considered an 
asset, even if only temporarily, for this to be accomplished. The 
reason is that savers use the extra cash in the first round primarily to 
purchase assets or "sources" rather than con,umption services. If they 
replace lower-yielding cash with another asset, it is necessary for cash 
and other assets to be considered substitutes by the wealth holders. 
Otherwise, if wealth holders considered cash to be only generalized 
purchasing power, they would not spend on sources any more than they 
spend on services, and there would be no method by which the interest 
rates could be lowered (if a broad range of assets is relevant.) 
Otherwise, there would be only a price level rise. 
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be bid up first (1982, p. 30). After the first round of spending, the 
new money mingles with the old, and its specific effects are not 
identifiable. 
If cash were the only form of wealth and if the individual "finds" 
excess cash in his portfolio, his equilibrium position described above 
has been disturbed. At this point, 
••• he will want to raise his consumption and reduce his cash 
balances until they are back at the former level. Only at that 
level is the sacrifice of consuming at a lower rate just balanced 
by the gain from holding correspondingly higher cash balances 
(1969e, p. 5). 
If assets other than cash exist, the individual will try to 
replace cash with other existing assets (1982, p. 482; 1963, p. 218), 
because the ratio of the marginal return from holding money to the price 
of money is not equal to the marginal return from some other asset to 
its price. "The first thing people will do is to try to purchase other 
assets" (1969c, p. 75). There is a profitable trading opportunity. 
Persons who have received the new money in the first round either 
as new money balances or as an increase in income, consider "cash" to be 
an asset, as above, so they are more likely to adjust their portfolios 
by replacing the new cash with some other asset with a higher MR/P 
ratio. It is the purchase of alternative existing assets due to the 
stimulus of excess cash balances which raises asset prices and lowers 
their yields. 
The attempt by holders of money to restore_or attain a desired 
balance sheet after an unexpected increase in the quantity of 
money will tend to raise the prices of assets and reduce interest 
rates ••• (1982, p. 58) • 
• • • holders of cash will try to adjust the portfolios by 
replacing cash with other assets (including both securities and 
physical assets.) In the process they will bid up the price of 
other assets and drive down the rate of interest (1982, p. 482). 
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The interest rate on physical assets is usually not recorded or stated, 
so that the change in this rate is an unrecognized effect of the 
transmission process. The change in the rate on securities, though, 
will be a noticeable effect of the change in the quantity of money. 
The lowering of the rate of interest on a broad range of assets 
has the effect of raising 
the prices of the sources of the service flows relative to the 
prices of service flows themselves, which leads to an increase in 
spending on both the service flows and the production of new 
sources of service flows (1982, p. 486). 
Spending on assets is increased due to the existence of excess cash in 
the portfolio. The spending rate change is manifested in relative price 
changes which has two effects: 1) agents modify their spending to take 
into account the effects of an altered ratio between the prices of 
assets versus the prices of their services (a change in interest rates); 
and 2) producers, in their attempt to maximize profit, may increase 
production of those goods whose prices have risen. 
Thus the short run result of an increase in the quantity of money 
is a short run lowering of all rates of interest (implicit and explicit) 
due to higher prices for "goods" and other assets; a second effect is an 
increase in spending for services (consumption) since the price of these 
has not yet risen • 
• • reported interest rates are only a few of the large set of 
rates of interest, many implicit and unobservable, that are 
affected by the changed rate of monetary growth (1982, P• 486) • 
• • • monetary disturbances will produce systematic patterns in 
the reaction of such components of output as construction, other 
investment, and so on (1982, p. 620). 
Whether output will be increased depends upon whether the increase 
in Mis anticipated or unanticipated. This issue is treated later in 
the chapter. 
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F. The Adjustment Process 
The preceding sections of this chapter have emphasized Friedman's 
monetary theory and the transmission process by which a change in the 
quantity of money affects nominal spending in the aggregate economy 
through a process of asset substitution. In the remainder of the 
chapter, we analyze Friedman's theory of (a) the short-run division of a 
change in nominal income between prices and output, (b) the long-run 
adjustment to a new equilibrium, and (c) the transition between the 
short-run deviation and the long run equilibrium. The central ide~ that 
Friedman uses is th,e distinction between actual and antici~a~ed 
magnitudes. 
Long Run Equilibrium 
Friedman identifies a theoretical long run equilibrium position in 
the economy. Long run equilibrium is characterized by the situation in 
which anticipated values are equal to their measured values: the actual 
rate of growth of prices is equal to the anticipated rate of growth; the 
actual rate of increase of nominal income is equal to the anticipated 
increase; and as a consequence, the actual rate of growth of real income 
is equal to the anticipated permanent growth rate of real income (1982, 
pp. 59-60). This situation results in agents not being hindered by 
misperceptions caused by measured values differing from anticipations. 
In long run equilibrium, all measured changes in output are the result 
of changes in real (not monetary) conditions of supply or demand. 
Therefore, agents may fully respond in confidence that what they 
perceive is reality. This allows them to maximize utility and firms to 
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maximize profit, making any necessary adjustments without hesitation. 
The long-run equilibrium 
••• is not a state which is ever assumed to be attained in 
practice. It is a logical construct that defines the norm or 
trend from which the actual world is always deviating but to which 
it is tending to return or about which it tends to fluctuate 
(1972, p. 925). 
At this equilibrium position, the interest rate is determined by 
"whatever variables other than money growth affect the interest rate" 
(1982, p. 490); output is determined by real variables in the economy, 
that which would be "ground out" by the Walrasian general equilibrium 
equations (1982, pp. 60, 413); the price level is determined by the 
equilibrium between the demand for real balances and the supply of 
nominal balances (1982, pp. 25, 36). 
Long run changes in output, employment and the real rate of 
interest are not caused by monetary factors but by real ones. These 
real factors include the real supply of resources, the real demand for 
goods and services based on equalization of the marginal utility-price 
ratio, technological conditions of production, and institutional factors 
(1982, p. 413). The long run growth rate of output is "independent of 
anticipated changes in nominal magnitudes except as they affect real 
magnitudes [such as] the real interest rate or the real quantity 
of money" (1982, p. 413). 
In this state of long-run equilibrium, individuals are maximizing 
utility over their lifetime horizon. To accomplish this, they seek to 
maintain a rate of consumption that corresponds to their estimation of 
permanent income. Actual measured income may vary, but, in long run 
equilibrium, agents have allowed for this event by providing for 
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themselves a stock of wealth which provides "income" and aids in 
smoothing out consumption (1957, p. 16; 1976a, p. 62). Therefore, this 
desired stock of wealth is one which ensures the level of permanent 
income that the agent desires given the disutility of labor in acquiring 
it and the foregoing of immediate consumption (1957, p. 16). In a broad 
view, this permanent income may be regarded as a return on the stock of 
wealth, both for the individual and for society. 
In equilibrium, the agent has achieved that stock of wealth which 
he desires insofar as the return corresponds to the level of permanent 
income he desires given his personal constraints. Agents build this 
stock of wealth by saving out of income; consumption is the consumption 
of the services of the source of wealth. Equilibrium, then, is a 
situation in which saving is zero (1976a, p. 297). 
If the individual does not have that [equilibrium] stock of 
wealth, he will move toward it. There will be an equilibrium rate 
at which he will want to move toward it that will depend on how 
far he is from his desired wealth and on what his current wealth 
is (1976a, p. 64). 
There is some stock of wealth and some rate of interest which 
equilibrates the desires of the suppliers of wealth with those of the 
demanders of wealth. At this equilibrium, aggregate net savings and 
investment would be zero, and the stock of wealth would be that optimum 
stock that the economy desired (1976a, pp. 295, 307). But, agents may 
replenish or diminish their stock as conditions change: their 
estimation of permanent income may change; or the value of their wealth 
in relation to permanent income may change; or there may be an 
opportunity to increase wealth by making a favorable trade without the 
necessity of foregoing consumption due to a change in the relative 
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prices of assets. Additionally, the size of the stock of wealth does 
not affect the "value attached to the flow of services from that stock" 
(1976a, p. 297). 
Friedman's model of individual behavior may be stated as follows: 
Let U • utility; U(t) • utility at time t. Let G • the disutility of 
labor; G(t) • disutility at time t. Let C • consumption; C(t) • 
consumption af time= t. Let W • the stock of desired wealth; W(t) • 
wealth at time• t. Let p = the internal rate of discount which relates 
wealth to future consumption (the trade-off.) Let r • the interest rate 
or actual trade ratio for present to future consumption. Then, 
Max. U • U[C(t)] + G[C(t)J; U' > O, G' < O; 
U(to> - J.Tu[C(t)]e-ptdt 
W(t0 ) • J~Ct)e-rtdt 0957) 
0 
A situation that Friedman often describes is one in which the 
money supply is growing at a rate of 3% per year, output is growing at 
3% per year, and prices are stable (only relative price changes occur to 
reflect real alterations in supply and demand) (1982, pp. 66, 480). 
Agents expect this situation to continue, for they form their 
anticipations on the basis of past events. Their anticipations are of 
the level of prices, nominal income, and real income. (Note that agents, 
given only two of these variables, may deduce the third.) Since the 
rate of growth of the money supply cannot be directly observed, agents 
form no expectations of this variable but observe only its effects. 
These anticipations or expectations form a part of the information set 
as agents evaluate their actual position in relation to their desired 
position. If long run equilibrium exists, agents will make no errors in 
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their actions. Each decision will serve to increase utility (or profit 
in the case of firms.) 
Assume the long run equilibrium situation sketched above in which 
agents expect no inflation. (Note: expectations of inflation may be 
incorporated into a long run equilibrium; in that case agents discount 
price changes by the expected rate of inflation.) Assume some event 
occurs which disturbs the composition of portfolios. If the initial 
disturbance involves an asset other than money, agents will respond by 
attempting to trade the asset which is in excess supply, or by 
attempting to acquire the asset that is deficient. This attempt will 
alter the relative price ratio between that asset and all others, but 
the price level of output itself will not be changed. An increase in 
relative price of an asset will encourage producers of that asset to 
increase production of it, and to decrease production of other assets. 
Since there has been no increase in aggregate demand, only a change in 
demand for some goods relative to others, total production will not 
change if agents are fully informed of relative prices. 
Wealth holders will be back in equilibrium when their portfolios 
have been restored to their former balance, and this will have been 
accomplished by changes in relative prices and by increased production 
of some goods and decreased production of others. The level of prices 
will not have been changed, and nominal incomes will not have risen, and 
the economy continues in long run equilibrium. 
If the change in "wealth" had occurred because of an unanticipated 
change in the quantity of money that managed to get into the portfolios 
of wealth holders, the story will be different. Since the economy uses 
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money to denominate the values of assets, the attempt to trade money for 
other assets will have the effect, not of changing the relative "price" 
of money, but of changing prices of all other goods. An unanticipated 
change in the quantity of money will throw agents out of long run 
equilibrium since the price level will change as demand increases or 
decreases for other assets when wealth holders attempt to restore 
portfolio balance. 
Even though the stock of assets is unchanged at this point, 
there will be a change in relative price of existing assets as agents 
trade assets. Output rates are altered due to perceived changes in 
relative prices. Since no real determinants of the output rate have 
changed, the long run position of the economy is the same rate of growth 
of output, but the transition may involve significant departures. "The 
ripples produced by a monetary action may therefore take a rather long 
time to reach the whole range of assets" (1969b, p. 256). 
Short-Run Adjustment 
For Friedman, a key question is the process of adjustment 
to a discrepancy between the nominal quantity of money demanded and the 
nominal quantity supplied" (1970, p. 225). Assume that the discrepancy 
arises from a change in the supply of money; Friedman states that "The 
key insight of the quantity theory approach is that such a discrepancy 
will be manifested primarily in attempted spending, thence in the rate 
of change in nominal income" (1970, p. 225). This manifestation was 
described above in Friedman's transmission mechanism. In general form, 
(1 ) 8y =' d l~f Y • f [ (M} *, ~s, ~d, Ms , MJ 
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where Ms• money supplied, Md• money demanded, Y • nominal income, 
and an asterisk attached to a variable denotes the anticipated value of 
that variable. To illustrate, a particular version of (1) would be: 
(2) ly • By* +-y"(gMs - _gMd) + fClog Ms - log Md). 
One of the features of Friedman's model is that agents build into 
their information sets anticipations of rates of growth of the price 
level as well as of income (nominal or real). In this manner they 
attempt to separate monetary events which do not indicate a change in 
output rates from real events upon which they should act if prices 
perform their task of transmitting information. As rates of price 
change increase or decrease over time, agents build in these 
expectations to alter their behavior. They come to "expect" inflation. 
They also incorporate real variables (such as the rate of change in real 
income) into their decision process. 
Prices change because of alterations in spending behavior that 
occur because of changes in the available returns from some form of 
wealth or from consumption of services given anticipations of inflation. 
Considering that agents are continually in the process of revising 
expectations as they spend, the rate of change of prices will be a 
positive function of the rapidity that they revise their expectations to 
conform with actual rates of change. 
Therefore: 
(3) gp !:. d log 
dt 
P • ~d log 
dt 9* +c:Jl[dlogY-(d dt log dt 9~ 
+ /i [log Y - Clog y)* 1 
where Y* • expected nominal income, P* • expected level of prices, and y 
= the real level of output. 
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Note if logy• (logy)*, the expected level of real income will be 
equal to the actual level, and if 
d log Y • 
dt 
d log Y* 
dt 
then the expected rate of growth of prices is equal to the actual rate 
of growth of prices. That is, inflation or deflation is fully 
anticipated. 
The rate of growth in real income may be altered whenever actual 
nominal income and prices are not equal to their long run anticipated 
values. In this case, optimizing agents alter "real" output in response 
to perceived profit opportunities. Therefore, the change in the rate of 
growth of real income becomes a function of the difference between 
expected nominal and real income and their measured values. 
(4) d lof y • d log Y* 
d dt 
+ ( I - cl) d log Y - d log Y* 
dt dt 
-(J [ log y - (log y )*]. 
The divergence between expected nominal income and its measured 
value is reflected in some part by output changes and in some part by 
price changes. The value of t:::J... determines the relationship. If one 
sums equations (3) and (4), the result is 
(5) d log P 
dt 
+ d logy • 
dt 
d log Y • 
dt 
d log P* + d logy* 
dt dt 
If prices fully reflect any changes in nominal income, then ot• 1 
and f, • -, and real output grows at its long term growth rate. If 
prices are rigid, then«.• O, /3 • O, and all of the change in nominal 
income is in output. 
The first case Friedman calls the extreme quantity theory 
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assumption that prices bear all adjustment; the second case he calls the 
extreme Keynesian assumption that quantity is the only variable that 
adjusts. Friedman's own theory of nominal income makes neither of these 
assumptions. His assumption is that the anticipated values are revised 
over time to conform with observed values, so that the difference 
between them is continually diminished. Anticipations are revised such 
that the larger the discrepancy, the faster revisions of anticipations 
of that variable are adjusted (1982, p. 65). 
In Friedman's adaptive expectations model, the expected rate of 
change in the price level at a point in time is some function of all 
past rates of 
(6) d log P"r 
dt 
change up to that point. 
T 
• jf[log P(t)dt] and 
0 
d log Y* 
dt 
T 
• Jf[log Y(t)dt] 
0 
The rate of change of prices is determined by nominal income, real 
income and the anticipated values of each, plus the expected rate of 
price change. The rate of change in real income is determined by 
nominal and real income and the anticipated values, plus the expected 
growth rate of real income. Real income then is co-determined by "real" 
factors and by expectations in the short run, providing a feedback to 
agents who reform long run anticipations and alter current spending 
behavior. "The problem is to assure, at long run equilibrium, these two 
values do not conflict" (1982, p. 66). 
An Illustration: An Increase in M 
Assume that the economy starts from a position where gp • o, 
gy = 3%, gM • 3%, and gy • 3% (gp = rate of growth in the price 
level, gy • rate of growth of nominal income, gy • rate of growth of 
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real income, 8M • the rate of growth in the money supply). Since in 
long run equilibrium, all anticipations are realized, then gp* • o, 
gy* = 3%, and gy* • 3% (gp* • expected growth of prices, gy* • 
the expected growth of real income, gy*. the expected growth of 
nominal income). Let there be a change in the rate of money growth so 
that gH • 8%, while gM* • 3%. 
First, Friedman asks what the long-run equilibrium solution will 
be. After full adjustment, nominal income will be rising at 8 percent 
per year. Since the real determinants of output have not been affected, 
prices will be rising at 5 percent per year and real output at the rate 
of 3 percent per year. 2 But the long-run equilibrium outcome will be 
one in which all anticipations are realized. If the increase in 8Ms 
is unanticipated then 8Kd would not immediately adjust in equation (2) 
causing a discrepancy between 8y and gy*• Now, this discrepancy 
will be resolved by a change in gp (equation 3) and gy (equation 4), 
and will continue until all actual measured values are equal to their 
long run anticipated values. 
An unanticipated change in the money supply is manifested in an 
altered demand for particular products. The seller of a particular 
product has no way of knowing whether this increase is an increase 
relative to the demand for other products; if it were, he would be 
2 Friedman notes that, while g should be at its long-run rate 
of growth, the equilibrium level of Xutput will not be unaffected by 
the monetary change. If real output is measured so as to include the 
"non-pecuniary services of money," y will be lower after the monetary 
change because (1) the higher cost of holding real balances will lead 
producers to substitute other resources for money, thereby lowering 
efficiency, and (2) the flow of non-pecuniary services from money will 
be lower (1970, p. 230). 
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correct in expanding output of the product. If he were certain that the 
demand was merely a reflection of a change in flgeneral nominal demand," 
he would correctly respond by adjusting price. At the outset of the 
adjustment process, the seller has no way of knowing the correct 
response so output changes are to be expected when there is a change in 
nominal demand (1982, p. 415). 
The short run is an adjustment toward a new nominal level of 
income but away from the long run permanent growth trend of real income 
and level of real interest rates. The "misperceptions" of producers and 
workers are caused by changes in the rate of growth of money, and fools 
these agents into thinking that the price changes are due to a real 
change in demand for their products or services. 
In Friedman's analysis, he assumes that prices are "flexible." He 
considers a price to be flexible "in the sense that it can and does 
change promptly to changes in demand and supply and that there are no 
institutional obstacles to its changing. ." (1972, P• 925). 
However, Friedman and Schwartz do not assume "perfectly" flexible 
prices (1982, p. 58). If prices were perfectly flexible, then there 
could occur no cyclical reaction to a change in nominal demand--all the 
adjustment would be in prices and none in output. Friedman and 
Schwartz maintain that a change in money is reflected in both Pandy 
(1982, P• 57). 
Therefore, if there is a change in supply or demand, prices will 
reflect some of the adjustment and will respond promptly, although in 
the early stages, much or most of the adjustment will be in output 
(1968, p. 8; 1976a, p. 216; 1982, pp. 403, 414, 489, 498). Since there 
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is a "rate" of price change, it follows that agents act on the 
information that the price signal provides before the full adjustment 
has taken place. Particularly, producers will adjust rates of output at 
early signs of a price change to avoid losses or to capture a profit 
opportunity. It is this early reaction based on price misperceptions 
which permits short-run output reactions to monetary stimuli. 
In Friedman's short run analysis, the initial state is one of 
full-equilibrium market-clearing. Thus, the reaction by producers is 
due to a misperception. If they had known that monetary changes were 
responsible for the change in prices (even if in some brief interval 
there would have been a temporary relative price difference) they would 
not have altered output levels (1976a, p. 223, 1982, p. 415). Prices 
are bid up as agents attempt to purchase a quantity of goods and 
services which carry one nominal value with "spending" that carries a 
higher nominal value. Price or quantity or some combination of the two 
must adjust to clear the market. Agents will alter quantity supplied 
only as a result of a perceived change in relative price. 
If agents had been in long-run equilibrium before, then some rise 
in the price level must occur in response to an increase in nominal 
spending. A monetary-induced change will change the price level if it 
is accompanied by a higher rate of spending (dollars per time period) 
causing gy to exceed gy,rr• The economy always accomodates changes in 
nominal demand by some combination of a rise in P or in the real 
quantity of goods. No increase in real supply is possible without some 
perceived change in price, since producers were at an optimum level of 
output previously. Whatever price is the outcome of the process will 
"clear" the market. 
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Prices are flexible in both directions. They fall if there is a 
decline in nominal spending, causing either through a price change, a 
quantity change, or some combination of both. The lowered price clears 
the market. 
Adjustment in the Goods and Labor Markets 
Friedman's analysis starts from long run equilibrium in which all 
markets clear. The money market relates the supply and demand for money 
and the equilibrating variable which is the price level. The market for 
existing assets is related only to the price of existing assets, but the 
market for new goods must be related to output prices, the nominal wage 
rate, and the real wage. Assume that MS is exogenous. 
P • the general price level. 
PA= the price of existing assets. 
y = the quantity of newly-produced goods. 
N • the level of employment. 
r • the composite of the rates of interest. 
u • uncertainty factor. 
W • the money wage; W/P • the real wage. 
Let MS increase as a result of open market operations: 
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p 
DM (y, r, u) 
Nominal Money Supply 
Figure 2.1. Friedman's market for nominal money balances. 
I. Figure 2.1 shows that, in the long run, the price level is the 
variable that equates the nominal demand for money with nominal balances 
(1982, p. 36). However, since the price level is changed only as a 
result of spending which takes place through other markets, it does not 
move immediately to restore equilibrium in this market. Therefore, as 
the level of nominal money balances increases from MO to M at 1' 
PO, there is an excess supply of nominal (and real) money balances 
(MO - M1)• 
2. In figure 2.2, demand for existing assets rises to D1 since there 
is an excess supply of real balances, and money and existing assets are 
substitutes. There is a fixed stock of existing assets so that the 
. . " h" k f pA A price rises 1n t 1s mar et rom O to p 1 causing the yield on 
existing assets to fall. 
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Existing Assets 










Figure 2.3. Friedman's market for new output. 
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3. As shown in figure 2.3, the process of substitution of assets in the 
portfolio causes the demand for new assets to rise and thus the price of 
new assets to increase. In nominal terms, producers see an increased 
demand for their products from D0 to o1• Th' p t · 1s causes y o rise 
to Pyland producers to increase output of new goods from Yo to 
4. At this point, (see figure 2.4) output has increased, prices of 
assets are raised and yields are lowered. Producers have increased 
output because they saw a fall in the real wage rate from w/pe 0 
p 
to W/Pe 1 due to prices of their output rising, and therefore p 
they perceive a rise in the supply of labor. 
5. Workers, however, supply more labor because they see a rise in the 
real wage rate due to a perceived increase in the demand for labor. 
Workers see their wage as rising from wO/pe to wl/pe 
W W• 
They see their nominal wage rising but do not notice that all prices are 
rising. 
In the Friedman scenario considered here, the actual real wage 
rate does not change at all. All prices and wages are rising in the 
economy, price misperceptions occur on the part of both workers and 
employers, and a short run cyclical expansion of output and employment 
occur. Workers eventually realize that they are providing more labor 
for the same real wage, and prodcucers eventually realize their profits 
are down because the real wage rate has not fallen. And, money holders 
realize that with the price rise, the level of real balances now puts 
them in equilibrium. So, producers and workers will revert to their old 
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Friedman's labor market as perceived 
by workers and firms 
W/P 
Friedman's goods market as perceived 
by workers and firms 
Figure 2.4. Friedman's labor and goods markets. The effects of an increase in nominal mo
ney 
balances. 
(NB) 1 = supply of labor as perceived by producers 
(Nd) 1 = demand for labor as perceived by workers 
(yd) 1 = demand for output as perceived by producers 
(ys) 1 = supply of output (demand for labor) as perceived 
by workers 
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occur. Interest rates will be restored since the price of the services 
has caught up with the price of the sources. At the culmination: 
w/pe % w = w*; gy = gy* = 8%; gy = gy* = 3 ; 
= 5%. Therefore, the short-run fluctuation is linked to long-run 
equilibrium. 
A Decrease in the Quantity of Money 
Assume now that, again starting from full equilibrium where g = p 
gp*, gy = gy*, and gy = gy*, the monetary authority reduces 
the rate of growth of the money supply. The "initial deficiency" 1n the 
quantity of money will cause individuals who have been induced to trade 
money for other assets (government bonds) or who have otherwise suffered 
a decline in their money balances to try to restore that level of real 
balances which equates MR/P for their portfolios. The transaction 
raised the marginal return for a unit of money so that now it is 
higher than for any other asset. 
This group of affected wealth holders will attempt to sell more 
goods and services than they are purchasing. On the whole, however, 
they cannot succeed: "One man's expenditures are another man's 
receipts" (1982, p. 18). The aggregate attempt to do so will lead to 
reduced spending on assets and to falling prices of these assets (or a 
fall in the rate of their price change) as agents attempt to trade them 
for higher money balances (see figure 2.5). In terms of equation (2), a 
discrepancy is introduced into the second term in parentheses, and the 
decline in gMs reduces gy. This occurs because the fall in the rate 









Figure 2.5 Friedman's existing asset market. Response to a decline in 
nominal money balances. 
produced assets. Given Friedman's assumption that output prices are 
flexible, producers of assets will notice that the rate of change in 
prices of goods they are producing is falling. 
Now assume that the decline in &Ms is unanticipated. Producers 
therefore perceive that the real wage rate in terms of the goods they 
are producing is rising. Accordingly, ~ < 1 in equations (3) and (4), 
and both gy and 8p will decline. 
The decline in gp will reduce the demand for labor and cause the 
nominal wage rate to be lower than it otherwise would have been. On the 
labor supply side, workers see the rate of change in the nominal wage 
rate falling. This fall occurs because the supply of workers at the 
former nominal wage rate is greater than the demand. Workers, though, 
do not realize that the transmission process is causing the rate of 
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change of prices of all goods and services to fall, and they perceive 
that the fall in the rate of change of the nominal wage 1s identical to 
a fall in the real wage rate. Therefore, they will supply a smaller 
quantity of labor at each actual real wage rate (see figure 2.6) 
(1976a, p. 223; 1972, p. 930). 
Even though the actual real wage rate may have been constant over 
the cycle, workers and firms have reduced their demand for and supply of 
labor in the interim, both perceiving a movement in the real wage rate 
due to misperceptions caused by changes in the rate of change in prices. 
Agents' anticipations had been that the former rate of price change 
would continue. 
Firms who reduced output 1n response to a fall in the rate of 
change of prices did so because they perceived that the price of their 
W/P 
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Figure 2.6 Friedman's market for labor and goods. 
decrease in nominal money balances. 




product had fallen relative to the prices of inputs, including labor 
services (see figure 2.6). Price signals were necessary to cause a 
cutback in output, or recession. A falling level of prices is not 
necessary for recession, but it is necessary that agents' expectations 
are not realized. A recession is caused by the rate of actual price 
change being lower than the expected rate of price change. 
If all agents had had full information that the rates of all 
prices would change eventually, or, in other words, if they had 
anticipated the rate of change in prices, the recession would not have 
occurred. Firms would have lowered the rate of change in the nominal 
wage to the extent that the real wage would have remained constant at 
the previous level of output, since no changes in real magnitudes had 
occurred. Workers would have adjusted their supply of labor to conform 
with the new rate of change in prices, thus supplying the same quantity 
of labor as before, since the actual and perceived real wage would have 
remained constant. 
If a decrease in money caused output to fall, the recession in 
output is not permanent. As the rate of change in prices of assets are 
lowered through the transmission process, the effect spreads to all 
other prices in turn. Since the rate of spending on assets has fallen, 
the relative prices of assets are lower than that for consumption 
services. This imbalance discourages spending for consumption which by 
the same process lowers the prices of these goods and services. The 
lowered level of output causes the demand for real balances to fall and 
the marginal return on a unit of money to be lowered. Additionally, 
real balances are restored on the supply side through the effect of a 
I 
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falling price level which raises the price of money. At the new 
equilibrium MR/P for money is equal to that for other assets (1982, pp. 
18-19). 
At this point, agents have adjusted their price expectations to 
the different rate of price change. They are then prepared to adjust 
their output decisions to reflect their real long run optimal position. 
Producers will realize that there will be a higher profit from the 
former level of output. Workers will realize that their real wage has 
found its former level. When anticipations adjust, there are no more 
barriers to the optimum production level. In terms of figure 2.6, the 
labor and goods markets return to point o. In terms of growth rates, 
gp* and &y* adjust downward so that Sp• Sp*, Sy• gy*, and 
gy = &y*, and long-run equilibrium is restored. 
Price Misperceptions 
An unanticipated increase in the supply of money induces an 
increase in spending on existing assets causing their prices to rise. 
Individuals then react by increasing spending on new assets, and then on 
new output in general. The result is an increase in nominal demand (Y). 
Due to price misperceptions, producers react by increasing output and 
increasing the demand for labor. The resulting rise in the nominal wage 
rate induces workers to increase the quantity of labor supplied. Firms 
seek to increase production of those goods whose prices have risen, but 
they do not recognize that all other prices have risen. 
Therefore the sets of information are different to the two groups. 
Firms that produce goods whose demand has fallen relative to other 
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demands are unaware of the situation, since, to them, the prices of what 
they sell have not changed. Therefore, a misperception on the part of 
firms of the behavior of prices is necessary for any cyclical increase 
in output to occur. 
An Anticipated Increase in the Quantity of Money 
If agents were aware that the supply of money were being 
increased, they would expect inflation. But this expectation of 
inflation does not interfere with their tendency to equate marginal 
returns in their portfolios. If agents expect inflation and they 
received new money just equal percentage-wise to the increase in the 
price level, their long run best interest would be to hold the new 
money rather than spend it (1982, p. 413; 1969e, p. 10). But, in the 
interim between the distribution of the new money and the full rise in 
the price level, there is an opportunity for some agents to profit by 
trading the cash for assets with higher yields. If inflation is fully 
expected, prices may rise before any actual spending changes. 
Even if the recipients of the new money expect a one time price 
rise due to the new money, they will spend their new balances to 
capitalize on the short run profit opportunity. As they attempt to 
spend on goods and services, though, sellers of the goods and services 
also expect a one time price rise, and, to protect their profits, they 
will sell only at prices that reflect the expected price rise. Thus, if 
the quantity of money is fully anticipated, suppliers of output and 
labor will not be subject to price misperceptions and there will be no 
increase in output and employment (1977, p. 464). 
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At an anticipated 20 percent per year inflation, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
would have some real effects by altering desired cash balances, 
for example, but ••••••••••••••• it need not change 
the natural rate of unemployment (1977, p. 464). 
In this case, there is no opportunity for a change in the real rate of 
interest, since if the prices of services and their sources rise by the 
same percentage, the ratio will remain constant (1982, pp. 527-530). 
This process will occur rapidly due to the expectations adjustment so 
that there will be no perceptible change in the interest rate, and real 
balances will remain constant, while prices will reflect fully the 
change in the nominal stock of money (1982, p. 483). "In our example, 
prices rise, though markets are continuously cleared, because everybody 
knows that they will" (1969e, p. 10). 
Return to Long-Run Equilibrium 
When a monetary-induced expansion has taken place and prices of 
assets have risen, agents see a relative price difference between them 
and their services due to the lowered interest rates. During the 
adjustment process of getting rid of excess balances, they switch 
spending to consumption services thus driving up their prices. As 
producers increase output in response to the rise in the prices of 
assets, demand for real balances increases. At the same time, the 
rising price level is reducing the real supply of money. 
The initial excess of nominal balances will therefore tend to be 
eliminated ••• by either a reduction in the real quantity 
available to hold through price rises, or an increase in the real 
quantity desired through output increases (1982 1 pp. 18-19). 
Since nominal income changes only when there is a "discrepancy 
between the nominal quantity of money demanded and the nominal quantity 
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supplied" (1982, p. 62), then, when this discrepancy is eliminated, 
agents are back in long run equilibrium. The adjustment will bring the 
interest rate "back to its initial position," since the prices of the 
sources and services are back in alignment (1982, p. 490), and "[r]eal 
balances and the real supply of and demand for loanable funds would be 
at their initial level" (1982, p. 488). 
Producers or sellers who increased output in expectation of higher 
profits due to higher relative prices, find that all other prices have 
adjusted and that the increased output level is not the profit 
maximizing level. They find they had confused a general increase in 
nominal demand with an increase for their particular product (1982, p. 
415). 
At the culmination of this process, the marginal returns in the 
portfolio again are equalized, since with the higher price level, wealth 
holders desire a larger stock of nominal balances to maintain their 
stock of real balances. The MR/P ratio of money will be temporarily 
higher than for other assets, and individuals who had traded money for 
other assets will increase their nominal balances after the price level 
rises. 
If, as we have argued, demand for money is related to permanent 
income, the liquidity preference curve ••• will initially shift 
to the right in lesser proportion than the rise in ••• nominal 
income, though ultimately it will have to shift in full proportion 
(1982, pp. 488-489). 
The impact [lower rates of interest] and the intermediate [higher 
nominal income] effects together would, by themselves, ultimately 
produce a return to the initial rate of interest (1982, p. 487). 
However, the adjustment process takes a long time, and involves 
relative price changes in the meanwhile. 
A swing produced by monetary disturbance can. • be expected to 
take a considerable time ••• and to display a consistent pattern 
of reaction of both nominal and real magnitudes (1982, P. 260). 
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The deviation from the long run trend in output growth is 
manifested as a cyclical recession or expansion, and in Friedman's 
"personal judgment," 
•• the initial effects of a higher and unanticipated rate of 
inflation last for something like two to five years ••• a full 
adjustment takes I say, a couple of decades (1968 1 p. 11). 
The higher or lower rate of output, though significant in strength and 
duration, was not permanent since it occurred due to a misperception on 
the part of producers. These misperceptions will be corrected in the 
course of the full adjustment: 
The transition between the short-run adjustment process and 
long-run equilibrium is produced by a revision _in anticipated 
values in response to measured values in such a way that ••• a 
single disturbance sets up discrepancies that are in the course of 
time eliminated. (1982, p. 64) 
Discrepancies between the rates of price and output change and 
their permanent values. produce revisions in the 
anticipated values that ••• after a cyclical reaction process, 
eliminate the discrepancies between measured and permanent values. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • [We assume ] an 
anticipated value is revised at a rate proportional to the 
discrepancy between actual and anticipated values (1982, p. 65). 
Thus the increase in output will automatically be reversed as employers 
discover that the real wage has not fallen and workers discover that the 
real wage has not risen. 
Effects on the Nominal Rate of Interest 
Friedman and Schwartz see real and nominal interest rates lowered 
in the short run as prices of the sources are bid up relative to the 
prices of the services. Nominal rates will be lowered for a time until 
the "effects" of the new money begin to reverse themselves. This should 
occur "in something less than a year" (1968 1 p. 6). The real portion of 
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the interest rate will revert to its permanent value in the course of 
the long run adjustment process since wealth holders will attempt to 
equate marginal returns in their portfolios. 
The key feature of this process is that it tends to raise the 
prices of sources •• relative to the prices of the services 
themselves •••• But these reactions in their turn tend to 
raise the prices of services relative to the prices of sources, 
this is, to undo the initial effects on interest rates (1969b, pp. 
255-256). 
There may be a lasting effect on the nominal rate if wealth holders 
permanently incorporate inflation anticipations. There would be a 
"price anticipation" premium on the real rate of interest which would 
make the nominal rate and real rates unequal (1982, pp. 490-491). There 
could theoretically be effects on the real rate itself due to 
anticipation of inflation, since this would cause savers to economize on 
cash balances and prefer other forms of wealth which may be less 
"productive." But, Friedman and Schwartz "conclude that the real 
rate [can be] regarded as unaffected by anticipated inflation" (1982, 
P• 494). 
Once anticipations catch up with the new price level, real rates 
of interest will depend only on changes in real conditions in the 
economy mentioned above. The prices of services will be in the same 
proportion to the prices of the sources as before. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRIEDMAN'S INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL THEORY 
A. Friedman's Interpretation of The General Theory 
Friedman criticizes Keynes' unemployment "equilibrium" in The 
General Theory as "explained by rigidities or imperfections, not as the 
natural outcome of a fully operative market process" (1968, p. 3). 
Keynes, according to Friedman, is guilty of incorporating a liquidity 
trap to prevent full employment in the long run and to insure rigid 
prices in the short run. Additionally, Keynes failed to recognize the 
wealth effect which would have assured the existence of a full 
employment equilibrium even in the event of a liquidity trap. 
According to Friedman, a fully operative market process would work 
to eliminate deviations from equilibrium by changes in the price level. 
Unemployment is a characteristic of a short run departure from long run 
equilibrium which tends to be corrected by market forces. If 
involuntary unemployment existed, unemployed workers would have a 
tendency to "offer their labor services at a slightly lower real wage 
• " (1976a, p. 214). Friedman asks, "How is this force contained?" 
(1976a, p. 214). Institutional factors may be responsible for "delaying 
the adjustment," but cannot be responsible for "enforcing a long run 
stable equilibrium position at less than full employment" (1976a, P• 
215). 
In Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' theory, he identifies 
three propositions on which he says Keynes relied: 
1. As a purely theoretical matter, a long run equilibrium 
position characterized by "full employment" of resources need not 
exist, even if all prices are flexible. 
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2. As an empirical matter, prices can be regarded as rigid--an 
institutional datum--for short-run economic fluctuations; that 
is, the distinction between real and nominal magnitudes that is at 
the heart of the quantity theory is not important for such 
fluctuations. 
3. The demand for money has a particular empirical form 
--corresponding to absolute liquidity preference--that makes 
velocity highly unstable much of the time, so that ••• changes 
in the quantity of money produce offsetting changes in V. This 
proposition is critical for the other two •••• Absolute 
liquidity preference at an interest rate approaching zero is a 
necessary though not a sufficient condition for proposition 1. 
Absolute liquidity preference at the "conventional" interest rate 
explains why Keynes regarded the quantity equation. • as 
largely useless for policy or for predicting short-run 
fluctuations in nominal and real income (identical by proposition 
2) (1982, PP• 41-42). 
The Liquidity Trap 
It seems that Friedman's interpretation of The General Theory 
places the blame for a level of output at which there is unemployment on 
the existence of a liquidity trap at the existing level of rand Y. The 
liquidity trap enforces a long-run unemployment equilibrium even if all 
prices are flexible. 
Keynes described the demand for money as separable into various 
"motives." Demand for money from the speculative motive in real terms 
is a decreasing function of the rate of interest. If there is an 
increase in the supply of money, wealth owners will hold it as an asset 
only if the rate of interest falls. In order for the rate of interest 
to be lowered, recipients of the new money balances must "bid up" prices 
of assets and securities and thus lower their yields. Therefore the 
rate of interest (or price of bonds) which equates the purchases and 
sales of bonds or assets will be the new equilibrium rate of interest. 
Wealth owners are holding more cash, and the rate of interest is 
lowered. 
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The liquidity trap is a perfectly elastic demand for money balances, in 
which persons would rather "hold" additions to the money stock rather 
than purchase an interest bearing asset at such a low rate of interest. 
It is characterized by a perfectly elastic range in the demand for money 
"curve." Normally, as the rate of interest falls, wealth holders will 
desire more cash to hold for future profit opportunities. If a 
liquidity trap exists, the demand for money becomes infinite at some low 
rate of interest. In this case, all wealth owners desire liquidity at 
that rate because they believe that the future rate of interest will be 
higher. An increase in the supply of money would have no effect on the 
prices and yields of bonds and other assets because the wealth holders 
would not spend it to purchase bonds or other assets, thus prices would 
not rise and the yields would not fall. Wealth holders are waiting for 
the prices of assets to fall (yields to increase) and are holding 
"liquid" assets (money) in the interim. Wealth holders are willing to 
sell an infinite quantity of bonds, but are willing to buy none at 
this low rate. 
If there were a liquidity trap, the LM curve would have a flat 
portion where the demand for money is perfectly elastic (see figure 
3.1). Therefore, shifts in the LM curve (from LM0 to LM1) due to an 
increase in the quantity of money would not lower the interest rate or 
affect nominal income. The LM curve represents the loci at which rand 
Y are in equilibrium in the assets market. Since r • r 0 represents 
the lowest market rate that can exist, then an increase in the quantity 
of money would be nugatory. Real income (y) (or nominal income) could 
not be raised by increases in the money supply since the interest rate 
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would not fall in response to an increase in the quantity of money. 
Additionally, a fall in the price level which would increase the supply 
of real balances would have no effect either since it also must operate 
through a shift in the LM curve. The level of output y0 may not be 
changed by any monetary means if there exists a liquidity trap. 
r 
y 
Figure 3.1. An IS-LM representation of the Liquidity Trap. 
B. The Long Run with Flexible Wages and Prices 
If wages and prices were perfectly flexible, as Friedman and 
others believe is necessary for a long run view, the price level would 
adjust to restore that level of real balances which would provide full 
employment. However, a falling price level would be deprived of its 
beneficial effects in the case of absolute liquidity preference. 
Friedman maintains that the liquidity trap is Keynes' ultimate 
barrier to full employment. 
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If liquidity preference were absolute, or nearly so,--as Keynes 
believed likely in times of heavy unemployment--interest rates 
cannot be lowered by monetary measures. If investment and 
consumption are little affected by interest rates, ••• lower 
interest rates, even if they could be achieved, would do little 
good (1968, p. 2). 
Time and time again when Keynes must face up to precisely what it 
is that prevents a full-employment equilibrium, his final line of 
defense is absolute liquidity preference (1972, p. 942). 
I do not see how anyone can ••• come to any other conclusion 
than that his 'special twist' was highly elastic liquidity 
preference and that 'this was a key element in Keynes' 
proposition' about the possibility that there might not be a 
full-employment equilibrium even with flexible prices (1972, p. 
942). 
Friedman and Friedman and Schwartz have charged that the existence 
of a liquidity trap is "necessary" and a "key element" for long run 
unemployment equilibrium if all prices are flexible. 
If all prices are flexible, then any output level requiring less 
than full employment can never be stable because as long as at least one 
person is involuntarily unemployed, it would be in his best interest to 
offer his labor services at a lower "price" thereby putting additional 
downward pressure on the general price level. Keynes' model, according 
to Friedman, recognizes this automatic adjustment, but relies on an 
extraneous force (the liquidity trap) to prevent it from operating. 
Using an IS-LM framework to describe the automatic adjustment 
process in figure 3.2, let y • real output, Y • nominal income, M • 
nominal money balances, N • the level of employment, P • the level of 
prices, r • the rate of interest. Now, assume the economy is in 
full-employment equilibrium at y • Yf, with employment No• Nf• 
The nominal money supply is M0 , the price level Po, and the interest 
rate r 0• Let some decline in aggregate demand resulting in a decline 
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in spending so that the IS curve shifts to the left, causing the new 
equilibrium level of output to be y1• 
r 
y 
Figure 3.2. An IS-LM representation of a decline in demand. 
In figure 3.3, the output and labor market for the firm is shown. 
Firms have a production function y • f(N) such that F'(N) • MPN < O, 
where the quantity of labor demanded is a function only of the marginal 
product of labor. If price~ are flexible, then Pis bid down to P1 to 
maintain sales. Therefore, the demand for labor will fall to D1 • 
HPN*P1 and employment will fall to N1• 
This situation is unstable. Unemployed workers will immediately 
bid the nominal wage to w2 to secure employment. Because of pure 
competition in the labor market, the equilibrium wage rate for all 
workers will fall from w0 to w2• Firms will rehire the workers at 
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Figure 3.3. Adjustment of the output market and labor market to a decline in demand. 
W2 because at this lower wage, the marginal product of the worker is 
equal to the wage rate at the same level of employment. But, aggregate 
spending is lower since the total wage income has fallen Cw2 * No) 
so if the prices of goods and services fall enough to bring about a 
price level of P2 , then the market will clear. Real output is 
restored to its former level yf• employment is at Nf' but prices and 
wages have fallen to P2 and w2• Through the lowered price level, 
the LM curve will shift to the right tp LM1(p2) in figure 3.4, and 
spending will be restored in real terms. 
r 
Figure 3.4. Return to full employment via an increase in real balances 
through falling prices. 
The real quantity of money balances has increased at the lower 
price level. At the same time that the product market is finding its 
new equilibrium level of output, ~hanges in the real money supply are 
operating to lower interest rates and increase investment spending, 
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which hastens the return to full employment. At M0 /p01 the LM curve 
is at LM0• But, the fall in P shifts the LM curve to LM1 which 
corresponds to M0/p2 (see figure 3.4). If this were the only effect 
of lowered prices, it would be capable of restoring full employment at 
(Yf, r 2), even if the IS curve did not shift back to 1s01 due to 
the pressure on wages, but remained at 1s1• In figure 3.5, the supply 
of labor curve shifts to the right to reflect the lowered price level. 






Figure 3.5. Restoration of full employment in the 
labor market due to the effect of falling prices. 
N 
As long as there continues to be pressure on prices to fall due to 
the existence of unemployment, the LM curve will shift to the right 
until full employment is restored at a lower rate of interest. 
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If, however, a liquidity trap exists, the interest rate will not 
be lowered and output cannot be increased by falling wages and prices 
augmenting the real supply of money. Thus Friedman contends that the 
liquidity trap is critical for Keynes' proposition (1). 
Friedman and Schwartz discredit totally proposition (1) from a 
theoretical standpoint, stating that this proposition "has been 
demonstrated to be false" (1982, p. 42). They point out that "Keynes's 
error consisted of neglecting the role of wealth in the consumption 
function (1982, p. 42). Keynes "recognized in his asides that 
wealth has an effect on consumption," but failed to incorporate this 
mechanism in his formal theory (1982, p. 45). Friedman considers the 
wealth effect theoretically pervasive: 
There always exists, with a fixed nominal quantity of money, a 
rate of price decline sufficiently great to reconcile at full 
employment the desires of producing enterprises to invest and of 
wealth holders to save, no matter how stubborn both are (1976a, p. 
320). 
The wealth effect would operate to offset the power of the liquidity 
trap to prevent full employment since it affects the IS curve only. 
The wealth effect derives from the lowered price level and 
operates on the value of "savings" held in the form of fixed money 
assets. Holders of this wealth experience an increase in the real value 
of this wealth as the price level falls. Of course, fixed money assets 
are two sided--for every debtor there is a creditor. But, it has been 
theorized that if the debtor is the government, then this debt may be 
imperfectly acknowledged by the citizens whose liability it is. 
Therefore, a fall in the price level would increase the wealth of debt 
holders but would not increase the perceived liablility of the taxpayers 
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who are responsible for the debt. In the case of currency, or outside 
money, the holder generally recognizes no liability whatsoever. 
Wealth changes operate on the willingness to spend and save. If 
wealth holders realize an increase in their wealth, they will spend more 
from a given level of current income, thus raising the aggregate level 
of spending. Therefore, when the price level falls, the IS curve will 
shift to the right, since with the increased wealth, less saving would 
occur at each value of y, and the product market would be in equilibrium 
at combinations of greater values of randy. If no other effects were 
forthcoming from the fall in prices (no change in the LM curve) given 
the wealth effect on spending, prices would eventually fall enough to 
restore equilibrium through shifting the IS curve. 
Through the wealth effect of falling prices, the IS curve will 
shift back to IS0 to restore equilibrium at full employment. At full 
employment, the rate of interest which prevails would equate the desires 
of savers and investors. As shown in figure 3.6, any level less than 
Yf will result in pressure on prices to fall further. 
Thus there are two forces operating to restore full employment in 
the long run, but they both depend on the fall in the wage and price 
level. If one mechanism fails, there is another to back it up. If 
Keynes did neglect the role of a desired level of wealth, an important 
effect of falling prices would be that households would spend more and 
save less thus shifting the IS curve to the right. This effect would 
take place even if a liquidity trap existed because it does not depend 
on a fall in the interest rate. 










Wealth effect with a liquidity trap 
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Figure 3.6. The Wealth Effect of falling prices. 
y 
Wealth effect in the absence of a liquidity trap 
equilibrium interest rate is the expected rate of interest. At a very 
low rate, the return gained from holding other assets would not be 
enough to compensate for the additional risk involved. Therefore, 
liquidity preference becomes absolute. Friedman says that Keynes 
believed that this minimum rate set a "floor" to the market rate when 
the equilibrium rate would have to be lower to clear the market at full 
employment (1982, p. 55). 
Friedman and Schwartz see a "fallacy" in this argument since they 
say that the existence of money would force these two rates to be the 
same. The equilibrium rate would be adjusted through a flexible price 
level so as to introduce a floor to the equilibrium rate making it 
identical to the market rate. This is another way to look at the 
"wealth effect" that Keynes missed in his theory, even though in his 
"asides" he recognized that it existed (1982, p. 55). 
Even with a liquidity trap, the market rate could be the 
equilibrium rate if the price level fell enough so that consumption were 
stimulated to the extent that full employment were restored. Therefore, 
this is Keynes' fatal "error." Even though he acknowledged its 
existence, he failed to realize its key role in long run adjustment. No 
unemployment equilibrium is possible with flexible wages and prices. 
Thus proposition (1) has been demonstrated to be "false," and even some 
of Keynes' most noted disciples have acknowledged this fact. 1 
1 James Tobin stated that, "[he[ did not establish an underemploy-
ment equilibrium" (1975, p. 201). Also, Don Patinkin feels that Keynes 
only demonstrated a short run disequilibrium, not an unemployment 
equilibrium (1965, p. 337). But, Patinkin thinks too much attention has 
been paid to this question since the focus on "equilibrium" has caused 
an undue emp~asis on rigid money wages or a liquidity trap. Patinkin 
himself considers Keynes' theory in view of a disequilibrium setting. 
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C. Short Run Price Rigidity 
Friedman and Schwartz analyze short run price rigidity in the 
General Theory as having the necessary condition of the liquidity 
trap. Existence of a perfectly elastic demand for money is the root 
cause of short run price rigidity. 
Keynes, they say, "assumed" rigid wages because there was a "lack 
of concordance between observed phenomena and the implications of a 
literal application of Marshall's assumption to aggregate magnitudes" 
(1982, p. 47). Therefore, Keynes reversed the roles that Marshall had 
assigned to price and quantity variables: quantity adjusts quickly while 
price adjusts slowly "at least downward" (1982, p. 46). The 
"idiosyncratic" period between World War I and the writing of the 
General Theory influenced Keynes to abandon his former quantity theory 
leanings and fit a new theory to the empirical observances (1982, p. 
621). But, say Friedman and Schwartz, he carried it to the "extreme, 
all adjustment in quantity, none in price" (1982, p. 48). 
Friedman and Schwartz say that Keynes "rationalized" his 
assumption of wage rigidity on two levels: on the surface, he relied on 
institutional variables such as trade unions and money illusion; at a 
deeper level, he relied on proposition (1)--there could be no 
equilibrium price level if there were no equilibrium. Wage rigidity, 
they say, was crucial to Keynes' model to "fix the price level" and lend 
stability to the system (1982, p. 47). 
It was Keynes' "erroneous interpretation" of the Great Depression 
which led him to regard monetary policy as "ineffective in stemming a 
decline" (1982, p. 48) Due to his assumption about prices, the quantity 
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theory equation could be rewritten as: M/P = ky, where M = nominal 
money balances, P = the price level, k = the inverse of velocity (the 
demand for real balances), y = real income. If the quantity of money 
were increased, and if Pis assumed constant, then all adjustment would 
have to take place on the right side of the equation. Even at this 
point, say Friedman and Schwartz, Keynes' theory could be consistent 
with a monetary interpretation of changes in output. But at this point 
he introduces absolute liquidity preference. 
If elastic liquidity preference exists, adjustment would take 
place mostly through changes ink. The demand for money would be highly 
elastic so as to absorb the almost the entire change in the money 
supply. In Keynes' "most extreme, and we are tempted to say purest" 
form of his theory (1982, p. 48), all changes are ink; liquidity 
preference is absolute; there are no possible effects on y. 
Keynes' rationale for this position, according to Friedman and 
Schwartz, is the demand for money function he specifies in which the 
speculative demand is highly sensitive to changes in the rate of 
interest. Since the interest rate is a "price"--the price of credit 
(1982, pp. 26, 48), then by assumption this price is "slow to adjust". 
The variable that must adjust is "the real quantity of money people 
desire to hold" (1982, p. 48).2 An infinitesimal change in the 
2 In another discussion of the relation between the liquidity trap 
and rigid prices, Friedman and Schwartz say that in the event of a 
change in the quantity of money "Keynes supposes that the whole of the 
adjustment will be ink. And this result can also be regarded 
as a direct consequence of his assumption about the relative speed of 
adjustment of price and quantity." (1982, p. 48) In this case there is 
a reversal of the previous causation. Since the adjustment ink is 
the liquidity trap, Friedman and Schwartz are saying that sticky prices 
cause a liquidity trap (or that if Keynes' model is to have sticky 
prices, it must logically have absolute liquidity preference.) 
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interest rate would cause an infinite change in the quantity of money 
demanded. 
Friedman and Schwartz's conclusions from this analysis are that 
absolute liquidity preference and rigid prices (including interest 
rates) go hand in hand. Otherwise, a change in the quantity of money 
would affect interest rates. A change in interest rates implies that 
there has been a change in the price of assets (or in their returns), 
and this would mean that a change in the quantity of money affected 
prices. Keynes' theory did not admit this possibility according to 
Friedman and Schwartz. With absolute liquidity preference, nothing is 
affected by a change in the supply of money except a change in the 
demand for real balances in the same proportion. Changes in the supply 
of money do not affect prices of assets, interest rates, the level of 
output, or the price level of output. Therefore, a theory that 
incorporates rigid prices must have some theoretical cause--in Keynes' 
theory it was absolute liquidity preference. 
As Friedman and Schwartz point out, this is really not the same 
thing as asserting that prices and wages are "constant." It only means 
that Keynes' theory provided for no effects on prices or wages as a 
result of a change in the quantity of money (1982, p. 49). There are 
"forces" which determine the wage level, but these are not part of the 
"theory in question," but are affected by forces "abstracted from in the 
theory," and a result of "ad hoc relations" (1982, p. 49). It was not 
enough for Keynes to admit that wage and price changes occur; they were 
not a direct consequence of his monetary theory, so his formal theory 
"has nothing to say about what determines the absolute price or wage 
level "(1982, p. 50). 
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Friedman says Keynes theorized that the interest rate could not be 
changed by any monetary means in the short run because at "low" interest 
rates a liquidity trap would exist, but at higher rates there would be 
an "unstable" demand for money in which velocity would change to offset 
any change in the money supply by the banking authority (1972, p. 908). 
This unstable demand for money would be caused by speculators who would 
move quickly to offset any change in banking policy. These speculators 
have expectations that the "conventional" interest rate will persist in 
the future, thus they will frustrate any attempt of the monetary 
authority to affect the rate of interest by buying and selling bonds. 
If the central bank tried to increase the money supply and lower 
the rate of interest by purchasing bonds, these speculators would sell 
an infinite supply of bonds at the going price. Wealth holders who 
would have been induced to sell at the higher prices find that these 
speculators flooded the market thus driving down the price to the former 
level. The slightest rise in the price of bonds would encourage them to 
sell their bonds and effectively frustrate the attempt of the monetary 
authority to raise bond prices. 
A similar situation would exist when the monetary authority 
attempted to lower bond prices and raise yields. These same speculators 
would buy an infinite quantity of bonds at the slightest lowering of 
bond prices, in order to profit when the price rose again. If these 
speculators exist, then the monetary authority is blocked in its efforts 
to lower or raise the rate of interest. Its actions merely change the 
quantity of money balances held by these speculators (1982, pp. 53-54). 
A feature of this phenomenon is that nominal income becomes 
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independent of the quantity of money. If nominal income increases (for 
some reason other than a monetary inducement) which requires an increase 
in transactions balances, then holders of these speculative balances 
will provide them at no increase in interest rates. Conversely, these 
speculators will absorb all excess balances made available by a fall in 
nominal income, even if the rate of interest does not fall. 
The conclusion is that in circumstances of absolute liquidity 
preference, income can change without a change in Mor in 
interest rates and M can change without a change in income or in 
interest rates. The holders of money are in metastable 
equilibrium, like a tumbler on its side on a flat surface; they 
will be satisfied with whatever the amount of money happens to be 
(1982, p. 54). . 
Friedman and Schwartz conclude that Keynes saw absolute liquidity 
preference at the conventional rate of interest in the short run, so 
that money changes are unimportant in explaining changes in prices, 
output, or rates of interest. They say that Keynes did qualify this 
assertion by applying it only to conditions of unemployment, and that at 
high levels of employment the demand for money is "unstable." At full 
employment, they say, he conceded that increases in the supply of money 
would affect prices, and in fact it would only affect prices. This 
qualification, though, is unimportant, since Keynes paid only "lip 
service" to the possibility that it could happen, so it would do his 
theory no injustice to neglect it (1982, p. 49). 
Implications of the Liquidity Trap 
Friedman and Schwartz see a difference between a long run and a 
short run liquidity trap which they say that Keynes and his followers 
"tended to merge" (1982, p. 55). As a consequence, the important 
effects of the expected interest rates in the demand for money were 
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omitted. The theoretical distinction between the long and short run 
liquidity traps is necessary to point out consequences of long run or 
short run liquidity preference. The long run liquidity trap is caused 
by the expected rate of interest R* being so low that "the extra return 
from holding non-money assets would only just compensate for the extra 
risks involved" (1982, p. 54). This long run liquidity trap involves 
the risk factors of investing long term rather than activity by 
speculators. The liquidity trap in the long run may occur only at an 
interest rate approaching zero, while in the short run it may occur at 
the "conventional" rate due to the activity of speculators. 
Friedman's Interpretation of Keynes' Demand for Money 
Keynes' system "emphasized the relation between nominal income and 
investment or autonomous expenditures rather than the relation between 
nominal income and the stock of money" (1982, p. 41). Therefore his 
monetary theory was more of an appendage to his basic income-expenditure 
approach. Even though Keynes recognized a spectrum of interest rates, 
his "interest rate" corresponded to that on long term government 
securities. This was a result of Keynes' definition of "money" as any 
short term liquid asset, cash and deposits, so that any distinction made 
between money and bonds in Keynes' model would be misleading (1982, P• 
52). 
Keynes' liquidity preference function (demand for money) specifies 
the quantity of nominal balances demanded as a function of "the" rate of 
interest. Friedman and Schwartz note several problems with it. First, 
the demand function should be specified as a function of the difference 
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between the rate of interest and the rate paid on "money," but due to 
the "simplification" Keynes made above, they say, this was not 
necessary. Second, Keynes failed to distinguish between nominal and 
real money balances in his demand function. Again, this is due to his 
assumption that "prices could be taken as rigid" and that nominal and 
real income were identical (1982, p. 481). 
Friedman and Schwartz specify a formalized version of Keynes' 
demand for money function. It is separable into two components, the 
transactions demand and the speculative demand, and each depend on 
different variables (1982, p. 52). 
M/P • M1/P + M2/P • kly + f(R - R*, R*), where kl• 
velocity of transactions and R • the current rate of interest, R* • the 
expected rate of interest, y • real output, M1 • money held for the 
transactions motive, M2 • money held for the speculative motive, M • 
the supply of nominal balances, and P • the price level. In practice, 
Keynes and his followers have treated the demand for money as a function 
of current interest rates, even though they considered the effect of 
expectations in developing the demand for speculative balances. This 
omission was due to their concentration on the short run (1982, P• 53). 
D. The Keynesians: the Narrow Range of Assets 
Criticism of the "Keynesians" 
It is not surprising that hardly an economist today accepts 
Keynes's conclusion about the strictly passive character of~, or the 
accompanying conclusion that • money does not matter" (1982, p. 49). 
Even so, Keynesian economists are identifiable by their tendencies to 
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adopt Keynes' assumptions about the relative speed of adjustment of 
price and quantity (1982, p. 49). If they reject absolute liquidity 
preference, then they must offer some other explanation of sticky 
prices. 
Friedman and Schwartz see a ''more subtle difference between the 
approach of economists in the Keynesian tradition and the approach we 
have adopted" (1982, p. 57), and that difference concerns the effects of 
the range of assets considered for the transmission process. The 
transmission mechanism by which changes in the quantity of money operate 
to change real variables such as output, employment and the rate of 
interest, forms the basis for monetary theory. Any differences that are 
apparent in monetary theories must find their origin in the transmission 
process. 
Friedman and Meiselman distinguish between two views of the 
transmission process, one of which focuses on "credit" effects and the 
other on "monetary" effects. The "credit" view concentrates "on a 
narrow and well-defined range of capital assets and a correspondingly 
narrow range of associated expenditures" 0963, p. 217). The yields 
from these assets can be sunnnarized by "a" rate of interest, which 
becomes the focus of the analysis to the exclusion of other effects. 
The "credit" view recognizes that investment expenditures are 
financed generally by debts and equities, and there is a close link 
between the prices and yields on these assets and the Keynesian 
income-expenditure explanation of movements in output. Since investment 
spending is sensitive to changes in the rate of interest, as monetary 
policy affects "the" rate of interest, it allows for increases in 
81 
investment spending. Income is affected as the multiplier operates on 
changes in investment. Therefore, for those who adopt this "credit" 
view, "the important thing about money 
class of expenditures" (1963, p. 217). 
is how it affects this 
The "monetary" view on the other hand is a ''much different, and 
broader view" (1963, p. 218). Adopting this perspective, households 
possess a stock of "capital" which provides services that they consume. 
So, at any time, the whole stock of unconsumed goods, including physical 
capital which they may hold in the form of claims on enterprises, real 
estate, personal consumer durables (including clothes and food), and 
human capital, represents the range of assets considered for the 
monetary view. There is an interest rate implicit in all "assets" which 
measures the yield or services provided by the good, so monetary policy 
affects the prices and yields of all goods. 
Friedman and Meiselman argue that the "monetary" view is "more 
useful" than the credit view. They maintain that it has been 
empirically demonstrated that changes in money affect more than interest 
rates on a narrow class of financial assets. Money affects "a much 
broader range of assets" and therefore the rates implicit in them 0963, 
pp. 221-222). Friedman and Schwartz contend that the broader range of 
assets is theoretically necessary for tracing changes in the quantity of 
money. The narrow channel (corresponding to the credit view) does not 
take into account the full impact that changes in money have on 
expenditures for goods, their prices, and on implicit rates of interest, 
so that they "insist that a far wider range of assets and interest 
rates must be taken into account" (1982, p. 58). 
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Friedman and Schwartz pinpoint the major difference in monetary 
theory as dependent upon the range of assets considered for the 
portfolio (1982 1 p. 58). They contend that the narrow range adopted by 
the Keynesian& provides the underpinning for a model in which the price 
level cannot be affected by monetary policy. If the range of assets is 
"extremely narrow," then the only "price" that is affected by changes in 
the quantity of money would be the prices of those particular assets in 
the savers' portfolios and their accompanying rates of interest. 
Therefore, "r" can vary in response to monetary changes, but prices of 
other existing assets (such as real estate and durables) and of current 
output will not be affected and thus can remain stable. Monetary 
changes would have no direct link to the general price level. Those 
economists who adopt the "credit" view of the transmission process can 
assume away effects of changes in the quantity of money on the price 
level in their theories. These economists, then, see money as affecting 
only "the" rate of interest which is the "market rate on a fairly narrow 
class of financial liabilities" (1982 1 p. 57), whose effect depends on 
the interest elasticity of investment expenditure. Therefore, they can 
theorize that changes in money affect spending on current output 
indirectly and sometimes weakly. 
E. Conclusions about Keynes' Monetary Theory 
Friedman and Schwartz contend that it is the empirical data which 
have discredited Keynes' theory, and of course the data were unavailable 
to him at the time (1982 1 pp. 621-622). Others have "expressed" the 
view that Keynes' theory is highly special, but they have not been able 
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to document it with evidence as fully as Friedman and Schwartz feel they 
have been able to do (p. 622). 
Friedman attributes the liquidity trap to Keynes as an explanation 
of the cause of rigid prices while he attributes the narrow range of 
assets to the Keynesians as their rationale for the same phenomenon. 
The result is that price level changes, which are critical for the 
automatic adjustment that Friedman sees as operational, do not occur. 
In the case of the Keynesians, monetary policy has "more significance" 
(1982, p. 49), but he sees Keynes as considering expansionary monetary 
policy as "ineffective in stemming a decline" (1982, p. 48). 
By rejecting the liquidity trap, the Keynesians had to find some 
other way to explain price rigidity, so they focused on the narrow 
transmission channel. The fact that they allow prices to change is of 
no consequence, since their formal theories have no mechanism by which 
prices are affected by changes in aggregate demand. 
If Keynes did adopt the liquidity trap as an explanation of 
unemployment equilibrium, then he had no monetary transmission 
mechanism. Money would not matter at all. Keynes' range of assets 
would reduce to only one--that being money. The LM curve would be 
perfectly flat in the range of absolute liquidity preference: the 
demand for money would be infinite; the demand for bonds would be zero. 
Friedman and Schwartz do not classify Keynes as embracing a narrow 
range of assets as they do the Keynesians. In fact, they say Keynes saw 
no distinction among any assets "whether these be bonds, equities or 
physical assets" because he assumed the price level to be rigid (1982, 
p. 54), and if prices were rigid, the rates of return on these assets 
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would be "fixed" for the short run. Therefore, whether or not a person 
might hold these assets is immaterial--the liquidity trap completely 
negates the transmission mechanism and renders the definition of 
"assets" unimportant. Money remains the only asset relevant to Keynes' 
monetary theory. 
Sticky wages and prices "forced the transmission process to go 
through an extremely narrow channel" for the Keynesians, while flexible 
prices allow Friedman and Schwartz to consider a broad range (1982, p. 
58). Therefore, if Keynes' monetary theory encompassed a liquidity trap 
which rendered prices rigid, then he could not also have a "broad" range 
of assets, which would require flexible prices. 
The conclusion is that Keynes considered monetary policy 
ineffective and that ''money does not matter." Though Friedman qualifies 
his statement with the condition of "in times of heavy unemployment" 
(1968, p. 2), he also states that in Keynes' theory, no monetary-induced 
price changes occur until full employment (1982, p. 623). This would 
imply that monetary policy is never effective in restoring full 
employment if it was instituted at a time of unemployment. 
The implication of Friedman's criticism is that, without the 
liquidity trap, Keynes would have been forced to adopt a flexible price 
model where changes in the supply of money affect prices of assets, both 
existing and newly-produced, and therefore rates of interest. As 
pointed out earlier, Friedman's definition of a "flexible" price is one 
that responds promptly to changes in supply or demand (1972, P• 925). 
Since Friedman's own model incorporates this mechanism, the liquidity 
trap is the barrier to Keynes' admission that his own model is a 
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"version" of the quantity theory with highly "special assumptions." The 
only cause for short-run output fluctuations then would be 
misperceptions of agents as they adjust to price signals. In 
particular, there would be no justification for Keynes' model of 
short-run fluctuations to be characterized by price stickiness if 
liquidity preference were not absolute. (A possible justification would 
be the "narrow range of assets," but recall that Keynes himself did not 
appeal to this justification; only his followers, the "Keynesians" took 
this approach.) If Friedman can discredit the Keynes' theory by showing 
its dependence on the liquidity trap for sticky prices, he has built a 
case against a theory in which unemployment may exist unaided by 
rigidities or not "fully operative" market processes. Thus there is no 
barrier to full employment in the long run, since flexible prices would 




KEYNES' MONETARY THEORY 
A. The Role of Money 
In The General Theory, Keynes considered money to have a key 
role in economic decisions of agents (1936, p. 32). One of his major 
criticisms of the classical school was that no account of money was 
allowed in their theories of employment and determination of output even 
though they purported to be, concerned with a monetary economy (1936, pp. 
19-20, 189). Indeed, Keynes presents a theory of money and its 
influence on employment, interest rates, output, and prices. Keynes' 
monetary theory is bound to his theory of the macro economy so closely 
that he states that it is illegitimate to try to separate monetary 
economics from the study of how output is determined as a whole, so we 
"require the complete theory of a Monetary Economy" 0936, p. 293). 
To spell out Keynes' monetary transmission mechanism, two 
preliminary tasks must be accomplished. First, the rationale behind the 
behavior of agents must be specified to conform with principles of 
maximization: the purpose of holding money or purchasing assets, and 
the inducements to alter the composition of the portfolio; the range of 
assets that an individual may hold for the purpose of storing wealth; 
the demand for money as a possible asset in the portfolio, especially 
the role of other variables such as interest rates, prices, and real 
income in determining the demand for money. 
Second, it is necessary to describe a long run position for the 
economy, the "equilibrium." The stability of long run equilibrium is 
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important for monetary theory and policy implications, and it serves as 
a basis for describing short run fluctuations or deviations. How the 
interest rate, the level of output and employment, and the price level 
are determined at a long run equilibrium, and what effect the level of 
money balances has upon this state, give insight into features of his 
theory that may differ from other monetary theories. It is the 
differences in monetary theory that we are interested in, and if 
conditions of long run equilibrium are different, the desirability and 
effectiveness of monetary policy is at stake. 
Keynes' transmission mechanism specifies how a change in the 
supply of money may affect real variables in the short run. The 
mechanism is subject to the assumptions and conditions of individual 
behavior specified in the long run model. The specific path that 
adjustment follows in the short run depends on the range of assets, the 
demand for money, and the consumption function. The short run 
adjustment and its duration is critical for the difference in outcome of 
monetary theory. 
This chapter will examine Keynes' monetary theory with reference 
to Friedman's criticisms. It will specify Keynes' range of assets, his 
demand for money and possible conditions of the long run state of the 
economy. Then, it will describe the short run adjustment to a change in 
the quantity of money, and what impact the change has on real and 
nominal variables--the level of output and employment, interest rates, 
and prices--and whether this impact may carry over into the long run. 
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B. The Range of Assets 
Friedman and Schwartz have contended that a major difference between 
their approach and that of Keynesians is in the transmission 
mechanism that is assumed to connect a change in the quantity of money 
with a change in total nominal income(• total spending)" (1982, p. 57). 
In particular, 
The difference between us and the Keynesians [the followers of 
Keynes] is less in the nature of the process than in the range of 
assets considered. The Keynesians tend to concentrate on a narrow 
range of marketable assets and recorded interest rates. We insist 
that a far wider range of assets and interest rates must be taken 
into account--such assets as durable and semi-durable consumer 
goods, structures, and other real property. As a result, we 
regard the market rates stressed by the Keynesians as only a small 
part of the total spectrum of rates that are relevant (1982, p. 
58). 
The adoption of the narrow range of assets means that Keynesian& 
can reject absolute liquidity preference and allow interest rates on a 
narrow range of assets to be flexible, while simultaneously continuing 
to regard price of other assets (houses, automobiles, furniture, 
clothes, etc.) as an institutional datum. Thus the Keynesians felt free 
to develop a short-run theory in which output prices and wages are not 
flexible. Friedman, on the other hand, has been led to interpret the 
transmission process in terms of relative price adjustment over a broad 
range of assets. 
Observe that Friedman has criticized only Keynes' followers (and 
not Keynes himself) on the issue of the range of assets. Indeed, to my 
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knowledge, Friedman has not discussed Keynes' views on this issue. But, 
is it not possible that Keynes himself relied on a transmission 
mechanism impinging on a narrow range of assets (rather than on absolute 
liquidity preference) to justify his short-run theory of sticky wages 
and prices? This is the issue addressed in this section. 
A desire for wealth is the motivation behind saving for the 
individual. "Wealth" is merely the "potentiality for consuming an 
unspecified article at an unspecified time" (1936, p. 211), and the 
ultimate goal of all economic activity is consumption (1936, p. 104) 
which is the "only raison d'etre of employment" (1936, p. 211). So 
the act of saving is important for portfolio theory because saving is 
the act of building the portfolio itself. It may not be the saver's 
desire to achieve some rational predetermined goal, but saving could be 
more of a psychological tendency (1936, pp. 107-108), and "this is where 
the trouble arises" (1936, p. 211). If there has been an increase in 
individual wealth, then saving has occurred since "• • when an 
individual saves he increases his own wealth" 0936, p. 83). 
What motivates the wealth-owner to choose one asset over another 
in which to store his wealth is its relative yield or return compared to 
that for other assets. Keynes says that some believe a wealth-owner 
desires "a capital-asset as such, whereas what he really desires is 
its prospective yield" (1936, p. 212). The potential owner of an 
asset calculates the difference between the expected present value of 
the yield provided by the asset in the form of a stream of returns and 
the current replacement cost of that asset to arrive at the marginal 
efficiency of that asset (MEC) (1936, p. 135). The wealth holder will 
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choose that asset having the highest marginal efficiency, whether it is 
newly produced or an already existing asset. 
The task at hand is not to determine the inducements to make new 
investments but to determine the inducements to trade assets within a 
portfolio the size of which is given. Once the level of savings is 
established, a person must make his or her portfolio choice. Keynes 
says that "it is in respect to the stock of accumulated savings 
that the individual can exercise his choice between liquidity and 
illiquidity" (1936_, p. 194). 
But this decision having been made [of how much to consume or 
save], there is a further decision which awaits him, namely in 
what form he will hold his command over future consumption which 
he hasreserved, whether out of his current income or from 
previous savings. Does he want to hold it in the form of 
immediate, liquid command (i.e., money or its equivalent)? Or is 
he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or 
indefinite period, leaving it to future market conditions to 
determine on what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred 
command over specific goods into immediate command over goods in 
general? (1936, p. 166). 
A person has a choice as to the degree of liquidity he will accept 
in his wealth holding. Money is of course the ultimate in liquidity, 
but other assets rival money in their liquidity premiums (bonds and 
government securities). This liquidity premium will be a factor in the 
demand for specific forms of wealth. The choice, though, is for the 
entire range of assets Keynes considered--cash, debts and capital goods 
(19 36, p. 8 l ) • 
Keynes identified many non-financial "goods" that wealth owners 
may store in their portfolios. If his purpose for mentioning these 
goods was merely to establish their unsuitability for storing wealth, 
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then a narrow-range interpretation could be correct. Another 
possibility is that Keynes gave lip service to the ability of certain 
goods to serve as assets but did not incorporate them into his formal 
theory. Keynes' transmission process must directly impact the prices of 
those assets he considers for the transmission process for them 
legitimately to be in his range of assets. 
This section will establish that Keynes' range of assets was broad 
and that his transmission process operates on the relative prices of 
assets as related to portfolio decisions by individuals. Capital goods 
comprise a broad category whose limits are subject to discussion, but as 
long as one is consistent in his limits, any reasonable distinction will 
suffice (1936, p. 61). 
Keynes identifies three attributes that assets possess in 
different degrees: 
(i) Some assets produce a yield or output~ •• by 
assisting some process of production or supplying services to a 
consumer. 
(ii) Most assets, except money, suffer some wastage or 
involve some cost through the mere passage of time • •• ; i.e., 
they involve a carrying cost.£ measured in terms of themselves • 
• 
(iii) •••• The amount ••• which they are willing to pay 
for the potential convenience or security given by this power of 
disposal ••• we shall call its liquidity premium 1. 
It follows that the total return expected from the ownership 
of an asset over a period is equal to its yield minus its 
carrying cost plus its liquidity premium, i.e., q - c + 1 (1936, 
PP• 225-226). 
There is an additional yield that Keynes recognized, and that is 
the "appreciation premium" which is the expected appreciation of the 
asset in terms of the standard of value (1936, pp. 224, 227). Keynes 
denotes this component of an asset's yield by "a." 
According to this definition of assets, it is clear that any good, 
92 
financial instrument or cash possesses some of these attributes in 
varying degrees. Consumer durables would qualify since they supply 
services to a consumer. Capital goods used in production would assist 
the process of production. It is not necessary for goods to possess a 
high liquidity premium to be considered an asset for the purpose of 
storing wealth, and it is not necessary that the yields be measurable in 
terms of output, for they could just as easily be subjective yields in 
terms of particular consumer goods. If the yield on some good were 
negative, that is a+ q - c + 1 < O, that good would not be an "asset" 
for that particular person. This could be the case for some 
non-durables whose combined yield from the other factors was less than 
the carrying-cost. Since services cannot be owned or stored, they would 
not qualify. The particular definition was not of great importance to 
Keynes, who agreed to "any reasonable line" (1936, p. 61). 
Keynes also attributes a "scarcity premium" to assets which 
represents the ability of these goods to offer services which have a 
higher present value than their current replacement cost or "supply 
price" (1936, p. 213). As the production of these assets increases, the 
scarcity premium falls, thus dragging down the total return from the 
asset. 
Since the value of a house depends on its utility, 
every house which is built serves to diminish the 
prospective rents obtainable from further 
house-building and therefore lessens the attraction 
of further similar investment unless the rate of 
interest is falling pari passu (1936, p. 130). 
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Yields on Assets 
The yields on assets as described above result from the 
interaction of the scarcity premium and the yields already identified. 
Maximization of utility operates to equate all "net" yields (having 
adjusted for risk) on the assets involved in the portfolio. Trading 
among assets will occur until no further trades can be made for profit. 
If agents see an opportunity for profit, they will trade, affecting 
asset prices, until all prices of assets will be such that that they are 
in the same relation to their yields as before (1936, p. 227). Even 
though there may be a difference in stated yields, the real yields on 
these assets (measured as above with implicit premiums accounted for) 
will be equalized due to the differences in liquidity, scarcity, 
appreciation potential and carrying costs. 
Keynes' example addresses the yields on physical assets and money. 
His use of money and physical goods is to demonstrate that though money 
and financial instruments are clearly substitutes, it is less obvious 
that money and goods are just as substitutable. In fact, the 
wealth-holder will seek a "balancing of advantages" in holding cash 
versus other assets (1936, p. 174). Keynes uses the following notation: 
a1 • expected appreciation of houses (assume> 0) 
ql = yield from owning houses (assume> 0) 
c1 = carrying cost of owning houses (assume• 0) 
11 • liquidity premium of houses (assume• 0) 
a2 • expected appreciation of wheat (assume> 0) 
q2 • yield from owning wheat (assume= 0) 
c2 • carrying cost of owning wheat (assume> 0) 
12 • liquidity premium of wheat (assume• 0) 
a3 • expected appreciation of money (assume• 0) 
q3 • yield from holding money (assume• 0) 
c 3 • carrying cost of holding money (assume• 0) 
13 • liquidity premium of money (assume> 0) 
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Thus in equilibrium the demand-prices of houses and wheat in 
terms of money will be such that there is nothing to choose in the 
way of advantage between the alternatives;--i.e., a1 + q1, 
a2 - c2 , and 11 will be equal. The choice of a standard 
will 1111:ke no difference to the result (1936, pp. 227-228). 
With this notation it is easy to see that the demand of 
wealth-owners will be directed to houses, wheat or to money 
according as a 1 + q1 or a 2 - c2 or 13 is greatest (1936, 
P• 227). 
Equalization of yields implies that wealth holders substitute 
various forms of assets in the portfolio to gain the best yield 
available. The yields that are affected represent those on assets which 
would be in a saver's portfolio. The fact that their yields are 
impacted in this manner means that they must be included in the range of 
assets. Therefore, the range must be broad enough to include such goods 
as houses, wheat or money. 
Keynes addresses the problem of liquidity by calculating the 
liquidity premium into the real yield which the wealth owner considers 
when making his choice. A corporate bond, therefore, may have a lower 
stated yield than a comparable physical asset; however, its implicit 
liquidity yield may be very high. "The owners of wealth will then weigh 
the lack of 'liquidity' of differenct capital equipments • as a 
medium in which to hold wealth against the best available actuarial 
estimate of their prospective yields allowing for risk" (1936, p. 240). 
Physical assets may not have the appeal of financial securities as 
long term stores of wealth due to carrying costs and low liquidity 
premiums. 
In the case of a commodity other than money, a modest stock of it 
may offer some convenience to users of the commodity. But even 
though a larger stock might have some attractions as representing 
a store of stable wealth, this would be offset by its carrying 
costs in the shape of storage, wastage, etc. (1936, p. 233). 
But, even so, the yield is calculated on the total return (a+ q -
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c + 1). If the price of debts were bid up by the central bank, lowering 
the yield, then the return on the physical commodity which was 
previously equal to the return on short term debt would appear more 
attractive to wealth-owners since carrying costs are already calculated 
into the yield on the asset. Equalization of yields on all assets, 
including goods and financial assets, is proof that Keynes' range of 
assets was broad and not limited to a narrow range of financial 
securities. If yields are equalized on assets, financial securities and 
money, then relative prices must change through subsititution among 
assets, and this must be the mechanism that restores equilibrium. 
Keynes points to the existence of organized markets as enhancing 
the liquidity premiums of certain assets, especially debts and equities 
(See Appendix C). Without the organized markets, those who desired a 
high degree of liquidity would have no choice except to hold money. 
"For in the absence of an organised market, liquidity preference due to 
the precautionary motive would be greatly increased; whereas the 
existence of an organised market gives an opportunity for wide 
fluctuations in liquidity-preference due to the speculative motive" 
(1936, pp. 170-171). This market in effect releases precautionary 
balances into the speculative pool. Given the existence of these 
organized markets and a degree of uncertainty, then "any.one who differs 
from the predominant opinion • may have a good reason for keeping 
liquid resources in order to profit (19 36 , p. 169 ) • 
Keynes recognizes that organized commodity markets, spot and 
future, may enhance liquidity premiums of certain "stocks of 
commodities" (1936, pp. 223-224). Therefore, holding these commodities 
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as assets must be on a par with holding debts or other securities. It 
is interesting to question whether a non-traded item such as a 
refrigerator could be considered a potential asset for the portfolio. 
Assets of this type for which there are no markets still yield 
"services," even though their liquidity premiums would be zero. But 
Keynes did not require assets to possess positive liquidity premiums. 
An asset is characterized by the fact that it has a yield which is the 
composite of the factors listed above. Goods that yield "services to 
consumers" are assets, and thus their yields stand in equality with all 
others. If the present value of the refrigerator fell below its selling 
price, it would be traded and another asset purchased. Even though the 
nominal yield on money is "nil" (1936, p. 226), it still competes with 
other assets because of the liquidity service that it provides (1936, p. 
231). 
Keynes mentions no psychological aversion to long term debt, but 
he does point out that 
there is a risk of loss being incurred in purchasing a long term 
debt, • • [therefore] The actuarial profit or mathematical 
expectation of gain calculated in accordance with the existing 
probabilities ••• must be sufficient to compensate for the risk 
of disappointment (1936, p. 169). 
The "mass psychology" aspect of expectations of future rates of 
interest operate to affect current rates of interest. The person who 
believes that long term rates will be higher in the future will keep 
cash in order to profit from his expectation. The one who believes it 
will be lower in the future will borrow "for short periods in order to 
purchase debts of longer term" (1936, p. 170). This speculative 
substitution should bring the prices of debts of varying maturities into 
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line with each other according to their risks. If inflation were 
expected by wealth holders, they would choose real assets over financial 
assets such as bonds or money. 
A third source of risk might be added, namely, a possible adverse 
I 
change on the value of the monetary standard which renders a 
money-loan to this extent less secure than a real asset; though 
all or most of this should already be reflected, and therefore 
absorbed, in the price of durable real assets (1936 1 p. 144). 
It is possible that prices of short term debts could be bid up so 
far that no one believed that prices of long term debts could fall 
enough to cover the risk differential. In this case, the central bank 
could only affect prices of short term debts. "The short-term rate of 
interest is easily controlled by the monetary authority But the 
long-term rate may be more recalcitrant. ." (1936, p. 202-203). 
With yields being equalized in equilibrium, it is necesssary that 
a process of asset substitution exists, so that wealth holders trade 
until prices and yields are equalized. This requires a broad range of 
assets for the transmission process and the prices of assets such as 
durable goods to be affected by changes in the prices of other assets. 
The Marginal Efficiency of Capital 
Aggregate investment is the addition to the physical capital stock 
after allowing for depreciation--the purchase of!!!!! capital-assets 
(1936 1 p. 75). Therefore, an individual "invests" when he adds to his 
stock of physical assets by purchasing a newly produced asset. These 
purchases will be made only if the return from doing so exceeds the 
return from any other activity. If the return available from new assets 
falls below the rate of interest (or any other alternative return), no 
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further investment will occur (1936, p. 236). Since the return from 
purchasing new assets varies inversely with the price of the asset, then 
low prices of new assets relative to other existing assets encourage 
investment. So, "there is no sense in building up an enterprise at a 
cost greater than at which an existing one can be purchased 
(1936, p. 151). 
Entrepreneurs who "invest" do so after calculating the marginal 
efficiency of the asset they purchase. The marginal efficiency is the 
difference between the present value of the expected yield and the 
"supply price" of the asset in question--the cost of purchasing it. 
This calculation gives the return on investment which is compared to 
other returns available. Therefore, a wealth holder or entrepreneur 
will purchase a new asset only if its marginal efficiency is greater 
than the rate of interest • 
• • • the marginal efficiency of capital is here defined in terms 
of the expectation of yield and of the current supply price of 
the capital asset. It depends on the rate of return expected to be 
obtainable on money if it were invested in a newly produced 
asset (1936, p. 136). 
Keynes reasons that"• 
interest in terms of itself 
for every durable commodity we have a rate of 
." (1936, p. 223). This rate of 
interest corresponds to the marginal efficiency of the asset. 
Therefore, it may be that it is the greatest of the own rates 
of interest that the marginal efficiency must attain if it is to 
be newly-produced • " (1936, p. 223). 
The wealth holders seek out the greatest returns available when 
deciding in what form to store their wealth. There would be no 
incentive for a wealth holder to purchase new units of capital assets 
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unless their yields were greater than any currently available asset. If 
the marginal efficiency of a new asset is greater than the rate of 
interest, the investment purchase will be made. Since the marginal 
efficiency is based on expectations of yield, it will change as 
expectations do. But, it is its relation to the rate of interest which 
determines the volume of investment. 
For the stimulus to output depends on the marginal efficiency of 
capital rising relatively to the rate of interest (1936, p. 
142). 
When investment in new assets takes place, the marginal efficiency of 
all assets of that type falls. The fall in the marginal efficiency 
occurs for two reasons: one is that the prospective yield due to the 
scarcity premium falls; another is that the supply price of the asset 
will rise, due to "pressure on the facilities for producing that type of 
capital" (1936, p. 136). These events take place simultaneously 
although "the second of these factors being usually more important in 
the short run, but the longer the period in view the more does the first 
factor take its place" (1936, p. 136). 
This result is certain enough so that schedules for individual 
assets can be established relating the marginal efficiency to the 
quantity of new investment in that asset. For the economy as a whole, 
it is possible to construct a schedule of the relation of the rate of 
investment to the marginal efficiency of capital in general. As the 
rate of investment increases, the marginal efficiency of capital in 
general falls (1936, p. 136). Another consequence of the rise in the 
rate of investment is the increase of prices associated with the 
increase in output due to the rise in the wage-unit and increasing 
marginal cost (1936, p. 249). 
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Keynes warns that"• whilst a decline in the rate of interest 
may be expected, cet. par., to increase the volume of investment, this 
will not happen if the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is 
falling more rapidly than the rate of interest (1936, P• 173). 
Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who expect profits from 
the activity. They are the purchasers of the new capital. Their main 
concern is the marginal efficiency of the capital assets they seek to 
purchase, or in other words the expected profitability of the investment 
in relation to its price. A ready alternative that could be gotten from 
an existing asset or debt is given by the prevailing rate of interest. 
These entrepreneurs are free to purchase existing assets as well as new 
assets, so they will only purchase the new assets so long as no existing 
asset offers a better return. "The schedule of the marginal efficiency 
of investment may be said to govern the terms of which loanable funds 
are demanded for the purpose of new investment" (1936, p. 165). 
c. The Demand for Money 
Money may be held as a store of wealth, since "cash" is one of the 
possibilities of the assets that Keynes saw. It is possible to hold 
cash for spending and to keep cash as an asset. Liquidity preference is 
a function of the rate of interest, income, the price level and 
expectations of interest rates and the price level. 
Keynes saw three distinct motives for holding money which underlie 
the individual's demand for money. The demand for money is a "single 
decision, though the composite result of different motives" (1936, p. 
195). The holders of cash may not segregate their demands into "three 
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watertight compartments" since one may serve as a contingent reserve for 
another (1936, p. 195). 
The transactions motive, consisting of "income" and "business" 
transactions balances, and the precautionary motive are affected by the 
"cheapness and reliability of methods of obtaining cash" and the 
"relative cost of holding cash,"--the opportunity cost of holding cash. 
But except in the case of "large changes in the cost of holding cash," 
it is a ''minor factor" in the demand for money for these motives. The 
largest effect on these components of demand for money is a result of 
the "general activity of the economic system and of the level of money 
income" (1936, p. 196). Therefore as the level of income increases, the 
demand for money increases. 
The speculative motive has at its basis "the object of securing 
profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring 
forth" (1936, p. 170). The only reason for holding speculative cash 
balances is for the purpose of increasing returns by purchasing an asset 
later than immediately, especially if a person "believes that future 
rates of interest will be above the rates assumed by the market" (1936, 
p. 170). This is a valid reason for keeping cash, and the "necessary 
condition is the existence of uncertainty as to the future rate of 
interest" (1936, p. 168). Otherwise, with a positive rate of interest, 
"it must always be more advantageous to purchase a debt rather than to 
hold cash as a store of wealth" (1936, p. 169). 
This speculative demand for money is highly sensitive to the rate 
of interest. 
As a rule, ••• the schedule of liquidity preference relating the 
quantity of money to the rate of interest is given by a smooth 
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curve which shows the rate of interest falling as the quantity of 
money is increased (1936, p. 171). 
Since, "experience indicates that the aggregate demand for money 
to satisfy the speculative-motive usually shows a continuous response to 
gradual changes in the rate of interest as given by the prices of 
bonds and debts of various maturities" (1936, p. 197), the speculative 
motive is the component of the demand for money which is "particularly 
important in transmitting a change in the quantity of money" (1936, p. 
196). 
Therefore, if the rate of interest falls, the demand for money due 
to the speculative motive would be increased. The change in "r" 
determines the change in M2 , given that expectations of the future are 
constant (1936, pp. 199-200). The speculative pool is a residual whose 
size is dependent upon "the degree of its [the current rate of interest] 
divergence from what is considered a fairly safe level of r" (1936, p. 
201). 
The demand for money is also a function of the price level (or the 
wage-unit as Keynes describes it), indicating that demand is for real 
rather than nominal balances. If the price level is raised through the 
rise in the "wage-unit," the demand for nominal balances increases 
(1936, pp. 173, 249). Keynes' assumption early in The General Theory 
of a constant wage-unit when he described liquidity preference did not 
require him to specify this component of demand, but it is brought out 
in later discussions. 
The demand for money as an asset depends on the prices of other 
assets which could serve as substitute stores of wealth. Not only does 
it depend on their current prices, but it is also sensitive to the 
expectation of price c.hanges in the future. The demand for money, or 
the liquidity preference schedule, may shift due to changed expectations 
concerning the future policy of the central bank (1936, pp. 202-203). 
If this were the case, the rate of interest at which persons would be 
content to hold a certain level of speculative balances could change 
"without any market transactions being necessary" (1936, p. 198). 
Expectations of changes in the value of money in the future reduce the 
liquidity premium of money and therefore the demand for money (1936, pp. 
231, 238, 241), since "money itself rapidly loses the attribute of 
'liquidity' if its future supply is expected to undergo sharp changes" 
(1936, footnote, p. 241). 
The equilibrium rate of interest on money is determined by the 
supply of money and liquidity preference (1936, p. 167). If any of the 
determinants of the demand for money change, it will change the 
equilibrium rate of interest without the necessity of the supply of 
money having to be altered. 
Keynes' demand for money is actually the same demand as for other 
assets, since money is a part of the portfolio. However, since money 
also facilitates transactions, variables affecting this component of 
demand must be included. Therefore, Keynes' demand for money function 
is M'1 • Md(Y, r, P, P*, r*), where Y • the level of nominal 
income(+), r • the complex of interest rates on debts and other assets 
(-), P • the level of prices(+), P* • the expected future general price 
level (the value of money)(-) (1936, pp. 142, 237), and r* • the 
expected future rate of interest(+) (1936, pp. 142, 198). 
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The shape of the demand function is a declining function of the 
rate of interest given the levels of the other variables. However, at 
rates considered "unsafe" 0936, p. 203) or at rates so low that they 
cannot cover the costs associated with risk (1936, p. 202), or the 
expenses of lending (1936, p. 208), liquidity preference may become 
absolute--demand will be infinite, ''M2 may tend to increase almost 
without limit in response to a reduction of r below a certain figure" 
(1936, p. 203). 
Since the rate of interest is "psychological" and "conventional," 
this minimum rate may not "be rooted in secure knowledge," so that it 
"will not be always unduly resistant to a modest measure of persistence 
and consistency of purpose by the monetary authority" (1936, p. 204). 
The speculative demand for money is the cornerstone of Keynes' 
transmission process for money. Through this demand, wealth owners 
allow for changes in their portfolios. The speculative balance is the 
"fund" which finances trading. It grows as the rate of interest falls 
and shrinks as it rises, thus allowing changes in yields to spur asset 
trading and to finance higher output levels. If persons held no 
speculative balances, purchases of assets would be possible only at the 
expense of other expenditures, and yield differences would be 
immediately erased as assets were traded for other assets allowing no 
changes in output. There would be no possiblility of lowering the rate 
of interest for any length of time and therefore no stimulus to 
investment expenditure. 
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D. Long Run Equilibrium 
Recall that Friedman characterizes Keynes' basic challenge to the 
quantity theory as being summarized in three propositions, one of which 
is that a long-run full employment equilibrium need not exist even if 
all prices are flexible. Further, in Friedman's view, this proposition 
depends on absolute liquidity preference. In this section we examine 
the long-run implications of Keynes' model in the light of Friedman's 
criticism. 
The long run position of the economy that Keynes describes as 
"equilibrium" is one in which there is no automatic tendency to change. 
Keynes says that there may be a "cyclical movement around this 
equilibrium position," when the marginal efficiency of capital rises and 
falls above zero (1936, p. 218), but the economy tends to return to this 
state of affairs, thus giving it the status of "equilibrium." 
Unlike Friedman's long run position in which all anticipations are 
realized, Keynes sees a possibility of the existence of unemployment in 
the long run, as an equilibrium state (1936, pp. 242-243). If there 
were unemployment, quantities demanded and supplied would not be 
equated: there would be excess supply of labor and an excess 
(potential) supply of goods. Workers would not be on their notional 
demand curves. As Keynes criticized the classical school, if one is 
able to assume that conditions always exist which "force" the return to 
full employment in the long run, theory may only describe the laws that 
"govern the application and rewards of the commmunity's productive 
resources," so that the "volume of output depends solely on the assumed 
constant level of employment in conjunction with the current equipment 
and technique" (1936, pp. 243-244). 
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••• even in the long period the volume of employment is not 
necessarily full but is capable of varying, and ••• to every 
banking policy there corresponds a different level of long-period 
level of employment; so that there are a number of positions of 
long-period equilibrium corresponding to different conceivable 
interest policies on the part of the monetary authority (1936, P• 
191). 
Keynes identified three possible long run equilibrium positions: 
1) that in which the level of capital (and rate of investment) is 
constrained by an equilibrium interest rate too high for full 
employment, and one in which the level of wages and prices do not fall 
to lower this rate sufficiently for full employment; 2) that in which 
due to perfectly flexible wages and prices there is full employment and 
the rate of interest is equal to the real yield on capital; and 3) that 
in which liquidity preference has become absolute at some level of 
interest so that even if wages and prices are flexible and do raise the 
real quantity of money, the rate of interest low enough for full 
employment cannot be achieved. The first case is the normal one; the 
second two are extreme. 
Even though Keynes identifies cases 2) and 3) as "limiting" and 
"extreme" (1936, pp. 207, 191), Friedman bases his criticism on the 
third one while not recognizing that 1) and 2) also exist, so it is 
necessary to examine all cases of long run equilibrium in Keynes' theory 
to judge whether Friedman has been faithful to The General Theory. 
Long Run Unemployment Equilibrium 
The yield on money though is not self-adjusting for several 
reasons: "money" is not produced in response to its price rising as 
other assets are; no ready substitute exists for the "exchange value" of 
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money; when money is produced, its liquidity premium does not fall 
nearly so rapidly as the return on other assets falls (1936, pp. 229, 
233); even though the real quantity of money may be increased by 
perfectly flexible wages, this process has such a harmful effect on 
stability and expectations, it should not be counted on to restore full 
employment (1936, p. 269). 
Thus with other commodities left to themselves, "natural forces," 
i.e. the ordinary forces of the market, would tend to bring their 
rate of interest down until the emergence of full employment •• 
• Thus in the absence of money ••• the rate of interest would 
only reach equilibrium when there is full employment (1936, p. 
235). 
This unemployment "equilibrium" is the result of a long term 
interest rate on money that does not respond to changes in conditions of 
aggregate demand. Rather than the interest rate adjusting in the long 
run, it is output and employment that do. Keynes says, the 
position of equilibrium, under conditions of laissez faire, will be 
one in which employment is low enough and the standard of life 
sufficiently miserable enough to bring savings to zero" (1936, p. 217). 
The stock of capital must be constrained to that level where the 
marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the rate of interest on 
money. Once this level is reached, new investment expenditure would 
become zero, hence savings must also equal zero. 
In the long run, other economists see no difficulty in the flexibility 
of prices and wages causing a return to full employment due to the 
increase in the real quantity of money which will reduce the rate of 
interest. Keynes agreed with this proposition in principle: the fall 
in the wage level could restore real balances thereby reducing the rate 
of interest. In fact, if wages were perfectly flexible so that they 
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changed immediately with every change in aggregate demand, full 
employment may be a more frequent long term position • 
• • • though in the extreme case where money-wages were assumed to 
fall without limit in face of involuntary unemployment ••• there 
will ••• be only two possible long-period positions--full 
employment and the level of employment corresponding to the rate 
of interest at which liquidity preference becomes absolute 
(19 36 , p. 191 ) • 
Even a fixed quantity of money could not prevent the rate of 
interest from falling and from increasing the level of output. Therefore 
if wages and prices were "perfectly" flexible, the quantity of money 
would be "nugatory" in the long run (1936, p. 191). Keynes, however, 
does not limit his long period analysis to one characterized by 
perfectly flexible wages and prices, but considers the case in which 
there is no tendency for prices to fall without limit, but to settle in 
at a level which assures some measure of satisfaction with the status 
quo. 
In fact, an economy in which wages and prices were perfectly 
flexible would be an "extreme case" in which no stability of values 
would be possible and in which fluctuations in output would be so great 
as to make futile all expectations and planning (1936, p. 269). If the 
long period equilibrium were at full employment, it would be marred by 
an instability of values as the interim periods were characterized by 
great swings in prices (1936, p. 253). 
As it is, the rate of interest is not responsive to excess supply 
of labor, that is, wages and prices are not sufficiently "flexible," so 
••• it may fluctuate for decades about a level which is 
chronically too high for full employment;--particularly if it is 
the prevailing opinion that the rate of interest is self-adjusting 
• (1936, p. 204). 
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This situation of long run equilibrium, like Friedman's, occurs 
without interference by a monetary authority or central bank. While in 
Friedman's model there is no need for this interference, in Keynes' 
description of long run equilibrium, there is no automatic return to 
full employment. There is a monetary constraint, and wages and prices 
do not move to bring adjustment. Even though this "mean position" is 
"established by laws of necessity" and is descriptive of the present and 
past states, "it is not a principle which cannot be changed" (1936, p. 
254). 
Absolute Liquidity Preference 
As discussed earlier, Keynes saw a minimum interest rate 
acceptable to wealth holders, for both psychological and practical 
reasons, below which liquidity preference would be absolute. This would 
be another possible long run position. 
In this case, output below the full-employment level could not be 
increased by any method which depended on lowering the rate of interest. 
If the propensity to consume were "given," no possible increases in 
output would be possible, even if we rely on falling wages and prices to 
reduce the demand for money. Wages would have to fall to "zero," but 
even this would be futile since the rate of interest is the critical 
variable, "given" the propensity to consume (1936, p. 191). 
Similarly, if the central bank attempted to lower the rate of interest 
by increasing the money supply, the same situation would occur. No 
lowering of the rate of interest, and no raising of effective demand 
would be possible through this means. In this case, purely monetary 
measures are indeed ineffective in stimulating output (1936, P• 233). 
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As a position of long run equilibrium, however, Keynes considered 
the liquidity trap unlikely. Although Keynes perceived that it might be 
"important in the future" (1936, p. 207), he saw no examples of it 
hitherto; he did recognize that it could have existed in the past, 1 
unknown to observers, since central banks have been unwilling to "deal 
boldly in debts of long term." If they had been willing, there would 
have been a test of absolute liquidity preference. Banks could have 
purchased long term debt at constant prices, and there would have been 
an unlimited supply of such debt. Not only that, but the public 
authority would have found that they could have borrowed "on an 
unlimited scale at a nominal rate of interest" ( 1936, p. 207). 
The minimum rate of interest acceptable to wealth holders must 
exceed: "(1) the cost of bringing borrowers and lenders together, (2) 
income and sur-taxes and (3) the allowance which the lender requires to 
cover his risk and uncertainty If the remaining net yield is 
"infinitesimal," then "time-honoured methods may prove unavailing" 
(1936, p. 309). However, Keynes sees this as a possible limit to 
monetary management in the long run. 
Keynes was describing a situation that could occur in "highly 
abnormal" circumstances (1936, p. 207). Long run unemployment is normal 
and must be caused by "normal" interactions, including the failure of 
prices to adjust even in the long run. 
Full Employment under Perfectly Flexible Wages and Prices 
If prices and wages responded "perfectly" to every change in 
aggregate demand and if no liquidity trap existed, then the real 
1 Later in the dis·cussion, howeveT, Keynes· acknowledges- a 
"flattening out" of liquidity preference in the U, S, durine the 
Great Depression. 
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quantity of money would be that which would restore the interest rate to 
the full employment level. Keynes said that the classical school 
"assumed" certain "natural forces which caused the market rate to 
satisfy one or the other of the above conditions" (1936, pp. 243-244). 
The quantity of money could be changed by falling wages and prices 
which would restore the level of real balances necessary to maintain 
that rate of interest necessary for full employment. 
If money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a 
tendency for less than full employment •••• there would be no 
resting-place below full employment until either the rate of 
interest was incapable of falling further or wages were zero" 
(1936, PP• 303-304). 
But if the quantity of money is virtually fixed, it is evident 
that its quantity in terms of wage-units can be indefinitely 
increased by a sufficient reduction in money-wages; and that its 
quantity in proportion to incomes generally can be largely 
increased •••• We can, therefore, theoretically produce 
precisely the same effects on the ra~e of interest by reducing 
wages, that we can produce by increasing the quantity of money 
whilst leaving the level of wages unchanged (1936, p. 266) • 
• • • the Classical Theory has been accustomed to rest the 
supposedly self-adjusting character of the economic system on the 
fluidity of money-wages; • • • A reduction in money-wages is 
quite capable in certain circumstances of affording a stimulus to 
output, as the classical theory supposes (1936, p. 257). 
Though this case is an "extreme" (1936, p. 191), nevertheless it is 
possible, and Keynes did recognize it as one long run outcome. He 
prefers though not to concentrate on those remote possibilities but to 
recognize the real world facts which mitigate pure theory, and temper 
the outcome. The fact is that money wages do not fall without limit 
whenever there is a change in demand, but they tend to fall less than 
the decrease in demand due to worker resistance (1936, p. 303). So, the 
characterization of this case as extreme is "well founded in facts" 
(1936, p. 303). 
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Nevertheless, if we confine our attention to Friedman's precise 
criticism of Keynes' long-run analysis (that absolute liquidity 
preference is essential for the failure of long-run full employment 
equilibrium to exist even if all prices are flexible), we must conclude 
that Friedman is correct. But, we conclude here that the analysis of a 
long-run equilibrium in which all prices are flexible is not an issue 
that was part of Keynes' "basic ~hallenge" to the reigning theory. 
Rather, as noted above, Keynes considered flexible prices to be an 
"extreme" case, and he considered the long-run analysis to be tangential 
to his main concern: 
Now "in the long run" this [quantity theory of money] is probably 
true. • • • • • • • • But this long run is a misleading 
guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. 
Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in 
tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is 
long past the ocean is flat again (1924, p. 88). 
Thus we turn to Keynes' theory of short-run fluctuations of economic 
activity and in particular to the role of money in such short-run 
analysis. 
E. Keynes' Short Run Analysis 
Price Behavior 
The price level of output is a function of costs and of the scale of 
output in Keynes' short run analysis (1936, p. 294). Prices change as 
one or the other of these determinants change. There is no direct 
"jump" from increases in the supply of money to increases in the price 
level bypassing the effects of output changes. Indeed, it is this 
argument that Keynes makes throughout The General Theory. It is only 
through either a change in marginal costs (measured in money) due to a 
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change in the real level of output or a "pure" price rise due to a 
change in the wage-unit that prices can change. Thus, Keynes apparently 
has a model in which prices rise only as a result of a higher output 
level. Prices then are "sticky" in the sense that there exist forces 
which inhibit a prompt response of output prices to a change in 
2 
demand. Keynes' approach with respect to price behavior differs from 
that of Friedman, who regards output prices as responding promptly to a 
change in demand. This implies that in Keynes' approach employers and 
workers are willing to supply more output in the event of an increase in 
demand, even in the absence of a price signal. 
Keynes contends that output prices will tend to rise as output 
rises for the following reasons: 
1. "Since resources are not homogeneous, there wil 1 be 
diminishing, and not constant, returns as employment gradually 
increases" (1936, p. 296). That is, t.he marginal product of labor will 
diminish and, if the real wage equals marginal product, it will be 
necessary for the real wage to fall. Output prices must rise to 
accomplish the real wage decline. 
2. "Since resources are not interchangeable, some commodities 
will reach a condition of inelastic supply whilst there are still 
unemployed resources available for the production of other commodities" 
(1936, p. 296). In this situation, the economy will encounter 
2 Keynes complains that it is a "great fault" of the quantity 
theorists that they do not distinguish between a rise in prices due to 
the rise in the wage-unit (caused by "bottlenecks") from a rise in 
prices due to an increase in output (caused by increasing marginal cost) 
(1936, p. 209). 
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"bottlenecks" at high levels of output even though there is not yet 
"full" employment. 
3. "The wage-unit wi 11 tend to rise before full employment is 
reached" (1936, p. 296). Workers are more successful at getting wage 
increases during expansions, and so the nominal wage rate will rise. 
In a later article (1939), Keynes eliminated the first reason for 
rising prices. In that article, he concluded that the real wage was 
best regarded as constant during short-run fluctuations of output. Thus 
there is no necessity for a real wage reduction during expansion to be 
achieved by a rise in prices. However, the other two causes of rising 
prices remain. 
Thus as output rises, prices also rise. As more and more 
"bottlenecks" are encountered because of the nature of an interdependent 
economy, price rises account for a larger share of the increase in 
effective demand (1936, p. 301). The limit is a situation of true 
inflation at full employment in which the simple quantity theory of 
money becomes operational (1936, p. 303). Changes in the price level 
depend on whether a change in effective demand operates more on 
increasing employment or in increasing the "wage-unit." 
There 1s an "extreme complexity" in the relationship between the 
3 quantity of money and the price level. If velocity is constant, then 
effective demand will change in exact proportion to the change in the 
quantity of money. If prices change in full proportion to changes in 
3 In the long run, 11 • stability or instability of prices will 
depend on the strength of the upward trend of the wage-unit 
compared with the rate of increase in the efficiency of the productive 
system" (1936, p. 309). 
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effective demand, then output and employment are constant. These are 
the assumptions of the quantity theorists which Keynes seeks to deny 
(1936, pp. 208-209). 
The response of effective demand to changes in the quantity of 
money (ed) is a function of liquidity preference and the variables 
specified in the demand for money. The response of money wages to 
changes in effective demand 1s ew, and the response of employment and 
output to changes in effective demand are e d e an e 0 • The latter two 
are determined by the physical elasticity of supply. 
An approximation to the way in which money affects prices (denoted 
bye) 1s as follows: 
e = ed(l - e e + e e e ). e o e o w 
If e e = 1, there are constant output returns to increases 1n e o 
employment; if ew = 1, money wages change in full proportion to 
changes in effective demand (1936, pp. 304-305). Keynes points out that 
this is only a demonstration of the complexity involved in trying to 
pinpoint the determination of prices, since several elasticities are 
involved. But, it can be seen that the price level at any given time 
depends on the degree of capacity utilization, the demand for money, and 
the readiness with which money wages change in accordance with the 
change in effective demand. 4 
4 The long run price level may be proportional to the quantity 
of money if liquidity preference has stayed fairly constant. This, 
however, is more an historical than a theoretical question (1936, P· 
306). The trend has been upward, but that is easy to understand since 
" when money is relatively abundant, the wage-unit rises; and when 
money is relatively scarce, some means is found to increase the 
effective quantity of money" (1936, p. 307). 
Historically, the stability of liquidity preference and increases 
in productivity have provided a "fair measure of stability of prices" 
(1936, p. 308). In the long run, nominal income (Keynes' price level) 
is a function of liquidity preference and the quantity of money. 
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The Transmission Process 
Open market operations involve the purchase or sale of short term 
government securities in the open market by the central bank. If 
securities are purchased, the result of this process will be that prices 
of short term government securities are bid up, and the yields on these 
securities, being the fixed coupon rate divided by the price, fall. 
There is a fall in the yield on short term securities and an increase in 
money balances which wealth holders have voluntarily have received in 
exchange for the securities, due to the higher prices. 
Keynes' analysis, as documented above, involves a broad range of 
assets in portfolio decisions. Therefore, his analysis implies that 
wealth holders will now try to convert these new money balances into 
higher yielding assets, including consumer durables, since yield is what 
they desire. The question may arise as to why money is not kept as an 
asset. Money in this and all cases is primarily a medium of exchange, 
since the services that money provides come in the form of liquidity 
services (1936, p. 231). When the quantity of money increases, the 
yield per unit of money falls somewhat (but not as much as for other 
assets, 1936, pp. 229, 233), so that wealth owners desire to trade it 
for more profitable investments. At the same time the open market 
operation has caused the yield on government securities to fall (because 
of its price increase) so that yields on other assets are greater (1936, 
PP• 200-201). 
Part of the increased money will be stored as M2 (speculative) 
balances due to the lowered rates of interest yielded by assets which 
are alternatives to holding money. Money's yield has also been lowered, 
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and at the completion of the entire process, all yields on assets will 
stand in the same relation to each other as before. Spending on 
investment in new capital goods has been increased due to the relative 
price differential seen by wealth holders. The opportunity cost of new 
investment is lower in terms of alternatives and in terms of borrowing 
funds to accomplish it. The prevailing rate of interest has been 
lowered since the prices of debts have risen. Though Keynes uses the 
term "interest rate" in different contexts, he defines it in his 
"general discussions" as "the complex of various rates of interest 
current for different periods of time, i.e., for debts of different 
maturities" (1936, footnote, p. 167). 
The other way for new money to be introduced into the economy is 
through direct government expenditures. In this case, nominal income 
would increase directly as a consequence of the increase in money, since 
the new money "accrues as someone's income" (1936, p. 200). As 
recipients of the new money spend it, they will choose to consume part 
and save part so that 
some portion of the money will seek an outlet in buying 
securities or other assets until r has fallen so as to bring about 
an increase in the magnitude of M2 and at the same time to 
stimulate a rise in Y to such an extent that the new money is 
absorbed in M1 and M2 (1936, p. 200). 
Given the level of government spending and of taxes, the change in 
Mis the change in spending in the first round of the monetary action, 
and these recipients will allocate some of spending for consumption and 
some for "saving." The part that is saved causes the prices of 
securities and other existing assets to be driven up, since the quantity 
of these are fixed. The lowered yield on assets and securities causes 
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interest rates in general to be lower than if government bonds had been 
issued and investment to be stimulated as above. Equilibrium is 
restored when all yields are in equilibrium and real yields are 
equalized. 
Thus incomes and such prices [of alternative stores of wealth] 
necessarily change until the aggregate of the amounts of money 
which individuals choose to hold at the new level of incomes and 
prices thus brought about has come to equality with the amount of 
money created by the banking system (1936, pp. 84-85). 
The desire to spend on assets comes in this case from the 
psychological desire to save, so that some portion of income will be 
devoted to spending on assets whose prices are driven up. If this were 
not the case the effects of money would not operate through relative 
prices. In the first case, the desire was that of persons already 
holding wealth to maximize returns on their savings. 
A Model of Market Transmission 
Keynes' channel by which open market operations affect spending 
and real variables provides for transmission of effects from one market 
to another. It is clear that Keynes separates markets according to 
special characteristics. For example, he speaks of prices of existing 
assets and the supply-price of newly produced assets (1936, pp. 142, 
235, 248), and since he distinguishes between the prices of these 
categories of goods they must be separate. These markets are separate 
yet related in that the interest rate established in one market is an 
argument in the demand function for the other market. The market for 
consumer goods (non-durables and services) is yet another market. 
Producers and demanders of durable goods face a different set of 
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decisions than the participants in the consumer goods markets. As 
Keynes outlines these differences, it is clear that his model separates 
these markets. 
Assumptions that are made in developing Keynes' model are as 
follows: Individuals demand current consumption and future consumption. 
Future consumption is provided for by saving, and savers attempt to 
maximize yields on their assets. 
The demand for a particular asset has the following arguments: 
Ps • the price of substitute assets 
y • real income 
q = the physical yield (either production or consumer services) of 
the asset. 
a• the appreciation premium 
1 = the liquidity premium 
c • the carrying cost 
k • the rate of investment 
K • the stock of capital-assets 
s • the scarcity premium; s • s(K) 
The rate of investment is given by k • dK/dt. The scarcity premium is 
negatively related to K. We may take demand for the asset to depend on 
oA • DA(Ps, y, s(K), rA) where rA •(a+ q + 1 - c). 
The process begins by an open market operation in which the 
monetary authority purchases bonds for cash. 
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Since the central bank does not engage in purchasing or selling 
real capital assets or private securities, the first round effects would 
be on the rates of return on government securities, as shown in figure 
4.1, the effect on other assets coming later, as the sellers of bonds 
trade their excess money for other assets. 
One reason for supposing that there is a special connection arises 
from the fact that • • the banking system and the monetary 
authority are dealers in debts and not in assets or consumables. 
(p. 205) 
The next step in the process is that wealth holders will recognize 
the existence of other profit opportunities--that is, there are other 
assets whose prices have not been affected. They will increase demand 
for these assets (DA0 to oA1 ) and attempt to purchase more of 
these assets and in doing so drive up their prices (see figure 4.2). 
These assets are "existing" assets, but since wealth owners care only 
D 




Figure 4.1. Keynes' markets for government bonds and money. 
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about the yield on the asset and not the form, this is irrelevant. When 
they drive up the prices of these assets from pA0 to pA1 , they 
have driven down their yields simultaneously. 
Once all other assets have higher prices and lowered yields, it 
becomes profitable to purchase (or order) new capital goods--either 
consumer durables or production capital. The prices of these goods are 
still a bargain to potential investors or wealth holders. So, the 
increase in the prices of existing assets raises the demand for newly 
produced assets. Up to this point, Keynes' analysis bears a strong 
resemblance to that of Friedman. However, at this point, the two 
approaches depart. For we shall now argue that under certain conditions 
(which Keynes considered to be quite common), the increase in demand for 
newly produced assets will cause the output of these assets to be 
increased but will do so without the necessity of an increase in their 
prices or in the nominal wage-rates of workers employed in their 
production. 
Y, s) 
DA (Ps ) 0 , y, s 
Existing assets 
Figure 4.2. Keynes' market for existing assets. 
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Excess Supply 
Keynes in The General Theory attempted to build a model of an 
economy characterized by excess supply of goods and labor. The 
existence of excess supply is due to deficient demand for goods, so that 
a gap will occur between a community's actual and potential production. 
In particular, producers set levels of production according to effective 
demand but not exceeding that level where the real wage falls below the 
marginal disutility of labor (1936, p. 26). Effective demand is 
determined by the amount expected to be spent on consumption at that 
level of employment plus the amount expected to be spent on investment 
purchases by the community (1936, pp. 25, 29). Therefore, given the 
propensity to consume, effective demand is a function of expected 
investment expenditure (1936, p. 27). Expected investment expenditure 
is determined by the expectation of the "yield" on the purchase of a new 
capital asset compared to its supply price. If this yield is greater 
than the highest rate of return from alternative uses, it will be 
undertaken (1936, p. 137). There is, then, an inverse relationship of 
these highest yields to the volume of investment, and since the level of 
output is determined by the level of investment when the propensity to 
consume is given, the long run level of output is determined by the 
schedule of "greatest yields" (1936, p. 136). 
Employment is uniquely associated with the level of output at any 
time given the state of art of industry (1936, p. 246). The level of 
output is in equilibrium when employers have no incentive to change it 
in order to profit further from the aggregate demand proceeds being 
greater than the aggregate supply price (costs) (1936, pp. 25, 27). 
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Following the line of reasoning, then, employment is also a function of 
the schedule of "greatest yields." 
To illustrate Keynes' idea of excess supply, we present a model of 
an economy consisting of households and firms. The households attempt 
to maximize utility, which is given by: 
U • U(N, cd', A/P +Aa), subject to 
+ w*N + A/P • cd' + .4a, where cW/aN < O, ~u/acd' > 0, 
3U/3(A/P +Aa) > O. 
The firm attempts to maximize real profits which are given by 
1'r • Y - w*Nd', subject to y • F(N), F' > O, F'' < O. 
Where N • quantity of labor 
d' C • effective demand for consumption goods and services. 
A• nominal value of assets 
P • price level 
a• A/P, the real value of assets 
1l' • the real value of profits 
w • W/P, the real wage rate 
Nd'• effective demand for labor 
N8 • notional supply of labor 
Nd • notional demand for labor 
yd'= cd' + i • effective demand for output 
yd • notional demand for output 
Y8 • notional supply of output 
y • real value of current output 
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In this model, Ns is the quantity of labor supplied by 
households if they are constrained only by the real wage and their time 
endowments. The actual level of employment, N, is determined by the 
level of output firms can sell so that 
That is, firms hire just that amount of labor necessary to produce the 
amount of output they can sell, y (figure 4.3). In turn, y is 
determined by the effective demand for goods yd', so that y d' = y 
Observe that, at K = Nd' < Ns, excess supply of labor exists; at 
w1, N < Ns, or, as Keynes stated it, " ••• the existing real 
equivalent of these wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the 
existing employment ••• " (1936, p. 14). With respect to the behavior 
of firms, Keynes specified in The General Theory that F'' < 0 and that 
W/P 
N N y 
Figure 4.3. Keynes' labor and goods markets demonstrating excess 




w • 3 y~~, so that the notional demand for labor (Nd) and the 
notional supply of goods are negatively sloped. 
Keynes attributes the above situation to deficient demand for both 
investment and consumption goods. Deficient demand in the investment 
goods market comes about because of the competition that existing assets 
provide for the purchase of newly produced capital goods. As long as 
there is an existing asset with a higher return, savers will choose that 
asset over newly produced assets. 
Now assume that the central bank increases the quantity of money 
from Ml to H2 through open-market operations. This action: 
according to Keynes' transmission process, will increase the demand for 
existing assets (figure 4.4), shifting the demand curve for these assets 
from DA(M1) to DA(M2). The increase in the prices for existing 
assets allows new investment to be made, since it is only in this 
situation that savers will be willing to order a new capital good rather 
than purchase an existing asset. 
Now those assets of which the normal supply-price is less than the 
demand-price will be newly produced; and these will be those 
assets of which the marginal efficiency would be greater ••• 
than the rate of interest ••• (1936, p. 228). 
No further increase in the rate of investment is possible when the 
greatest amongst the own-rates of own-interest of all available 
assets is equal to the greatest amongst the marginal efficiencies 
of all assets ••• (1936, p. 236). 
When the price of existing assets increases, the demand curve for 
newly-p~oduced assets shifts from D(PA1 ) to D(PA2). Investment 
increases from kl to k2, and the increase in output increases the 
effective demand for labor, shifting the Nd' curve in figure 4.3. 
Workers will be willing to supply more labor at the existing (or 
even a lower) real wage rate. Therefore, they do not require the 
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Figure 4.4. Effects of an increase in the quantity of money on the market for newly 





inducement of a higher nominal wage rate, and there will be no pressure 
for W, the nominal wage rate, to rise. In The General Theory, Keynes 
contended that the marignal product of labor (3y/aN) would fall as 
output rose, that w •oy/3N, and that therefore the real wage would have 
to fall. Keynes apparently was arguing that the real wage would fall as 
a result of the increase in output (1936, p. 10). Workers would not 
resist 
••• reductions of real wages, which are associated with 
increases in aggregate employment and leave relative money wages 
unchanged, unless the reduction proceeds so far as to threaten a 
reduction of the real wage below the marginal disutility of the 
existing volume of employment (1936, pp. 14-15). 
Thus, whereas workers would resist"• •• reductions of money-wages, 
which are seldom if ever of an all-round character ••• "(1936, p. 
14), they allow their real wage rate to fall as output prices tend to 
rise. 
But a question emerges: If ffrms were located on their Nd and 
yS curves (figures 4.3 and 4.4) prior to the increase in demand, how 
could firms be characterized as having excess supply? Keynes' evident 
desire to build excess supply in the market for output into his model 
was obscured by his incorporating the classical view of diminishing 
8y/3N and the requirement that w • ly/3N into the analysis. In a later 
article (1939), he altered this portion of his analysis to allow for a 
constant w during short-run fluctuations and a constant ay/3N over a 
significant range of output fluctuations. 
The effects of these alterations are shown in figures 4.5, 4.6, 
and 4.7. In figure 4.5, the monetary stimulus which raises pA shifts 
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figure 4,5. Effects of an increase in demand when there is excess 
supply in Keynes 1 market for new assets. 
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Figure 4.6. Excess supply in Keynes 1 







Figure 4.7. Exces~- supply in 
Keynes·' goods -ma;rket with 
constant -ma-rginal cost. 
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upward pressure·on price. That is, so long as the producer of durable 
goods can purchase inputs (including labor services) at constant prices, 
his marginal cost curve will be horizontal. And, as noted above, 
workers will be willing to supply more labor at a constant nominal wage 
rate, W, due to excess supply in the labor market. 
Figure 4.6 follows Keynes (1939, p. 46) by introducing imperfect 
competition into the model. In this case, for the individual firm, 
price will exceed marginal cost. If marginal cost is constant as above, 
the firm can increase output at a constant price. But even with a 
constant price, real profits will rise because of the difference between 
the price and the marginal cost. In terms of the demand for labor, the 
firm will hire additional labor so long as w i (1 + l/ep)ay/3N, 
where ep is the price elasticity of demand for output. Thus excess 
supply of goods clearly exists at point Bin figure 4.7. An increase in 
demand, which moves the firm to the output level of some point such as 
A, can be achieved without the inducement of a lower real wage rate. 
As the economy approaches the level of fully employed resources, 
marginal cost is no longer constant. 
A point must surely come, long before plant and labour are fully 
employed, when less efficient plant and labour have to be brought 
into commission ••• (1939, p. 44). 
But the statistical phenomenon of the stability of labor's share of the 
national product, and therefore a possible constant real wage over the 
business cycle, might be explained by the degree of imperfection of 
competition diminishing as output neared its capacity level in terms of 
labor and existing plant. Therefore, the notional demand for labor 
would approach the marginal product of labor as the economy became more 
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competitive due to a higher ratio of actual to capacity output (1939, p. 
49). It just may be, theorizes Keynes, that the "change in the degree 
of the imperfection of the market is such as to offset the combined 
effect of changes in marginal costs and of changes in the prices of 
materials brought in from outside the system relatively to money wages" 
(1939, p. 49). 
A way that this mechanism could operate to keep the real wage 
constant is that as output is increased from y0 to y1 and the 
effective demand for labor shifts from Nd' 0 to Nd' 1 , the 
notional demand for labor curve would shift up to (1 + 1/elp.)ay/oN in 
figure 4.8, as the price elasticity of demand has increased due to more 
competitive conditions. While output has risen from y0 to Y1, the 
real wage has remained at w-tr. Another increase in output would shift 
the effective demand for labor to Nd' and further raise 2• ep 
shifting the notional demand for labor to (1 + 1/e2P)ay/oN, until 
finally at Yf (full employment of resources) the effective demand for 
labor curve would cross the supply of labor curve where the notional 
demand for labor equals the supply of labor so that both workers and 
firms would have eliminated their excess supply. Only under purely 
competitive conditions would ep be equal to infinity, so (1 + 
1/ep)ay/,N • ay/)N. It is not necessary for the level of full 
employment to dictate purely competitive conditions, although Keynes saw 
competition improving as the ratio of actual to capacity output rose 
and declining as the ratio fell. Keynes only stipulated that full 
employment would be a situation of diminishing marginal product of 
resources. At less than full employment, the resulting demand for labor 
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W/P 
Figure 4.8 Keynes' goods market with imperfect competition improving as 
the economy nears capacity providing a constant real wage 
rate. 
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is perfectly elastic over the business cycle at IP'. While diminishing 
returns are present, the demand for labor curve is a result of a 
combination of competitive conditions at high levels of output and of a 
constant marginal product of labor at low levels of output. 
In this analysis, Keynes has retained his hypothesis that the real 
wage is always equal to the firm's demand for labor [either the marginal 
product of labor, when ep • o-, or (1 + l/ep)ay/3N] so that the 
worker may have an excess supply of labor. But, in The General 
Theory, the firm faces a declining marginal product of labor and there 
is pure competition, the firm will not be in a position of excess 
supply, bu would be maximizing profits. The later development of the 
1939 paper of a constant real wage, allows for firms to be in a 
sub-optimal position also. In this last case, made explicit by the 1939 
article, Keynes shows a situation of excess supply of goods, and the 
demand for labor is horizontal over some range. Firms would like to 
move to Yf, but are constrained by the level of effective demand. 
Since the necessity of a declining real wage has been dispensed with, 
"the good effect of an expansionist investment policy on employment •• 
• [can be] due to the stimulant which it [gives] to effective demand" 
(1939, p. 40), and "we can advance farther on the road towards full 
employment than ••• previously supposed without seriously affecting 
real hourly wages or the rate of profits per unit of output" (1939, p. 
41). 
Further Effects of the Transmission Process 
At this point, there has been an increase in output and employment 
in the market for newly produced assets. During the expansion, the real 
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wage has remained constant, but labor income (w x N) has risen since 
Nl > N0 • The increase in real income then produces further 
increases in real income through the multiplier effect, as workers 
increase their demand for consumption goods (cd') and additional 
assets (A a). The additional increase in effective demand raises firms' 
demand for labor, which, if the economy is still at less than full 
employment, results in yet another round of increased real income and 
increased effective demand. The extent of the increase in real income 
that comes from the primary increase in the production of new "assets" 
may be determined by the investment multiplier "k" (1936, pp. 114-116). 
"Thus their effort to consume a part of their increased incomes will 
stimulate output until the new level ••• of incomes provide a margin 
of saving sufficient to correspond to the increased investment" (1936, 
P• 117). 
The market for consumption goods is stimulated by an increase in 
the level of output economy-wide • 
• • • increased employment for investment must necessarily 
stimulate the industries producing for consumption and thus lead 
to a total increase of employment which is a multiple of the 
primary employment required by the investment itself (1936, p. 
118). 
The multiplier works to increase income for all markets, since there was 
excess supply at the outset (1936, p. 248). 
Full Employment in the Market for Investment Goods. 
Assume again that the monetary authority purchases bonds in the 
open market and, in doing so, raises the market price of these bonds and 
drives down their yields. Recipients of the new money, who have 
voluntarily traded their bonds for cash, now look for more profitable 
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investments for their wealth since the yield on short term governnent 
bonds has fallen. The demand for other existing assets increases. 
Since the supply in this market is inelastic, prices of existing 
(traded) assets increase. Consequently, the demand for newly produced 
assets of all types increases, since they are now a "bargain" to the 
investor: their MEC has risen relative to the rate of interest. 
But now assume full employment in the market for newly produced 
goods; producers will require a price increase in order to expand 
production of these goods. However, this price increase will be such as 
to discourage increased purchases of these newly produced assets. In 
fact, if there is no excess capacity, the supply curve for these newly 
produced assets will be vertical above full employment (see figure 4.4), 
causing price to rise the full extent of the increase in demand (1936, 
pp. 118-119). At this point, the price rise of the newly produced 
assets will reduce the MEC of those assets so that in relation to the 
rate of interest, the previous equilibrium position is restored. The 
rate of investment will not rise, thus causing no increase in output and 
no effect on the market for consumption goods through the MPC and the 
multiplier. 
Behavior of Producers of Capital Goods 
A further complication exists with respect to newly produced asset 
markets. The constraint on clearing in these markets depends not only 
on coordination with the labor market but also on the price level 
established for existing assets. This price level is a determinant of 
demand in the market for newly produced goods. 
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Prices in the newly produced goods markets rise only as as a 
result of output increases not in response to demand changes, even if 
there remains some unemployment in these industries: 
••• the wage-unit itself will tend to rise as employment 
improves, and the increase in output will be accompanied by a rise 
of prices (in terms of the wage-unit) owing to increasing cost in 
the short period (1936, p. 249). 
Thus instead of constant prices in conditions of unemployment, and 
of prices rising in proportion to the quantity of money in full 
employment, we have in fact a condition of prices rising gradually 
as employment increases (1936, p. 296). 
This [rising prices] is not a process that will have only begun 
when full employment has been attained;--it will have been making 
steady progress all the time that expenditure was increasing 
(1936, p. 290) • 
• • • supply price will increase as output from a given equipment 
is increased. Thus increasing output will be associated with 
rising prices ••• (1936, p. 300). 
Therefore prices respond to an increase in the output of the good 
due to increases in the wage-unit, bottlenecks, and increasing short run 
costs. Producers of the goods do not need an "up front" price signal to 
increase production; they are willing to expand production at the market 
price. 
Prices of existing assets have risen, but prices of newly produced 
goods rise only after output has begun to increase. Therefore, a 
consequence of the transmission process is that eventually there will be 
an increase in the price level. This increase is a consequence and not 
a precondition of the increase in output. Output increases take place 
without price increases. If price signals were required, then these 
investors would have had to recalculate the marginal efficiency of the 
asset at the new price before purchasing it. So, if the increase in 
demand for investment goods results in an increase in output at constant 
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prices due to the existence of excess supply, then what signals do 
producers see to increase production and employment? 
Producers of capital goods sell their products to the investors in 
the model. They rely on their estimates of effective demand when 
deciding the scale of their operations, and in particular, they get 
signals from the behavior of investors, who are their customers • 
• in the case of durable goods, the producer's short-term 
expectations are based on the current long-term expectations of 
the investor ••• (1936, p. 51). 
Thus the behaviour of each individual firm in deciding its daily 
output will be determined by its short-term expectations as to 
the cost of output ••• and as to the sale-proceeds of this 
output; ••• in the case of additions to capital equipment ••• 
these short-term expectations will depend on the long-term 
expectations of other parties (1936, p. 47). 
[Keynes is agreeing with Mr. Hawtrey's point that] ••• input and 
employment are influenced by the accumulation of stocks before 
prices have fallen •••• For the accumulation of unsold stocks 
(or decline in forward orders) is precisely the kind of event 
which is most likely to cause input to differ from what the mere 
statistics of the sale-proceeds would indicate ••• (1936, p. 51, 
footnote 1) • 
• • • I prefer ••• to emphasize the total change of effective 
demand which reflects the increase or decrease of unsold stocks •• 
• • Moreover, in the case of fixed capital, the increase or 
decrease in unused capacity corresponds to the increase or 
decrease in unsold stocks in its effect on decisions to produce • 
• • (1936, p. 76). 
Thus producers are induced to change output by a myriad of 
signals, and price need not be one of them. Since there is excess 
supply in this market for newly produced assets, producers would be 
willing to increase output at the going price if they perceived that the 
output could be sold. The increase in effective demand brought about by 
the rise in prices of existing assets causes purchasers to increase 
orders and producers to increase production without prices in this 
market having to change. 
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If wages fell "without limit" whenever there was unemployment, and 
if prices of newly-produced assets also fell, the market would clear. 
As long as there were workers willing to supply labor at a nominal wage 
low enough to make production possible, excess supply of labor would not 
develop in the market for newly produced assets. But, in reality, 
••• a contraction of effective demand below the critical level 
[full employment] will reduce its amounts measured in cost units; 
whereas an expansion of effective demand beyond this level will 
not, in general, have the effect of increasing its amount in terms 
of cost units. This result follows from the assumption that the 
factors of production, and in particular workers, are disposed to 
resist a reduction in their money-rewards, and there is no 
corresponding motive to resist an increase (1936, p. 303). 
The cost unit that Keynes has referred to is the weighted average 
of all costs entering into the production process. So, as above, if 
demand falls "measured in cost units," then demand has fallen more 
than costs, so that the producer would have to maintain prices for his 
output. The condition that Keynes calls "true inflation" is one in 
which any increase in effective demand results in an increase in the 
cost unit fully proportional to the increase in effective demand, thus 
allowing no margin for output increases. 
The producer will cut his employment before he cuts his prices. 
This is especially true when we consider that the "amount of employment, 
both in each individual firm and industry and in the aggregate, depends 
on the amount of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive 
from the corresponding output" (1936, p. 24). The entrepreneurs realize 
the gap between the supply price of their output and the expected 
proceeds from the expenditure of consumers or investors. Unless there 
is an expectation of increased expenditure on investment goods, neither 
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the producers of consumption goods nor the producers of investment goods 
will increase output (1936, p. JO). Since employers construct their 
labor demand according to the nature of supply and demand in other 
industries, and "as to the amount of effective demand" (1936, p. 259), 
then this area is out of their control. 
When producers cut output, a necessary consequence is that the 
marginal disutility of labor falls below the real wage. Unfortunately, 
there is "as a rule, no means of securing a simultaneous and equal 
money-wage reduction in all industries," and "a movement by employers to 
revise money wage bargains downward will be much more strongly resisted 
. . . II {19J6, P• 264). 
• • • the workers, though unconciously, are instinctively more 
reasonable economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they 
resist reductions of money-wages, which are seldom or never of an 
all-round character, even though the existing real equivalent of 
these wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the existing 
employment ••• (1936, p. 14). 
Therefore, Keynes sees an assymetry. If the economy were at full 
employment and demand rises, only prices would be affected. But, if the 
economy is at full employment and demand falls, output and employment 
are affected, and money-wages and prices will tend to fall only after 
output and employment have declined. The reason lies in the inability 
of workers to "insist on being offered work on a scale involving a real 
wage which is not greater than the marginal disutility of that amount of 
employment" (1936, p. 291). 
If this were not the case, the classical economists would have 
been correct in their assumption of continuous full employment at a wage 
equal to the marginal disutility of labor. Only if the real wage is 
greater than the marginal disutility of labor will it be possible to 
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increase employment by "increasing expenditure in terms of money" (1936, 
p. 284). 
The producers of consumption goods realize that they would not 
profit by increasing output, since there would be some part of the 
resulting increased income that was saved, and not spent on consumption 
goods. "Hence employers would make a loss if the whole of increased 
employment were to be devoted to satisfying the increased demand for 
immediate consumption" (p. 27). Producers of goods watch not only their 
own markets but other markets for signals as to the most profitable 
course of action. Since these producers have expectations as to what 
total demand will be and realize that prices will not fall in areas they 
cannot control, they are not in a position to lower price to gain a 
greater share of the market. Lowering prices on their output would 
reduce their total revenues and cause them to suffer losses on each unit 
of output they produced. They have no choice but to reduce output. 
If there is a decrease in the quantity of money causing a fall in 
spending, producers will not lower prices unless they could be assured 
that 1) lower prices on the goods they sell would induce their workers 
to lower their wages, and their suppliers to lower prices; 2) other 
firms would follow by lowering their prices so that there would be a 
general price decline; 3) this general price decline would lead to a 
lower interest rate through a reduction in the demand for money; and 4) 
the lower rate of interest would induce new investment purchases and 
fill in the gap between consumption expenditure and total output in 
monetary terms. 
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A Decrease in the Supply of Money 
It may now be shown how a decline in the nominal money supply from 
a position of full employment results in a fall in output and employment 
at the same real wage rate, with money wages and prices remaining 
"sticky." A decrease in the supply of money caused by open-market sales 
of securities by the central bank will produce the following sequence of 
events: 1) it will lower the price and raise the yield of short term 
government securities; 2) it will raise yields on all alternative forms 
of wealth since an excess demand for money emerges causing wealth 
holders to sell assets which have low yields, driving down the prices of 
assets; 3) it will discourage investment in new assets due to the lower 
prices on existing assets and thus cause a reduction in effective demand 
in these durable goods industries; 4) the effects of reduced demand in 
the investment goods market will not result in a lowering of prices due 
to the reluctance of producers described above, and due to the 
resistance of workers to lower money wages, output and employment in 
these industries are affected primarily rather than prices; 5) lower 
output in these industries impacts real incomes and profits and through 
the multiplier lowers effective demand and thus income in the 
consumption goods market; 5) producers in the consumption goods market 
also will be reluctant to lower prices since prices of those goods and 
labor which figure into their production decisions have not fallen. 
So, a fall in the quantity of money will have effects the reverse 
of those for an increase in the money supply. The price decline of 
existing assets is immediate (1936, p. 142); however, prices of newly 
produced assets and goods do not follow. These markets have an 
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additional constraint of the attachment of an employment market. If a 
constant marginal product of labor exists, and if prices fall in these 
markets, money wages would have to fall simultaneously. 
In figure 4.9, if we start at point A where y • Yf and assume a 
decline in the money supply as a result of an open market operation, 
demand in the market for newly produced goods is affected through the 
transmission process. The decrease in the money supply raises the 
interest rate on bonds as bond prices fall when the central bank sells a 
larger quantity on the open market. The return on other assets is lower 
than the return on these bonds and money, so wealth holders will sell 
other existing assets driving down their prices; therefore PA falls. 
Since investors compare prices of newly produced assets with the prices 
of existing assets, the prices of new assets will now be higher than for 
any other and they will substitute existing assets for new ones causing 
a fall in the demand for new assets. Lowered demand for new assets 
d d' causes Y to fall toy , and the corresponding demand for labor to 
fall to Nd'. Since there were diminishing returns at Yf and Nf 
(1939, p. 44), one might expect that a rise in the real wage would be 
necessary if Keynes' assumption that the real wage corresponded to the 
demand for labor. But, if Keynes' later assumption of imperfect 
competition at less than full employment is taken into account, it turns 
out that the rise in the productivity of labor is offset by the 
deterioration of competitive conditions in just that measure to produce 
a constant real wage rate. 
In figure 4.9, when effective demand for output falls to yd' 1 
d' and the effective demand for labor falls to N 1 , the real wage 
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Figure 4.9. The effects of a decrease in the quantity of money in Keynes' model. 
remains at w-A' because ep falls just enough to offset the increase in 
ay/3N caused by the decrease in output. Thus the decline in output to 
Y1 is matched by a shift downward and to the left of the notional 
supply of output from ys(eop) to ys(e 1p) reflecting the 
lower elasticity of demand caused by a lower level of competition, and 
the labor market moves from A to B. 
Similarly, as the decline in effective demand for goods shifts the 
effective demand for labor to Nd', employment declines from Nf to 
Nl• But the fall in ep shifts the notional demand curve for labor 
downward to Nd(e1 ) and w remains at w-A' as the labor market moves p ' 
from A to B. As demand declines further, yd' shifts to yd' 2 along 
the horizontal segment of ys(e1p), and the output market moves 
from B to c. In the case of the labor market, the further decline int 
he effective demand for labor shifts the Nd' curve along the horiontal 
segment of Nd(e 1p) from B to c. There is excess supply of goods 
since firms would prefer to be at A, where profits are maximized; there 
is excess supply of labor, since workers would if unconstrained supply 
more labor at w-A", (Nf), giving labor a larger real income. 
Limits to the Transmission Process 
The transmission process will be self-limiting as a new 
equilibrium is reached between the marginal efficiency of capital and 
the rate of interest. "• •• the rate of investment will be pushed to 
the point ••• where the marginal efficiency of capital in general is 
equal to the market rate of interest" (1936, pp. 136-137). Consider 
again an increase in demand. As investment in newly produced assets 
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takes place, the marginal efficiency of capital in general falls. The 
scarcity premium will not rise as output increases since other assets 
will be produced whose output is in competition with the output from the 
asset. The scarcity premium will fall. Relative to other assets, the 
supply price of a newly produced asset will rise since the increase in 
output will raise prices in that industry. The actual physical output 
or "services" from the asset will not be affected by changes in its 
supply, but its "yield" which is the total of all the other yields will 
fall. However, increases in the price level from increases in output 
tend to offset this decline somewhat as investors revalue the stream of 
prospective yields against the supply price of the asset 0936, pp. 
141-142). 
The increase in the price level will reduce the impact of the 
initial increase in money by increasing demand for nominal balances, and 
"• •• the effect of this on liquidity preference will be to increase 
the quantity of money necessary to maintain a given rate of interest" 
(1936, p. 173). 
Therefore, unless the rate of money growth continues, the interest 
rate will rise. Eventually the decline in the MEC and the rise of the 
interest rate will be such as to restore the purchase of new assets to 
the former level, since the advantage of the higher rate of investment 
will have vanished. Prices of assets and rates of return will again 
stand in such a relation to each other that there is no gain in trading 
further. This period of time "measured in years, is not very large" 
(1936, p. 251). 
There can be two outcomes to this process. One is that full 
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employment (in investment goods market) is achieved before the rates of 
return come into equilibrium; then the rise in prices would accelerate 
the realignment of the rates of return. Another is that the rates of 
return come into equilibrium before full employment. 
Prices of newly produced assets may not fully adjust to prices of 
existing assets, with the result that long term rates of interest may 
not fully adjust to changes in the short term rates. This 
non-adjustment is a result of the conditions that cause excess supply in 
the market for newly produced goods. As the rate of investment 
increases, the fall in the scarcity premium reduces the yield on all 
assets of that type and lowers demand for those assets. Prices on 
existing assets respond immediately, but prices on newly produced assets 
do not fall rapidly due to their labor market constraint. Therefore, a 




KEYNES' VIEWS ON MONETARY POLICY 
Keynes' theory has been widely characterized as promoting fiscal 
measures over monetary measures, and of particular interest in this 
study is Friedman's position that Keynes did not favor monetary policy. 
As documented in the introduction to this paper, Friedman has long 
held the view that Keynes considered monetary policy "ineffective in 
stemming a decline" (1982, p. 42). Not only is monetary policy 
ineffective, "money has no effect on anything"--neither prices nor 
output (1956, P. 17). 
Friedman believes that Keynes was led astray from his earlier 
support of the quantity theory by the experience of the Great 
Depression. (1982, pp. 47, 621; 1967, p. 87) He wrongly interpreted 
this period to have demonstrated the impotence of monetary measures, 
whereas in Friedman's interpretation, having access to more 
sophisticated data, the Great Depression was lengthened and made more 
severe by an incorrect application of monetary policy. 
Keynes carried his interpretation to the "extreme" and built a 
theory to fit the facts as he saw them (1982, p. 48). The resulting 
theory is "highly specific," applicable only to conditions of deep 
depression (1982, p. 464). 
As a result of Keynes' convictions, he favored fiscal measures in 
combatting unemployment, since monetary policy was of no use (1967, p. 
87). However, in the preceeding chapter it was made clear that Keynes 
did recognize the potency of changes in the money supply. While this 
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process has been recognized by interpreters of Keynes, it has been given 
second billing to the warnings and qualifications that Keynes did make 
concerning the limits to monetary policy. This paper will not argue 
that Keynes advocated a wholesale dependence on monetary policy to the 
exclusion of other measures or that he considered monetary policy the 
answer to unemployment. It will present evidence that Keynes did not 
consider monetary policy ineffective and that, under most normal 
circumstances, it is useful and potent. 
This chapter will provide support and clarification that Keynes' 
views on monetary policy can be summarized as follows: 
I. Monetary measures should be the first choice of policy makers, 
since monetary restrictions are capable alone of keeping the economy 
at a less than full employment level of output. 
2. Keynes' theoretical framework implies that monetary policy is 
effective and he believed that in practice the magnitude of its effects 
was sufficiently large that it should be implemented in real world 
circumstances in such a manner as to promote confidence in the system 
and a stability in prices. 
3. There may be extreme circumstances in which monetary measures 
do not result in increases in output. In these cases, monetary policy 
should not be abandoned but supplemented by other measures designed to 
restore confidence in and a balance to the economic system. 
4. Monetary policy should precede and complement any other type 
of economic policy. A monetary policy that is effective will erase the 
need for other policies which may be more difficult to implement. 
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A. The Importance of Monetary Policy in The General Theory 
One of Keynes' major criticisms of Marshall and other classical 
economists was that their theories took no account of the influence of 
money on real variables in the economy (1936, pp. 183-184, 189). He 
also criticized the false division of the study of economics into the 
Theory of Value and Distribution and the Theory of Money. Money, he 
argued, was an integral part of the determination of output as a whole, 
so that a better division would be the study of individual decision 
making when output was fixed, as one branch, and the determination of 
output and employment as a whole which requires "the complete theory of 
a Monetary Economy" (1936, p. 293). 
Keynes isolated three variables in the economy through which any 
change in output must occur. If one of these variables is not changed, 
then there can be no change in output. These are the rate of interest, 
the marginal efficiency of capital and the propensity to consume (1936, 
p. 245). A necessary (but not sufficient 1) condition for a change 
1n output is a change in one of these variables. 
If, without any change in these factors, the entrepreneur were to 
increase employment as a whole, their proceeds will necessarily 
fall short of their supply-price (1936, p. 261). 
Keynes advocates isolating those determinants which are 
responsible for output changes, and among those concentrating on the 
ones that a government is capable of affecting (1936, p. 247). The 
rate of interest is one of those variables important for changes 1n 
output and one over which the monetary authority has great influence. 
the 
See 
1 The change is not sufficient unless all other variables remain 
same; interactions among variables may cause a reduced effect. 
pages 173 and 184 in Keynes, 1936. 
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This is the case since interest rates are determined by monetary factors 
and not real ones (given the level of real income) (1936, pp. 165, 174, 
183-184, 213). The rate of interest can be influenced in the right 
direction and the failure to do so results in output that is below a 
full employment level. 
The rate of interest is not self-adjusting at a level best suited 
to the social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high, so 
that a wise Government is concerned to curb it ••• (p. 351). 
Since the rate of interest on money is one form of yield that a 
wealth holder may earn, he always has the option of purchasing debts 
rather than purchasing a capital asset. Therefore the marginal 
efficiency of capital must be greater than the rate of interest the 
wealth holder could obtain by loaning his money • 
• • • there is always an alternative to the ownership of real 
capital-assets, namely the ownership of money and debts; so that 
the prospective yield with which the producers of new investment 
have to be content cannot fall below the standard set by the 
current rate of interest (1936, p. 212) • 
• • • the rate of interest on money plays a peculiar part in 
setting a limit to the level of employment, since it sets a 
standard to which the marginal efficiency of a capital-asset must 
attain if it is to be newly-produced (1936, p. 222). 
Since the marginal efficiency of assets falls as their stock 
increases, 
a point will come when it no longer pays to produce them, unless 
the rate of interest falls pari passu. When there is no asset 
of which the marginal efficiency reaches the rate of interest, the 
further production of capital assets comes to a standstill (1936, 
P• 228). 
Keynes assumed a zero elasticity of production and substitution 
for money (1936, pp. 230-231). Money has no substitutes in transactions 
and cannot be "produced" to accomodate the desires of wealth holders. 
This unique combination of attributes serves to restrict the 
self-adjusting nature of the economy: 
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The money-rate of interest holds back investment in the production 
of those other commodities without being capable of stimulating 
investment for the production of money ••• (1936, p. 235). 
The classical economists supposed that a rise in the rate of 
interest due to an increase in the demand for capital assets would not 
affect the level of output. The rise in the rate of interest would call 
forth additional saving to restore full employment equilibrium (1936, p. 
274). But, if saving is determined by the scale of investment, which 
is determined by the rate of interest, which in turn is a result of 
liquidity preference and the supply of money, then the interest rate on 
money cannot be determined by the real "yield" on capital and the supply 
of "wealth. 11 Then 
a rise in the rate of interest will diminish investment; hence a 
rise in the rate of interest must have the effect of reducing 
incomes to the level at which saving is decreased in the same 
measure as investment (1936, pp. 110-111). 
Therefore, a stimulus to output would depend on the "marginal 
efficiency of capital rising relatively to the rate of interest" 
(1936, p. 142). Investment, a critical component of aggregate demand, 
"is prompted by a low rate of interest • . . . Thus it is to our best 
advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the 
marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment" 
(1936, p. 375). 
Keynes admonishes that 
The remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a 
lower rate of interest!" (1936, p. 322). 
The boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused ••• by 
the combination of a rate of interest ••• too high for full 
employment with a misguided state of expectation" (1936, p. 322). 
Therefore, 
The only relief [from unemployment]--apart from changes in the 
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·marginal efficiency of capital--can come (so long as the 
propensity to consume is unchanged) from an increase in the 
quantity of money ••• " (1936 1 p. 234). 
Thus, apart altogether from progress and an increasing population, 
a gradually increasing stock of money has proved imperative 
(1936 1 p. 340 1 footnote). 
In Keynes' model, the rate of interest important for investment 
and thus output is the rate of interest on money. However, this rate is 
highly "psychological" since it depends on the interaction between the 
supply of money and liquidity preference for the community (1936, p. 
202). The only method by which the rate of interest can be altered is 
by changing this equilibrium rate by either changing the supply of money 
or by influencing liquidity preference. · The psychological incentives to 
liquidity may be difficult to influence (1936 1 p. 309), so a more 
reliable method would be to change the supply of money. 
As noted earlier in this paper, the rate of interest is affected 
by a change in the prices of assets relative to their returns. When the 
price of bonds rises, the effective interest rate falls. Monetary 
policy affects rates of interest by changing the price of the asset. So 
whether one considers monetary policy as operating through interest 
rates "directly" or through the prices of assets "indirectly," the 
results of monetary policy are the same. Interest rates can only change 
(as a result of monetary policy) through changes in changes in asset 
prices. In Keynes' model, it was shown that a change in the prevailing 
interest rate is necessary to restore equilibrium in the money market, 
and in that sense interest rates might be considered to have a more 
direct influence on the money market. But the decision to invest 
because the rate of interest has fallen is equivalent to the decision to 
invest because the prices of new assets are "relatively" lower than 
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existing ones. In both cases, the wealth holder must decide on a set of 
alternatives, and in both cases the opportunity cost of investing is 
precisely the return that could be had either by holding money, by 
purchasing an alternative store of wealth, by increasing consumption,or 
by not borrowing. Therefore no attention need be paid to whether 
monetary policy operates through interest rates or through asset prices 
if the range of assets is broad. 
There are two methods by which the real supply of money may be 
increased. One method is the overt increase in nominal balances by the 
central banking authority which Keynes described in his transmission 
process. The other occurs as a result of falling wages and prices. In 
the second instance, the real money supply is increased so that real 
balances become sufficiently abundant in terms of the wage-unit "to 
restore a level of full employment" (1936, p. 253). 
The second method depends upon the flexibility and responsiveness 
of prices and wages to changes in employment and output levels. This 
flexibility, while desirable isofar as it propels the system back to 
full employment, results in fluctuations of the price level which 
detract from a stability of values. Every change in aggregate demand 
would set up great movements in the price level which would find "no 
resting-place below full employment" except at that point where 
liquidity preference became absolute (1936, pp. 303-304). 
Therefore, a much more beneficial policy would be a program of 
monetary management which would avoid great swings in the price level 
and would promote stability and confidence (1936, pp. 270-271). Stable 
prices are desirable since they remove many of the harmful effects that 
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expectations have on the level of output (1936, p. 88). Even though 
"analytically" they come to the same thing, Keynes advocated replacing 
the "laissez faire" monetary policy of flexbile wages with one that was 
intended to bring about the same results but avoiding the consequences 
of price instability (1936, p. 267-268). 
B. Monetary Policy Implementation. 
Keynes denied the simple quantity theory of money on the grounds 
that it ignored the effect of interest rates on the demand for 
speculative balances (1936, p. 196). For, otherwise, he said, output 
could be "assumed" to always be at full employment levels and prices 
would always change in proportion to changes in the quantity of money. 
This denial of the simple quantity theory does not constitute a denial 
of monetary policy. Rather, it is a recognition that monetary policy 
operates on interest rates rather than on output prices in the short 
run, and that the major thrust of monetary policy is the effect it 
produces on interest rates (1936, p. 200-201). 
Keynes' theory of how monetary policy affects the interest rate is 
described in Chapter IV. The effect of monetary policy on prices 
comes as a result of the change in output. As described in that 
chapter, if the economy were at full employment, the simple quantity 
theory would hold (1936, p. 209). Otherwise, a change in money balances 
usually has an effect on output through changes in the rate of 
interest. 
Accomodative monetary policy prevents the rate of interest from 
rising too high. If the demand for real balances rises as output 
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increases and if money has no substitutes and cannot be produced, an 
otherwise dynamic and healthy economy would be constrained by 
insufficient real balances to maintain the rate of interest which would 
result in full employment (1936, pp. 234-236). 
A remedy for this situation is the production of money in just 
that quantity which would maintain real balances: 
••• whereas if money could be grown like a crop or manufactured 
like a motor-car, depressions would be avoided or mitigated 
because, if the price of other assets was tending to fall in terms 
of money, more labour would be diverted into the production of 
money; ••• (1936, pp. 230-231). 
Unemployment develops ••• because people want the moon;--men 
cannot be employed when the object of their desire (i.e., money) 
is something which cannot be readily produced and the demand for 
which cannot be readily choked off. There is no remedy but to 
persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same 
thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e., a central bank) 
under public control (1936, p. 235). 
Keynes described the normal or usual result of changes in the 
quantity of money as a change in output. It is helpful to consider the 
transmission process in its "stages" of operation. In the first stage, 
rates of return on short-term government securities are lowered by a 
bidding up of their prices by the banking authority • 
• • • in normal circumstances the banking system is in fact always 
able to purchase (or sell) bonds in exchange for cash by bidding 
the price of bonds up (or down) in the market by a modest amount; 
and the larger the quantity of cash which they seek to create (or 
cancel) by purchasing (or selling) bonds and debts, the greater 
must be the fall (or rise) in the rate of interest (1936, p. 197). 
The second stage would come when individuals choose not to hold 
the new cash after the bond purchase but to spend it on other "existing" 
assets, thus raising their prices and lowering their yields. In this 
stage, "• •• some portion of the money will seek an outlet in buying 
securities or other assets until r has fallen ••• " (1936, p. 200). 
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This!. would correspond to the rates (implicit or explicit) on 
substitute assets, so that at the completion of this "stage," all rates 
of return have been lowered, including the interest rate on money. 
The last stage occurs when investment in new capital assets increases as 
a result of the lowering of the interest rates. New investment 
expenditures cause output to rise. At the same time, liquidity 
preference rises due to a lowering of the rate of interest and a rise in 
the level of income. The excess money balances now find a home in the 
portfolios of wealth holders, and equilibrium is once again restored. 
Thus each increase in the quantity of money must raise the price 
of bonds sufficiently to exceed the expectation of some "bull" and 
so influence him to sell his bond for cash ••• (1936, p. 171). 
The primary effect of a change in the quantity of money on the 
quantity of effective demand is through its influence on the rate 
of interest (1936, p. 298). 
There will be a determinate amount of increase in the quantity of 
effective demand which, after taking everything into account, will 
correspond to and be in equilibrium with, the increase in the 
quantity of money (1936, p. 299) • 
• • • the grant of bank credit will set up three 
tendencies--(!) for output to increase, ••• (1936, 
p. 83). 
Moreover, except in conditions of full employment, there will be 
an increase in real income ••• (1936, p. 82) • 
• • • employment, incomes and prices cannot help moving in such a 
way that in the new situation, someone does choose to hold the 
additional money (1936, p. 83). 
Thus incomes and such prices [of assets] necessarily change until 
the aggregate of the amounts of money which individuals choose to 
hold at the new level of incomes and prices thus brought about has 
come to equality with the amount of money created by the banking 
system (1936, p. 84). 
A change in M can be assumed to operate by changing r, and a 
change in!. will lead to a new equilibrium partly by-changing 
M2 and partly by changing Y ••• (1936, p. 200-201) • 
• • • the terms on which the monetary authority will change the 
quantity of money enters as a real determinant into the economic 
scheme (1936, p. 191) • 
• • • if the quantity of money beyond what is required in the 
active circulation is in excess of this proportion of the national 
income, there will be a tendency sooner or later for the rate of 
interest to fall to the neighborhood of this minimum. The falling 
rate of interest will then, cet. par., increase effective demand 
••• (1936, p. 306-307). 
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Therefore, the classical theory is wrong when it claims that the 
interest rate is self-adjusting without "grandmotherly care" (1936, p. 
177). 
C. Monetary Policy Under Extreme Conditions 
Unusual circumstances may exist in which reliance solely upon monetary 
policy may be disappointing. One example might be a situation in which 
there had been a "collapse" of the marginal efficiency of capital, so 
that investors would expect little or no returns from investment. If 
these expectations are held universally, lowering the rate of interest 
would be of little benefit. Confidence in future returns from 
investments would be low; therefore, any "practicable" reduction in the 
rate of interest would not be enough to stimulate new investment (1936, 
p. 316). This condition could exist at "reasonable" levels of interest 
rates, so it is not a liquidity trap. 
There could be a situation in which the rate of interest on all 
assets had been driven so low that savers uniformly expect that it 
cannot be maintained at such a low level. Therefore, in hopes of 
getting a higher profit by waiting, they will hold cash or some other 
extremely liquid asset in order to purchase assets at a later time. 
This is the liquidity trap. Since savers do not want to commit their 
wealth to an illiquid, low-yielding investment to which they will be 
tied for long periods, they will hold cash as a store of wealth for the 
interim. Therefore, at these low rates, liquidity preference is 
perfectly elastic, and the monetary authority has reached a limit below 
which the interest rate may not be pushed. 
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If open market operations were conducted in conditions of a 
liquidity trap, rates on short term government securities would fall. 
However, recipients of the new cash would not immediately try to convert 
it into other assets but would hold it until rates rose again. Thus, 
the substitution effect, upon which successful monetary policy depends, 
would not occur. The interpretation presented by Friedman that 
speculators would prevent a rise in the rate of interest is not apparent 
from Keynes' discussion of activity by speculators (see Appendix C.) If 
this discussion is the source of Friedman's views, it seems that it 
serves only to document the preferences of investors for short term, 
highly liquid assets. 
Keynes introduced the possibility of a liquidity trap as a limit 
to monetary policy in extreme cases. He never discusses it as a normal 
case, but only under highly unusual circumstances. It is a warning to 
those who would rely on manipulating the money supply as a remedy to 
unemployment under any circumstances. These statements are an expected 
adjunct to the policies of one who encourages and even mandates the use 
of monetary policy as a matter of course. Keynes, who was a student of 
money, foresaw the dangers of placing so potent a tool into the hands of 
those who were not duly warned. To those who sought a simple answer for 
the problems of unemployment: 
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method 
of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, 
but to provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of 
thinking out particular problems ••• (1936, p. 297). 
One danger in "formalising a system" is that we lose track of "the 
necessary reserves and qualifications and adjustments which we shall 
have to make later on" (19 36, p. 29 7). 
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A major topic in Keynes' qualifications is the effect of 
expectations on the behavior of agents. Expectations affect the rate of 
interest by shifting liquidity preference and by changing the elasticity 
of demand for money, so that in one instance monetary policy works 
satisfactorily, while in other seemingly identical circumstances the 
result is not intended. 
Keynes warned against large changes in the money supply which may 
cause uncertainty and therefore increase liquidity preference (1936, p. 
172). Also, expectations are "catching," so that a small change in the 
rate of interest may cause a "mass movement into cash" (1936, p. 172). 
Thus a monetary policy which strikes public opinion as being 
experimental in character or easily liable to change may fail in 
its objective of greatly reducing the long-term rate of interest, 
because M2 may tend to increase almost without limit in response 
to a reduction of r below a certain figure. The same policy, on 
the other hand, may prove easily successful if it appeals to 
public opinion as being reasonable and practicable and in the 
public interest, rooted in strong conviction, and promoted by an 
authority unlikely to be superseded (1936, p. 203). 
Changes in the quantity of money may increase output, and that 
sets up changes in other variables which tend to negate the increase in 
money. If the increase in output causes prices to rise substantially 
(due to inelastic supply), liquidity preference will rise. For 
independent reasons, the MEC may be falling, or the MPC may be falling 
(1936, p. 173). It is not that monetary policy does not work, it is 
that one must consider "complicating factors" and their "possible 
interaction" when "thinking out particular problems" (1936, p. 297). 
Monetary policy directly affects rates on short term government 
securities, but depends on substitution effects to change rates on long 
term debts and other assets 0936, p. 207). A "slip" may occur, 
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diminishing these effects because of response time or reluctance on the 
part of agents due to expectations. Liquidity preference may be 
absolute, or it may be zero. Keynes described the liquidity trap as a 
"limiting case" of which he knew no examples, but he does provide 
examples of a "flattening out" of liquidity preferences in both 
directions. He cites two cases, one in Europe and another in the United 
States, but he refers to these situations as "very abnormal 
circumstances" ( 1936, p. 207). 
An additional problem with the rate of interest being driven to a 
very low level is that it may not be enough to cover the real costs of 
risk and uncertainty associated with the asset. This cost is magnified 
as the term of the ownership of the asset is increased (1936, p. 202). 
Therefore, savers will not choose to hold their wealth in forms that 
provide a negative return (1936, p. 219). 
While high interest rates retard output and employment by limiting 
profitable investment, very low rates are equally dangerous for other 
reasons. Very low interest rates afford no room for manipulation of the 
money supply, since there is a minimum rate that will be acceptable to 
wealth holders for the reasons cited above. This minimum rate has 
proved the "most stable and the least easily shifted" (1936, p. 309). 
Therefore, "a long-term interest rate of (say) 2 per cent. leaves more 
to fear than to hope ••• " (1936, p. 202). 
These possibilities force Keynes to qualify his statements on 
monetary policy. However, it must be noted that he never abandons 
monetary prescriptions but advocates combining them with other methods 
in circumstances that require "more." A complete breakdown of the 
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system, situations in which "confidence" is gone, or a level of output 
very far below average are situations in which monetary measures may 
need some help. "Merely" (meaning only) monetary measures may be 
inadequate. 
If a tolerable level of employment requires a rate of interest 
much below the average rates, ••• it is most doubtful whether it 
can be achieved by merely manipulating the quantity of money 
(19 36, p. 309) • 
• • • the collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital may be so 
complete that no practicable reduction in the rate of interest 
wi 11 be enough. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
This is the aspect of the slump ••• which the economists who 
have put their faith in a "purely monetary" remedy have 
underestimated {1936, p. 316). 
A real problem with dependence on monetary policy alone is that 
fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of capital may be so great that 
changes in the money supply cannot keep the pace {1936, p. 320). The 
volatility of expectations, rather than the impotence of money, is the 
cause of this problem {1936, pp. 164, 219-220, 315, 319). Some of the 
problems of rendering monetary policy more effective can be solved if 
monetary measures are combined with other policies. 
D. Monetary Policy Combined with Fiscal Policy 
In spite of the qualifications he presents, Keynes does advocate 
reliance on monetary policy in normal times, and in this case monetary 
measures are crucial to the ongoing stability of output levels and price 
levels. But, "it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on 
the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an 
optimum rate of investment" {1936, p. 378). 
To mitigate some of the complicating factors, Keynes proposes 
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redistribution measures to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy: 
If the rentier is less prone to spend than the entrepreneur, the 
gradual withdrawal of real income from the former will mean that 
full employment will be reached with a smaller increase in the 
quantity of money and a smaller reduction in the rate of interest 
(1936, P• 290). 
[If the boom has proceeded to the point where the economy is 
saturated with capital goods (MEC • 0), then] The remedy would lie 
in various measures designed to increase the propensity to consume 
by the redistribution of incomes or otherwise; so that a given 
level of employment would require a smaller amount of investment 
to support it (1936, p. 324). 
These redistributions are necessary only when monetary measures to 
increase investment have failed because of the above-mentioned factors. 
The major tool to be used on investment is monetary policy. But where 
investment is "unplanned and uncontrolled" (1936, p. 324), then "there 
is no means of securing a higher level of employment except by 
increasing consumption" (1936, p. 325). 
Keynes says the "under-consumption" theorists have laid "a little 
too much emphasis on increased consumption at a time when there is still 
much social advantage to be obtained from increased investment" (1936, 
p. 325). So, to cover the event that the return from capital is 
secularly declining, Keynes advises that the "wisest course is to 
advance on both fronts at once" (1936, p. 325). "There is room, 




A. Major Differences in the Monetary Theories 
of Friedman and Keynes 
As a result of this investigation, some apparent conclusions may 
be stated. While it is useful to examine the monetary theory of an 
economist, it is more revealing to compare his theory with another on 
specific points. This chapter will make a comparison of Friedman and 
Keynes, especially in light of Friedman's criticisms. 
Friedman's model is characterized by a situation of agents 
adjusting to a change in the nominal supply of money, nominal income, 
and the level of prices. If price anticipations are less than perfectly 
accurate, agents will alter spending in real terms until the 
discrepancies are eliminated. There are two ways the discprepancies are 
resolved: 1) agents adjust their anticipations to the new nominal 
values and readjust their spending; and 2) prices will move so as to 
restore real values to their original levels. These occur 
simultaneously since they are interdependent. 
In the interim period, however, a change 1n the rate of spending 
causes a change in the rate of growth of prices. Because producers do 
not anticipate this change, they mistakenly perceive it as a relative 
price signal, and they alter their output levels to adjust to a new 
situation. If there had been an unexpected rise in prices, producers 
would perceive that the real wage had fallen and that they could 
profitably increase output. If there had been an unexpected fall 1n the 
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rate of change in prices, producers would see this as a price decrease, 
relative to their costs and other prices in the economy. In this case 
they would decrease the level of output. Of course, there had really 
been no relative price change at all. All prices in the economy had 
risen or fallen in concert, and because the producers were not aware of 
this, they mistakenly changed the level of output from the profit 
maximizing level. 
A similar story applies to workers in the economy. They offer 
more labor when their nominal wage is higher than the expected nominal 
wage, and conversely they offer less labor when their nominal wage is 
lower than expected. However, they overestimate their real wage in the 
first case and underestimate it in the second since they do not realize 
that all other prices in the economy had been moving together. They 
were fooled by unanticipated inflation or disinflation. 
Therefore, if all agents had been informed of the exact movement 
of the price level, monetary changes could not have influenced the level 
of output and employment. There is no reason for agents to depart from 
that level of profit-maximizing output or utility-maximizing employment, 
so they must have done so as a result of an error in their calculations. 
The previous state of long-run equilibrium requires that agents 
receive a price signal to alter their level of output or labor supplied. 
The initial result of increased spending is to raise prices, and as a 
result of the price increase output levels will be increased. This must 
be so since output cannot be increased if the economy is at its 
"natural" level of full employment without some price signal to agents. 
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If there is no "excess supply," agents are constrained by their marginal 
costs (for producers) and the marginal disutility of labor (for 
workers), and they must have an increase in price relative to their 
costs to raise output. If both voluntarily alter employment in the same 
direction, then the only explanation is that they must have perceived a 
change in the real wage, and since they require the real wage to move 10 
opposite directions, then at least one or both must have made an error 
as to the exact nature of the real wage. Friedman explains this by 
appealing to different sets of information available to workers and 
firms. Money affects output levels only if there are misperceptions and 
confusion of agents as to what is or is not a change in relative prices. 
Friedman says that his model incorporates flexible prices but not 
"perfectly" flexible prices. Perfectly flexible prices would prevail 
whenever agents fully anticipated changes in the price level (1976a, p. 
223; 1982, p. 415). In this case, monetary changes would be fully 
reflected in the price level and agents would not misperceive price 
level changes to be relative price changes. If prices are not perfectly 
flexible, it must be due to an information deficiency in the economy. 
In Friedman's theory, all prices, including the price of existing 
assets, the price of newly produced goods, and the money wage rate of 
labor, are flexible in the sense that they respond promptly to changes 
in the demand and supply. As prices begin to rise due to an increase in 
spending, agents take the rise 1n their price to be a real increase in 
demand for their "service," so they alter their production or supply of 
labor. This error in calculation results in less than perfectly 
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flexible prices; in this case output responds along with price, and 
delays the full adjustment in the price level. Therefore, it is 
misperceptions which cause prices to be less than perfectly flexible. 
Friedman has observed that, in the early stages of an expansion, 
much or most of the increase in spending will take the forms of an 
increase in output rather than an increase in prices. Observations such 
as this should not obscure the direction of causation in his model: it 
is the increase in the rate of change in prices of output and of the 
money wage rate of labor that cause output and employment to rise in 
the event of a monetary stimulus. Similarly, in the event of a monetary 
restriction, the decrease in spending will cause a decrease in the rate 
of change of prices and nominal wages, and this in turn causes output 
and employment to fall. In particular, the important point is the 
direction of causation, the observation that the decrease in the rate of 
change of prices may be small relative to the decline in output 
notwithstanding. More accurately, it is the price signal combined 
with price misperceptions that explains why monetary events cause 
cyclical fluctuations in Friedman's theory. 
Keynes' model takes an entirely different focus. The existence of 
money is responsible for an economy operating at less than full 
employment, but recession is not caused because agents are fooled by 
unanticipated disinflation. The distinction between relative price 
signals and changes in the general price level is not crucial to Keynes' 
analysis because misinterpretations of price "signals" are not important 
for causing non-optimal changes in output, and in conditions of excess 
supply, price signals are not necessary. Keynes did recognize that at 
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full employment a price misperception might occur as Friedman's model 
predicts (1936, p. 290). But this would be a very temporary state of 
affairs. Producers would not continue at a too-high output level for 
any significant length of time; the producers in Keynes' model are 
aware of their costs and the true relative price. 
At less than full employment, below which Keynes considers that 
the economy is perpetually fluctuating, agents have no problem sorting 
out the relative price change from the general one. In fact, the change 
in the supply of money operates on relative prices of assets by offering 
a real opportunity for profit, which agents quickly seize. Agents build 
into their calculations the expectation of price level changes, and so 
are not fooled by increases or decreases in the rate of inflation. But, 
the economy works well as long as upward changes are indicated; agents 
are always willing to increase the price of the goods or services they 
sell. The problem arises when effective demand is not sufficient to 
maintain full employment. Keynes' agents will not readily reduce their 
prices to maintain that rate of interest which will provide the level of 
effective demand that corresponds to full employment. 
Are Keynes' agents fooled by the decline in spending, thinking 
that their relative price has fallen? Keynes would say that his agents 
are much more aware. They realize that demand has fallen economy-wide; 
and they may realize that if all agents lowered their prices 
simultaneously, full employment could be restored. But they also 
realize that their own individual action will not substantially affect 
the whole economy. If one worker were to lower his wage, his fellow 
workers may not follow--certainly his creditors will not lower their 
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demands from him. If one producer were to lower his price, he does not 
expect that his workers will agree to lower wages and his suppliers to 
lower prices. Therefore, any lowering of wages and prices would be seen 
by the agents as individually harmful, and they perceive this because 
they make calculations of the effect of their actions in reference to 
what others will do to arrive at the final optimal course of action. 
Therefore, due to the interdependence of decisions, and the 
existence of a monetary economy in which nominal values assume the 
center stage because of fixed money obligations, and due to the 
reluctance of agents to suffer relative declines in income, the economy 
may become "constrained" by the failure of the price level to decline 
adequately to maintain full employment. Because of this coordination 
problem, the economy is always prevented from moving toward full 
employment because of agents' reluctance to lower own price; the same 
mechanism operates well when demand exceeds supply, and a price rise is 
called for--agents are always ready to raise price. Therefore, an 
unemployment situation is always on the horizon, since the economy is 
flexible only in one direction. 
Monetary policy is effective even if agents anticipate it. If 
agents will not lower nominal prices to increase real balances and lower 
the rate of interest, then let nominal prices remain stable and raise 
the quantity of money to accomplish the same result! Even if, as in 
The General Theory, workers are aware that their real hourly rewards 
may be falling, the real wage exceeds the marginal disutility of labor 
as long as there exists involuntary unemployment. So, workers are 
concerned with their "balance sheet" and their relative position in 
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terms of income and are reluctant to suffer nominal losses. Monetary 
policy has but one purpose: to reduce the rate of interest to allow 
"spending" for investment goods to increase and thereby to raise 
effective demand. 
A rise in effective demand does not have to operate through price 
signals if there is excess supply. Firms and workers both desire an 
increase in employment, for both benefit. If firms believe that an 
increase in output can be sold they will be willing to increase 
production at the same price, since labor will not demand a higher money 
wage if there is excess supply in that market; also their other costs 
will not increase immediately if there is a condition of excess supply 
throughout the economy. Further, if the productivity of labor is at 
least constant in the short run, there is no reason at all to raise 
prices even after production is underway until finally some 
"bottlenecks" are encountered which raise costs of production. 
Price changes occur in the existing asset market and the money 
market since these supplies are fixed, and those prices adjust 
immediately. However, in the market for new goods which have the 
additional constraint of labor market clearing, prices do not adjust due 
to the coordination problem described above. Therefore, sticky prices 
may exist, due to excess supply in the case of an expansion and due to 
the reluctance of agents to unilaterally lower price in the case of a 
contraction. Sticky prices in the market for new goods occur without 
the necessity of a liquidity trap. In fact, monetary policy affects 
output levels without the necessity of affecting prices of new goods. 
The crucial element is the existence of excess supply. If Keynes' 
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economy were at full employment, it would behave as Friedman's does in 
the event of a monetary stimulus. 
Since Keynes espouses a broad range of assets with relative price 
signals in the existing asset market, it is also not true that Keynes 
relied on a narrow range of assets as Friedman attributes to the 
Keynesians. In fact, it is not necessary to use any such assumption 
once it is realized that the existence of excess supply may explain 
movements in output caused by changes in the quantity of money without 
the necessity of agents being deceived by price level changes. It is 
also not necessary that agents receive a price signal to tempt them to 
increase output. Additional features of this explanation are (with the 
amendments of the 1939 paper) that the real wage may remain constant 
throughout the cycle, that firms and workers are allowed to know the 
true level of the real wage, and that it is not necessary to explain 
away quantity responses before changes in prices have occurred. 
At the very basis of the theories is the definition of 
equilibrium, and this seems to be the point from which most of the 
differences emanate. Friedman's definition of equilibrium is that "all 
anticipations are realized." Under this requirement, it is clear that 
Keynes' definition of an equilibrium state does not qualify. Whereas 
Keynes would maintain that there are any number of equilibrium 
positions, Friedman admits only one. 
Friedman concludes that the long run equilibrium is a hypothetical 
state, but that it is important since it is one toward which the system 
is constantly moving. Even though it may never actually exist, that is 
not relevant since the concept it delivers of the workings of the 
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automatic adjustment process are revealing. The level of output may be 
on either side of this "natural" level, but there are "forces" which 
left alone will move the level of output toward long run equilibrium. 
The natural equilibrium level may not be at "full employment" in the 
strict sense of a definition, however it will be at its "natural II full 
employment level at which agents choose to be if they have all the 
information that they need to make a decision. 
Keynes' equilibrium is one about which the actual level 
fluctuates, but this state is not hypothetical but actual. It is the 
normal state of employment and output. It does not have to be at less 
than full employment, but it is more often than not. While 
less-than-full employment may be an equilibrium state, over-full 
employment is not. The state of equilibrium is one that exists because 
of the nature of a monetary economy that stalls adjustment due to the 
existence of money as a store of wealth and the problems with 
coordinating price level changes to restore demand in real terms. It is 
not subject to full automatic adjustments even in the long run. 
Keynes recognized that Friedman's brand of equilibrium occupied 
the foreground in the classical school, and in fact, was responsible for 
their preoccupation with the long run and their lack of concern for 
pressing short run problems. But this too was one of Keynes' objectives 
in attacking the foundations of economics: long run equilibrium is a 
hypothetical state that should be of little concern to economists. 
The Rate of Interest 
Friedman theorizes that the rate of interest on money equilibrates 
the desires of savers to forego consumption with the desires of 
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borrowers who seek to borrow for investment or consumption. In the 
short run the interest rate may be affected by monetary influences as it 
temporarily disturbs relative price ratios, but the long run position of 
the interest rate is equal to the real yield on capital at the "natural" 
level of full employment. 
Keynes differs substantially from this position. The interest 
rate is the result of the demand for money and the supply of money. 
Investment affects the interest rate only through the effect that it has 
on output and prices. Increases in output and prices raise the demand 
for money which tends to have upward influence on the rate of interest. 
An increased demand for investment (increase in the MEC) would raise 
interest rates indirectly through the above channel, whereas in 
Friedman's model, the rate of interest would be bid up directly as the 
equilibrating variable. 
The rate of interest is affected by changes in the supply of money 
by changing the prices of assets in both Friedman's and Keynes' models. 
The influence of the interest rate on the money market though is more 
direct in Keynes' model as equilibrium in the money market is restored 
through changes in the rate of interest. In Friedman's model, the 
ultimate determinant of equilibrium in the money market is the price 
level. Both agree that an interest rate is not limited to debts, and 
both have a similar idea about what an interest rate represents--the 
price of the asset relative to the price of the "return" it yields. It 
is lowered or raised in the same manner also, as the prices of sources 
are bid up relative to the prices of services. 
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The Transmission Process and Short-Run Fluctuations 
The transmission process envisioned by Friedman and Keynes are 
broadly similar. An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply 
through open market operations sets up a substitution process as savers 
adjust their portfolios to reflect the changed bond prices and yields. 
In doing so, they drive up prices of existing assets. Even the "range'' 
of assets is broadly similar, though Friedman conceptually may go 
further than Keynes in this area; but, Keynes maintained that his main 
concern did not lie with what was called consumption and what was called 
investment (or saving). It is the case that Keynes recognized that 
durable goods and even stocks of commodities could serve as assets in a 
portfolio, in fact anything yielding services of any type. 
As the transmission process continues, there are some notable 
differences. In Keynes' model, wealth holders increase the quantity of 
money demanded as the interest rate falls. Therefore, there is a limit 
to spending occurring before interest rates are bid back up to their 
original level. Further, transmission to demand for consumption goods 
is not accomplished directly through relative price inducements but 
through the stimulus of higher income. That is, Keynes' consumption 
function is an important part of the process. An increase in the output 
of newly-produced durable goods (assets) requires firms to increase 
employment. The representative household now will be able to work more 
hours than previously was the case, so that real labor income will rise. 
This relaxation of the household's income constraint wil permit a higher 
level of consumption spending. Eventually, though, output prices will 
rise, and the demand for money will increase due to real output and 
price rises, causing a higher equilibrium rate of interest. 
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Friedman's model has a different outcome, not because of different 
assumptions about "price" but because of different assumptions about the 
demand for money. In Friedman's description of the transmission 
process, wealth-holders continue to spend the "excess" balances until 
their real balances are at their former level; of course this is only 
possible if the lowering of the interest rate had no influence on the 
demand for real balances. Otherwise, like Keynes' wealth-holders, they 
would have been satisfied with a higher level of real balances at some 
point in the process. The demand for money in Friedman's model is based 
on permanent values, and agents may for a time not realize that their 
permanent income has not risen and will temporarily alter the demand for 
money. As other anticipations adjust, though, the demand for money will 
return to its former level causing a return to the level of real 
spending that existed previously. In Keynes' model, interest rates and 
real income do affect the demand for real balances, while in Friedman's 
model they may affect demand during the adjustment process, but when 
agents "realize" their error, they readjust the demand for money to the 
long run values of income and the interest rate, and thus force a return 
to this level of output. 
Keynes' transmission process continues after the rate of interest 
is lowered as the multiplier effect from the increase in investment 
operates on the market for consumer goods, whereas in Friedman's model 
the effects of money are finished when agents have fully incorporated 
the new price level into their calculations. In Keynes model, after the 
initial stimulus, the market for "money" is equilibrated via the rate of 
interest, but its effects on output are still operating. In Friedman's 
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model, as soon as the money market is equilibrated by the price level, 
the effects are gone. However, in Friedman's model it takes 
considerable time for anticipations to adjust, whereas in Keynes' model, 
the interest rate moves quickly to restore equilibrium in the money 
market. Price rises in Keynes' model are an undesirable but inevitable 
occurrence. To mitigate the effects of rising prices on the rate of 
interest, an ongoing program of monetary management must occur. 
The Demand for Money 
The demand for money in both Friedman's and Keynes' formal 
specifications is very similar. Both specify real income, rates of 
return, the price level, and unspecified variables affecting the 
liquidity of money. While Friedman specifies uncertainty as a variable 
in his demand function, Keynes considers uncertainty a "given" since 
without it there would be no demand for money as an asset. Both 
consider money an asset, and both consider the "exchange" (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 231) services to be the principal function of money and the "source 
of its utility" (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963, p. 221). 
Even though Keynes separates his demand function and Friedman does 
not, Friedman admits to this separation in the basic motives. But, he 
says that wealth holders do not earmark dollars for one or the other 
purpose. Keynes says precisely the same thing. Therefore, this is not 
a difference. 
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The Capital Market 
Friedman does not recognize Keynes' scarcity premium which accrues 
to capital because it is scarce and desirable and not readily produced. 
As capital becomes more abundant in Keynes' model, the scarcity premium 
falls and therefore the inducements to produce it fall. The yield from 
capital falls as more is produced. 
In Friedman's model, he denies that the yield on capital falls as 
more is produced. The stock of capital has a special relation to the 
yield of capital, so that if the yield changes, the stock is adjusted to 
obtain the desired yield (1976a, pp. 299-309). In this way, the yield 
on capital does not depend on the stock in existence but on the demand 
for the services of the capital equipment and the physical output of the 
stock. 
B. Validity of Friedman's Criticisms 
The Liquidity Trap 
From the foregoing chapters it is clear that Keynes did recognize 
the possibility of a liquidity trap, but that it was not the cause of 
unemployment in the long run nor of price rigidity in the short run. As 
demonstrated earlier, output prices are sticky due to excess supply and 
the existence of a monetary economy in which agents are concerned with 
nominal values. Unemployment is caused in the short run by the failure 
of prices and wages to fall. Long run unemployment, in Keynes' model, 
is the result of the failure of prices and wages to be perfectly 
"flexible" even in the long run. Perhaps Keynes did not produce the 
kind of long run equilibrium acceptable to pure theorists, and perhaps 
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Keynes was not overly concerned with the rigor of pure theory, but 
he considered that the long run, if it had to be interpreted as a "pure" 
state of perfectly flexible prices, was not very useful to solve 
economic problems. He maintained that the interest rate could remain 
too high for decades, and certainly that was his cause of "long-run" 
unemployment rather than the other hypothetical "extreme" situation--the 
liquidity trap. If Friedman must criticize Keynes for dependence on a 
liquidity trap, he should clarify by saying that Keynes saw!!£ 
hypothetical long run situations if prices are flexible: one the 
liquidity trap, the other full employment, neither of which were 
issues that economists should be overly concerned with since they were 
not "usual." 
The short run liquidity trap that Friedman described was a 
possible result of Keynes' discussions about speculators (see Appendix 
C). But, it did not impact the transmission mechanism and was unrelated 
to money's role in the economy. In fact, Keynes claims that there is no 
obstacle to changing prices on short term debt that is "liquid." 
Wealth Effect and Saving 
Friedman himself acknowledges that absolute liquidity preference 
would exist at interest rates "approaching zero," (1976a, p. 316), but 
he sees this as never occurring, even theoretically, due to the wealth 
effect. Friedman's individuals "save" to attain a desired balance 
sheet. Keynes' individuals sav~ for many reasons: to enjoy future 
consumption or to build up a great fortune or just for the pure pleasure 
of not spending (pp. 107-108). In Friedman's model there is a limit or 
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a "desired" balance sheet. In Keynes' model there is not some 
predetermined stock of wealth. Saving still occurs even if assets grow 
in real terms due to falling prices. Therefore, in Friedman's model, 
the "wealth" effect will be operational, but in Keynes' model, there may 
be no desired balance sheet and no point at which "saving" stops 
altogether. Keynes does mention, however, the wealth effect on 
consumption (1936, pp. 57, 84, 92-95, 319), and he does concede that the 
propensity to consume will change as wealth increases, but he never 
considers that the propensity to consume would be equal to one when 
wealth reaches some level as Friedman does. 
Even if one assumes that Keynes incorporates changes in the 
propensity to consume in certain circumstances of increases in wealth in 
his theory of adjustment to changes in demand, the next question is: 
would a falling price level be up to the task of reaching this state of 
wealth? Since Keynes considered perfectly flexible wages and prices 
that fell without limit to be "extreme," it is doubtful that it could 
achieve this level of wealth if the same mechanism could not even 
restore the money supply to the level needed to lower the interest rate 
sufficiently. Prices would have to fall even further to achieve the 
"wealth" effect since wealth is less important as a determinant of 
consumption but the money supply is the major determinant in the rate of 
interest. There is the additional consideration that the percent of 
wealth affected in this manner would be small. 
According to Friedman, the wealth effect is always operational, 
even if a liquidity trap restrains a fall in the interest rate. Keynes 
considered the liquidity trap a "limiting" factor and would have not 
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have considered that in this improbable circumstance the wealth effect 
could have much influence either. Though Friedman sees that the 
"wealth" effect of falling prices encourages "spending," Keynes saw the 
opposite tendency associated with a falling wage and price level. In 
this case, the individual would want to "wait out the decline," usually 
by holding money or some highly liquid asset, inducing "saving" rather 
than spending. Only when all expectations were that the "bottom" had 
been reached, would there be any impetus to spending (1936, pp. 
263-265). 
C. An Alternative Explanation of Unemployment 
in the General Theory 
Some explanation must be offered as to why there is unemployment 
when there is an obvious route to full employment through price level 
changes. The explanation must lie in the failure of prices to move 
adequately. Friedman sees a relative price signal mechanism 
characterized by price misperceptions as the only way that changes in 
the quantity of money can operate to induce output changes since the 
economy always starts from a position of "natural" full employment. 
Friedman's interpretation of the absence of this mechanism in Keynes' 
theory is the liquidity trap which prevents relative price changes from 
inducing output changes. He says that once Keynes' followers recognized 
that the liquidity trap could not be justified empirically they relied 
on a narrow range of assets to restrict the price changes only to those 
assets recorded in financial markets, so that their mechanism had to 
operate through interest rates, and thus some element of short-run price 
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rigidity for goods could be theorized. Friedman sees the only other 
plausible model as his theory in which money affects a broad range of 
assets through substitution in all markets, and therefore assures that 
the level of output changes only in response to price changes because of 
the existence of price misperceptions. 
Friedman does not recognize a fourth possibility: that there may 
be market clearing in the market for existing assets and money but 
excess supply in the market for newly produced consumer and investment 
goods. This fourth model would allow relative price changes in the 
market for existing assets (and therefore interest rate changes), and 
would intensify the effectiveness of changes in the supply of money, 
since money in this model would assume a greater position than a medium 
of exchange--it would form the barrier to market clearing and the the 
best weapon against unemployment. 
In this model then, prices are flexible in the market for existing 
assets but sticky in the output market and in the labor market. The 
model allows for price increases (decreases) in the market for existing 
assets to increase (decrease) the demand for newly-produced assets. If, 
for example, a decrease in demand occurs under conditions of full 
employment, output prices and nominal wage rates will be sticky due to 
the coordination problem in a monetary economy. Accordingly, the 
decrease in spending will cause output and employment, rather than 
prices, to fall. Neither a narrow range of assets nor a liquidity trap 
are necessary to explain why prices are not flexible in the short run. 
In this fourth model, if the economy is in recession and 
experiences an increase in spending, there will be no pressure for 
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output prices and nominal wages to increase because excess supply 
exists. Firms and workers will be willing to expand output and 
employment at the existing price level and the level of nominal wages, 
and at the existing real wage rate. In particular, price misperceptions 
are not necessary to explain why short-run (cyclical) fluctuations in 
output and employment occur. It is the contention of this study that 
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KEYNES ON INVESTMENT BY FIRMS 
Keynes did not consider cases of "finns" making these decisions to 
invest based on alternative returns to various assets. Firms are a form 
of productive activity for their owners by producing that good which is 
its business. A finn will expand to the limit of its ability to secure 
financing to increase production of its own goods. Firms cannot be 
speculators in asset markets since they have no "income" which could 
either be consumed or saved. Income accrues only to the owners of the 
firm who are individuals. The desire for quick returns is not 
characteristic of the behavior of investment by firms. 
Whether or not firms make this decision to invest based on the 
relative prices and yields of alternative assets, as certainly 
individuals do, is important given the volume of investment purchases 
undertaken by firms in the economy. If, as argued above, firms are 
single-mindedly directed to increasing their own business, then any 
profitable opportunity to increase the scale of production would result 
in increased profits for their stockholders. A profitable opportunity 
would arise when the marginal efficiency of capital exceeded the rate of 
interest. But, given this assumption about the behavior of firms, they 
would already have exploited such opportunities to the maximum extent 
subject to the financial constraint imposed by the prevailing rate of 
interest and the debt to equity ratio of the firm. It is only through 
the relaxing of this constraint and the simultaneous lowering of the 
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rate of interest that will allow firms to increase the rate of 
investment. Once this is accomplished, then firms hold no reservations 
or expectations as individuals do. They are not portfolio holders, but 
they are "held" by their stockholders. 
The transmission process associated with an open-market stimulus 
would affect firms in the following way: the prices of government 
securities and existing assets are driven up by the transmission process 
described above; since common stock is one of the assets in savers' 
portfolios, its price will be driven up also. The reason is that savers 
will purchase more of the existing shares of common stock because its 
earnings to price ratio (its yield) is high compared to government 
bonds. But, when the price of the stock rises, the total equity held by 
stockholders will have risen in value since there are the same number of 
shares with higher market prices. This increase in equity lowers the 
debt to equity ratio for the firm and effectively relaxes the existing 
financial constraint. Now the firm may borrow or issue new shares of 
stock to raise funds for expansion, both methods raising the debt to 
equity ratio. Borrowing would seem to be the preferred method since the 
"cost" of funds is now cheaper due to the general lowering of all 
alternative "yields." An additional inducement, and an important one, 
is that the marginal efficiency of capital has risen relative to the 
interest rate for the firm as well as for the individual investor, for 
at this point, the supply price of newly-produced assets has not risen. 
This makes it easier for the firm to invest in new capital, at the same 
time that the individual investor finds it profitable to purchase new 
capital goods as a store of wealth. 
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Keynes recognizes the relationship between the price of shares and 
investment by firms • 
• • • a high quotation for existing equities involves an increase 
in the marginal efficiency of the corresponding type of capital 
and therefore has the same effect (since investment depends on a 
comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate 
of interest) as a fall in the rate of interest (1936, footnote, 
P• 151). 
It is interesting to note that firms are not "unconstrained" in 
their activities. Individuals are constrained by their wealth and their 
rate of saving out of income, while firms are constrained by their debt 
to equity ratios. Firms whose debt to equity ratios are high must pay a 
high rate of interest to borrow, due to the high risk which lenders 
assign the the borrower, and potential purchasers of new issues 
investigate the debt position of firms. Therefore, the transmission 
process is critical for this situation, especially if there is an 
economy-wide problem that firms are illiquid. Firms will have a mandate 
to invest in new capital equipment due to the transmission process. 
This investment will take place not due to portfolio management within 
firms, but due to the special nature of firms as organizations of 
production in which persons hold ownership and from which they demand a 
return. Although there are cases of firms purchasing other firms, this 
is not a situation of portfolio management but a substitution on the 
supply side. If firms behaved as individuals by saving and holding a 
portfolio of assets not related to their business, including equities of 
other firms, they would find themselves in the strange situation of 
competing with their owners for the available returns and of providing 
funds for their competitors in the form of loans and equities. 
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APPENDIX B 
FRIEDMAN'S VIEWS ON THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MONEY ON FIRMS 
Firms store money as a productive tool--meeting payrolls, 
purchasing supplies, and the like; therefore, the cost of holding money 
to accomplish these things (which is the opportunity cost of holding 
interest bearing assets) is "highly relevant" to the bu~iness enterprise 
(1982, p. 41). Another important set of variables is whatever affects 
the "productivity of money balances," though Friedman and Schwartz do 
not specify, important ones would be the rate of inflation and the ease 
of obtaining short term loans. 
The demand for money will vary from firm to firm according to the 
scale of the enterprise, but this scale is a "variable that an 
enterprise can determine to maximize returns, since it can acquire 
additional capital through the capital market" (1982, p. 41). The only 
constraint that the firm would be under is the real return on capital as 
related to the real return demanded by suppliers of wealth. If the 
return on capital were greater than the rate of interest, the firm would 
acquire more of it, "demanding" a greater level of capital, and 
therefore driving up the equilibrium rate of interest. In the same 
manner, if the return on capital fell, the firm would sell capital, thus 
driving down the rate of interest. In this way, the real rate of return 
on capital is always equated to the rate of interest. 
If a firm made wise decisions about purchasing the most productive 
capital whose rate was at least equal to the rate of interest, it would 
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be able to expand to any size, provided the economy possessed adequate 
capacity to produce this productive capital. There is no financial 
constraint on the ability of firms to invest. 
What effect does the short term lowering of interest rates have on 
"investment" by firms? In Friedman's model, if firms "invest" whenever 
the interest rate is lowered by purely monetary means, they borrow to 
purchase capital goods to expand their scale of production. When they 
attempt to purchase these assets, the suppliers demand a higher price 
for them since the former rate of output!!! equilibrium. A higher 
price for the asset means that the expected return on the asset will 
have fallen. In fact, if prices of assets move up uniformly, no new 
investment will be possible merely because interest rates are lowered. 
The transmission process equates returns on assets, real ones as well as 
financial ones, so that there is no advantage to the firm in 
"investing." 
The lowering of interest rates cannot have an effect on investment 
unless suppliers of these goods are willing to sell them at the same 
prices. If the transmission process affects output by affecting the 
willingness of suppliers to increase production due to a higher price, 
then unless firms miscalculate the price of the assets they are 
purchasing, some other explanation must be offered as to why there is an 
increase in investment by firms. 
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APPENDIX C 
KEYNES' VIEWS ON NEW INVESTMENT 
Organized markets 
Since a person may purchase existing assets or purchase new ones 
with his savings, a new asset will not be produced unless the aggregate 
level of savings rises. Otherwise, only transfers of wealth will take 
place. Therefore, saving must be equal to current new investment. (pp. 
81-82) It follows that unless it is attractive to purchase new wealth, 
therefore ordering its production, there will only be a reshuffling of 
portfolios. This situation will not lead to an increase in the rate of 
investment and will do nothing to increase output. Insofar as wealth 
owners choose existing assets over newly produced ones, investment in 
new capital assets is correspondingly reduced. 
Wealth owners' preferences are guided by their desires for yield 
from an investment. Part of this yield, as described above, is the 
liquidity premium. Keynes saw this desire for liquidity as operating to 
reduce the market transferrence mechanism from the market for existing 
assets to the market for newly produced assets. The organized markets, 
which facilitate transfers of existing assets among traders and which 
facilitate the issuing of new securities, operate from both sides to 
promote and at the same time discourage investment in new capital. 
With the separation between ownership and management which 
prevails to-day and with the development of organised investment 
markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in, which 
sometimes facilitates investments but sometimes adds greatly to 
the instability of the system (1936, p. 150). 
192 
The problem is caused by the fact that an investor has more 
choices than previously. He may either purchase a new capital asset to 
employ in producing goods, or he may purchase an existing asset in an 
organized market. He will do so according to which form of investment 
carries the higher expected return. If he chooses to purchase an 
existing asset on an organized market, and if his purchase does not 
perform as expected, he has the option of selling or trading for 
another. On the other hand, if he chooses a capital asset that is not 
traded, he is generally committed to the investment for a longer period. 
Therefore, the existence of organized markets lends a great deal of 
liquidity to the purchase of some assets, and in doing so, elevates 
their yields. 
But the daily revaluation of the Stock Exchange, though they are 
primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments between 
one individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive influence 
on the rate of current investment. For there is no sense in 
building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which 
a similar existing enterprise can be purchased ••• (1936, p. 
151). 
Some problems with encouraging long term investment are solved by 
the existence of organized markets: 
For if there exist organized investment markets ••• an investor 
can legitimately encourage himself with the idea that the only 
risk he runs is that of a genuine change in the news over the 
near future ••• which is unlikely to be very large (1936, PP• 
152-153). 
Thus investment becomes reasonably "safe" for the individual 
investor over short periods •••• Investments which are "fixed" 
for the community are thus made "liquid" for the individual ( 1936, 
P• 153). 
Keynes details a host of reasons that investment may be curtailed 
by the existence of these organized markets. The markets become a game 
for speculators who play desiring quick profits. The game turns 
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investment into a speculative exercise 1n which the players attempt to 
outguess each other rather than making decisions with regard to long 
term returns on their investment purchases. Since the "investors" are 
not well-acquainted with the businesses they are "purchasing," the day 
to day fluctuations guide their trading which are generally unrelated to 
the long term potential of the firm. These short term investors shun 
assets which represent long term committments that will not turn a quick 
profit. The long term investors are discouraged from borrowing to 
purchase capital assets since there exists an alternative way to earn 
quicker returns at a much lower risk due to the high liquidity premium 
(1936, pp. 154-156). 
Keynes sees a "dilemma" which plagues modern organized investment 
markets: 
If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, 
this might seriously impede new investment so long as alternative 
ways in which to hold his savings are available to the 
individual. This is the dilemma. So long as it is open to the 
individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money, 
the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be 
rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who does 
not manage the capital assets and knows very little about them), 
except by organizing markets wherein those assets can be easily 
realised for money (1936, p. 160). 
The transferrence from the market for existing assets to the 
market for new assets is thus somewhat strained by the high liquidity 
premiums that attach to traded assets, especially to already-produced 
assets. The transmission process operates on a structure of yields, 
which is altered by bidding up the prices of existing assets. The fixed 
supply of existing assets forces the entire change to be borne in their 
prices. Prices of newly produced assets rise only as their production 
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increases due to the existence of bottlenecks in the production process 
(1936, p. 300). When wealth holders regard this situation, they will 
see that aside from the increased liquidity premium of already existing 
traded assets there is an additional appreciation premium from their 
purchase. Therefore, the demand for newly produced assets must always 
"lag behind" the demand for existing assets. 
The price of new capital assets is governed by the conditions of 
supply. New capital assets which are traded in organized markets would 
command a higher price due to their liquidity premiums. But the 
suppliers of these assets make no distinction as to whether they are 
producing traded assets or not. At prices higher than equilibrium, 
suppliers would be willing to supply more new assets. But the demand 
for assets at this price is limited to the ones that are traded. 
Therefore the incentive of high prices on traded assets keeps suppliers 
of these assets in a condition of excess supply. The transmission 
process provides the only method by which effective demand can increase 
in the market for newly produced goods. The only method by which demand 
for newly-produced goods (traded as well as non-traded) can increase is 
through the increase in the price of substitute goods and a fall in the 
cost of acquiring these goods. 
Keynes recognized this interdependence between markets, and the 
importance of whether goods are traded or non-traded. Traded goods 
always command higher prices, and since they set the standard for all 
newly produced goods, the inevitable result is excess supply in the 
market for newly produced goods due to an equilibrium price that is too 
high. 
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For there is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost 
greater than an existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there 
is an inducement to spend on a new project what may seem an 
extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange 
at an immediate profit. Thus, certain classes of investment are 
governed by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock 
Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, rather than by the 
genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur (1936, p. 
151) (emphasis added). 
What did Keynes propose to do about this matter? 
The only radical cure ••• would be to allow the individual no 
choice between consuming his income and ordering the production of 
the specific capital-asset which ••• impresses him as most 
promising •••• 
• • • that would avoid the disastrous, cumulative and far-reaching 
repercussions of its being open to him ••• to spend his income 
neither on one nor the other (p. 161). 
Long Term Rates of Interest 
Another limit to new investment may be that the transferrence 
between markets is limited in that long term rates of interest may 
respond imperfectly to changes in short term rates. Keynes says that 
the central bank is always able to alter the price on short term 
securities through its open market operations (1936, p. 197). In this 
case, the long term rates will have to follow from the substitution 
process. Since the rate of interest on short term securities is given 
by the inverse of the price of these securities and the rate on long 
term securities is given by the price on them, then whenever the price 
of short term securities is bid up by the central bank, then savers will 
search for better yields in the asset markets. After all short term 
yields are affected in this manner, savers should then turn to long term 
bonds as a substitute investment. 
As savers purchase more long term debt, they bid up prices on this 
debt and lower its yield. Keynes sees a problem with this transmission 
process. 
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If the monetary authority were prepared to deal ••• in debts of 
all maturities, and ••• of varying risk, the relationship 
between the complex rates of interest and the quantity of money 
would be direct (1936, p. 205). 
The monetary authority often tends to concentrate upon short-term 
debts and to leave the price of long-term debts to be influenced 
by belated and imperfect reactions from the price of short-term 
debts ••• (1936, p. 206). 
Where these qualifications operate, the directness of the relation 
between the rate of interest and thequantity of money is 
correspondingly modified (1936, p. 206). 
Where ••• open market operations have been limited to the 
purchase of very short-dated securities, the effect may ••• have 
but little reaction on the much more important long-term rates of 
interest (p. 197). 
The long term rates are critical for investment in new capital 
goods. Since the nature of investment in new capital must involve a 
delayed return, changes in long term rates can determine the 
profitability of an investment. These are the rates which matter for 
calculating the marginal efficiency of capital and are an argument in 
the demand function for new capital assets. 
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